


THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



FEBRUARY, 1935

SHOOTERS' NUMBER

THE MUSIC OF *Skeet* GUNS

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FROM Maine to California and back again, from the Lakes to the Gulf, rolls the echo of Skeet guns. The country has taken up Skeet—and the sound of the guns is music to the ears of all who like to shoot.

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"DEVIL DOGS OF THE AIR"

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Cosmopolitan's First for Warner Bros.



STARS laugh at danger as they turn planes into kindling wood to help Director Lloyd Bacon top the thrills of "Here Comes the Navy."




HILARITY is the order of the day when Frank McHugh blazes into action with his big battery of laugh guns.


ICE-BOX TEST fails to cool ardor of hot-shot Cagney after he gets his first eyeful of Pat's favorite girl friend.



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THE THEATRE IN YOUR NEIGHBOR-
HOOD WILL FEATURE THIS HIT SOON.**

THIRTY YEARS AGO



MARINE CORPS RIFLE TEAM—1905

Sitting, left to right: Corporal Bill, Sgt. H. M. Buckley, Capt. F. E. Evans, 1st Lieut. D. C. McDougal, Gy-Sgt. Charles Clark, Sgt. Peter Costello. Standing, left to right—Pvt. Joseph DeLoach, Pvt. Simon Scott, Unknown, Pvt. James Markey, Corporal Louis Burkhardt, Sgt. Major T. F. Hayes, Sgt. John McP. Ketcham, 1st Sgt. Richard Howard, Gy-Sgt. Peter Lund, Gy-Sgt. Henry Baptist, Sgt. Henry Scott (Coach).

SHOOTERS' NUMBER

■ The staff settled on the dedication of this number in order to do partial justice to the pioneers of our small arms business. For years there have been certain officers in the Marine Corps who have given long and tedious hours toward the elevation of this vital phase of our professional life. This duty has been one of those things which has been popular with all, but one which only a few officers and men were energetic and persistent enough to keep on top.

A quarter of a century ago such names as Dr. Scott, "Bill" Elliott, Jack Dooley, "Bill" Harllee, "Cal" Matthews, "Moc" McDougal, "Charlie" Lyman, "Tommy" Holcomb, "Billy" Fay, "Pat" Evans, Ralph Keyser, Joe Jackson, John Andrews, Bill Fragner, Pete Lund, Henry Baptist, "Jimmy" Markey, Tom Joyce, Morris Fisher, Calvin Lloyd, Victor Czgeka and Freddie Wahlstrom all composed the roll-call of the pioneers of our small arms school.

From the teachings of this old school of rifle shots came the young school, composed of such well knowns as Harry L. Smith, Dulty Smith, "Tots" Humphrey, "Bill" Ashurst, "Charlie" Price, Pete Conradt, Ray Presnell and "Bill" Whaling.

The Association hopes that this younger school will run true to form and develop still a younger school, who will carry on with the same devotion and energy that was shown by those before their time.

The front cover of the GAZETTE represents an A-Target as a background and, as indicated, the shot group composes the photographs of the captains of our several National Match Teams. Those whose heads touch the black are the team captains whose teams won a National Match. The others in the "4" or "3" rings are those whose teams came in second or third. Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Smith was given the pinwheel position because the 1921 team, of which he was captain, carried off more honors than any team we ever sent to Camp Perry. In cases where the same officer was captain of one or more teams, because of limited space, a duplication of photographs could not be used.

This number is dedicated as the "SHOOTERS' NUMBER," with the hope that its text and illustrations will be an additional urge to our younger officers to become interested in this vital phase of their career.

—EDITOR.

PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Vol. 19

FEBRUARY, 1935

No. 1

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Cover by Editor

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PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS

The Marine Corps Association

ORGANIZED APRIL 25, 1913, AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

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OBJECT OF ASSOCIATION—"The Association is formed to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members; to provide for the improvement of their professional attainments; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; and to increase the efficiency of its members."—Section 2, Article 1, of the Constitution.

CONDITIONS OF MEMBERSHIP—Active membership open to officers of the United States Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve and to former officers of honorable service with annual dues of \$3.00. Associate membership, with annual dues of \$3.00 open to officers of the Army, Navy and Organized Militia and to those in civil life who are interested in the aims of the Association. Honorary members shall be elected by unanimous vote of the Board of Officers.

Associate membership, with annual dues of \$2.00, including yearly subscription to THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, open to enlisted men of the Marine Corps of the first pay grade.

CONTRIBUTIONS—The GAZETTE desires articles on any subject of interest to the Marine Corps. Articles accepted will be paid for at the GAZETTE'S authorized rates. Non-members of the Association as well as members may submit articles. In accepting articles for publication, the GAZETTE reserves the right to revise or rearrange articles where necessary.

All communications for the Marine Corps Association and THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE should be addressed to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington. Checks for payment of dues should be made payable to the Secretary-Treasurer.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. C. FEGAN, U.S.M.C., *Editor*

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MR. MEMBER! BE SURE WE HAVE YOUR LATEST ADDRESS

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Vol. 19

FEBRUARY, 1935

No. 1

"MARK" 44

A sketch of 44 years of rifle shooting

CAPTAIN ORIN H. WHEELER
U. S. Marine Corps

INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1890, records of target practice are exceedingly scarce. It is believed that the earliest record is that shown in reference (Samuel Tucker, 1777-1781), wherein the entries show that on April 8th, 1779, 3 pounds and one-half of powder was expended in exercise at Nantasket Roads, and during the period of 19 April, 1779 to 10 September, 1779, expended at Sea, 16 pounds of powder and one-half box Musquett Balls, and on September 10, 1779, 12 pounds of powder, 4 boxes and one-half of Musquett Balls, signed by "Seth Baxter, Capten of Marines."

The above entries evidently refer to target practice with the musket since Musquett Balls and powder were expended.

■ During the years 1890 to 1900 the records show very little regarding target practice in the Marine Corps. Entry in 1891 briefly states that long-range target practice and gallery practice was in vogue. In 1897 we find a little more detail giving the sharpshooter and marksman course of qualification, and during this year comments were that the instruction continued with zeal and earnestness. Qualifications had increased considerably over what they were in the past few years. The Marines, at this time, were armed with the .45 caliber Lee-Springfield rifle but were being gradually re-armed with the Navy 6 mm rifle. This resulted in the target practice continuing with the .45 Lee-Springfield rifle, since the new Navy rifle ammunition was about double in cost. These new Navy rifles were issued to shore stations, while detachments aboard ship are supplied from the ships' stock, which resulted in marine detachments going aboard ship and leaving ships' duty without equipment.

It is interesting to note that the records show 48 officers and enlisted men qualified as sharpshooter and marksman this year at the school of application. It was necessary that these men qualify with 80 per cent in their best four full scores in the gallery and on the range, after which they were transferred to a station which afforded facilities (longer ranges) for qualification for classification. Of interest here is the statement that the target practice season ends on October 31st.

There were many difficulties noted in the new rifle. Tests provide the cartridge was not suited to the rifle. It was a smokeless cartridge and the price \$37.00 per thousand—very high for target practice.

In 1898 our first Marine Corps rifle team was organized to compete at Sea Girt, N. J., for the Hilton Trophy. How-



MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT
GEORGE F. ELLIOTT, U.S.M.C.

The grand old man of our small arms shooting.

ever, the war with Spain disturbed the proceedings and the team was disbanded and the personnel transferred for duty at the front.

The qualification course being fired necessitates the firer firing two or more full scores at 200, 300, 500 and 600 yards, taking the two best such scores that must average 84 per cent of the aggregate, or taking the best two scores together with skirmish (if any) averaging 74 per cent of the aggregate; this was the sharpshooter course. A marksman had to average 74 per cent over the sharpshooter course or 64 per cent of the aggregate as laid down in the sharpshooter course to include the skirmish run. A first class had the same conditions as sharpshooter with an average of 64 or 54 per cent, respectively. Second class had to average 54 to 44 per cent, respectively, and all those failing to qualify as second class were third class. At this time the Marine Corps was greatly handicapped by having unsuitable ranges at the various posts and stations. There were some posts having ranges which exceeded 600 yards, allowing them to fire 800 and 1,000. At such posts the sharpshooter course was different than at those where only short ranges were available, and an average of 76 per cent or 70 per cent of the aggregate including skirmish run was the qualifying score on these longer ranges. Marksmanship qualification was under the same course with a 70 and 64 per cent, respectively. During this period we find pistol target practice being

stressed a great deal for both officers and men. Records show that 760 men fired record this year, 247 qualifying as sharpshooter and 189 as marksmen.

This year a vital change was recommended by the Adjutant and Inspector's Department, and that was that a man retain his arms and equipment originally issued throughout his enlistment. Sight covers were also provided for the new rifles.

In the battle of Cuzco, June 11, 1898, a very fine test was made of the new rifle over the longer ranges, and it was found to be very deadly at from 600 to 1,100 yards.

Rifle practice had progressed in the Corps this year and in the opening of 1899 season Major C. H. Lauchheimer, U. S. M. C., was appointed inspector of rifle practice.

The Marine Corps encountered another difficulty relative to the firing of the qualification course, in that the new Lee rifle had a longer range than the old type, and the heavy bullet made it impracticable for gallery firing. Reduced weight of the bullet and charge was finally resorted to to overcome this difficulty. Many protests were registered from citizens living in and around the ranges because of the long range of this rifle.

The Marine Corps was now taking an active interest in rifle matches and Major Lauchheimer attended the New Jersey State matches at Sea Girt, N. J., observing the Hilton Trophy competitions and obtaining data relative to methods of holding rifle competitions. The Governor of New Jersey very kindly placed the Sea Girt range at the disposal of the Marine Corps for the purpose of qualifying marines. Small arms firing regulations were revised and a higher standard of qualification established.

The progress of shooting remained more or less unchanged until 1900, when a different type of rifle, the Krag-Jorgenson, was issued to the Corps replacing the Lee. Naturally this resulted in retarding target practice due to shortage of this type of ammunition suitable for gallery practice.

Several new ranges were completed at various posts and stations in 1901, including up to 600 yards. Furthermore, this year the qualifications dropped considerably due to three elements: (1) the new rifles (2) raising the standard of qualification, and (3) the transfer of experienced men to the Far East, where they did not fire the qualification course. However, this year marked an increase in revolver practice, 386 out of 750 men qualifying as first class revolver shots.

This year a team was organized and sent to Sea Girt, N. J., to compete in the Hilton Trophy, consisting of two officers and 14 enlisted men. Captain Lewis C. Lucas, U. S. M. C., was in charge of the team and Second Lieutenant Thomas Holcomb, Jr., U. S. M. C., a firing member. On August 24th, Major Lauchheimer arrived and relieved Captain Lucas in charge of the team.

The course fired in the Hilton Match is of interest. Three pool shots at each range on pool targets were allowed each competitor before record firing. The course itself was 200 yards standing, 500 and 600 yards prone, with the admonition that the head of the firer must be toward the target and slings used. The Marine Corps team placed sixth in this match; the District of Columbia team winning the match. From a study of this match it was determined that the results of the Marine Team were due somewhat to the fact that they were firing regulation issued ammunition, which was approximately two years old and not smokeless powder. Investigation further disclosed that the high teams in the match used specially prepared hand-made ammunition with a three-groove, lubricated bullet. However, in a tryout for the International Team, Lieutenant Holcomb stood in 11th place, ten

men being selected, which tends to show that our shooters were on a par with those of more experience. It is easily seen from this that the Marine Corps was beginning to take a great deal of interest in the promotion of target practice.

In 1902 a team was again organized to compete at Sea Girt in the Hilton Trophy with Lieutenant Holcomb in charge. Other individual matches were opened up to the individual team members this year and we find four marines in the Wimbledon match, over a 1,000-yard course. This being the first long distance match entered in by marines was no doubt the reason for the poor showing they made in the match, having placed 23rd, 24th, 26th and 32nd. Again the Marine Corps Team placed sixth in the Hilton Trophy Match; New York winning. In the Company Team Match, three five-man teams were entered from the marine squad and they placed 7th, 8th and 13th, respectively. In the Regimental Team Match, we find 21 six-man teams entered. The Marines entered two teams which placed 11th and 13th respectively; the 4th New Jersey Team winning the match. The Marine Hilton Trophy Team fired in the Interstate Military Match, placing in 6th place, with Lieutenant Holcomb leading the Marine team with high individual score. In the Skirmish Team Match, which was also a six-man team, two Marine teams were entered, placing 2nd and 7th, respectively. It is of great interest to note that the first Marine team in this match won a prize of \$25.00, the first prize to be won by a Marine Corps Team.

In the President's Match Lieutenants Holcomb and Dewey placed 7th and 23rd, respectively among forty-nine competitors. Lieutenant Holcomb won a prize of \$5 in this match.

This year the Marines used specially hand-loaded ammunition from Frankford Arsenal. Several of the competing teams this year dropped the cannellured lubricated bullet and used a plain bullet. The teams using the plain bullets placed much higher than those using the old type. This information was not generally known until after the matches were over.

Lieutenant Holcomb again tried out for a place on the International Team, placing 4th and accompanying the team to Ottawa, Canada. The British won by a margin of twelve points over the United States, who were in second place. Lieutenant Holcomb made high individual score in this match, winning a gold medal and becoming the world's champion long distance shot by virtue thereof.

In 1903 Congress appropriated the sum of \$2,500.00 for a National Trophy. The Marines placed in 6th place in this year's match, each team member receiving a medal and the team being entitled to a \$50.00 prize. However, the rules of the match specified that the prize money was to be allotted to the Army and Militia, nothing being mentioned relative to the Navy and Marine Corps. Therefore, the Comptroller ruled the Marines were not entitled to the cash.

Lieutenant Holcomb was selected as a shooting member of the Palma Trophy Team, which competed at Bisley, England, with Great Britain, Canada, France, Norway, Australia and Natal. The United States won this match.

Up to this time the Marine Corps had no one especially familiar with coaching methods to assist them in their various yearly competitions, so it was deemed essential that a coach be found who had the necessary qualifications, if the Marine Corps expected to make any kind of showing against the old-timers in the shooting game. This man was found in the person of one Doctor Samuel I. Scott, a dentist, then living at Sandy Springs, Mary-

land. Doctor Scott had fired on the District of Columbia teams back in the 80's, knew all the ins and outs, and at that time there were many. Competitors not being averse to running a rat-tail file down the muzzle of another competitor's rifle, if he should leave it unguarded for a time, or even to pouring acid down the bore. Doctor Scott was a very colorful figure, having been born in Montgomery County, Maryland, 12 November, 1848, which made him 56 years old in 1903, when he enlisted in the Marine Corps as a private. His enlistment started on April 7, 1903, and he was assigned duty as a clerk in the Adjutant and Inspector's Department, Marine Corps Headquarters, until such time as the rifle team went into training. Doctor Scott spent three summers with the


Scott (Doctor), as coach, to compete in the National Match at Fort Riley, Kansas, and in the Dryden Trophy at Sea Girt, N. J. The Marine Corps team placed 5th in the National Match. One officer, First Lieutenant Giles Bishop, Jr., U. S. M. C., was a shooting member of the team.

This year the National Match course covered two and five hundred rapid fire, two, six, eight and one thousand slow fire with twice over the skirmish run.

The winning team was entitled to a cash prize of \$100, with a medal to each member.

Three Marines won places in the National Individual this year.

The 1905 National Match team was organized under



MARINE CORPS RIFLE TEAM, 1931. HOW MANY DO YOU KNOW?

Marine Corps Team, being finally discharged on September 30, 1905, with the rank of gunnery sergeant. He proved a very able coach and imparted much valuable knowledge to the various members of the Marine Corps Teams.

In 1904 there were several tests made relative to firing over water which resulted in a modification of the then range estimation system. There was no change of note in the qualification course. Up to this time insignia had not been issued to officers and men qualifying until the annual report of the inspector of target practice had been made, but beginning this year, reports were submitted upon a completion of firing and insignia was issued at once.

A Marine Corps Team was organized with Captain Rufus H. Lane, U. S. M. C., as team captain and Private

Captain Frank E. Evans, U. S. M. C., as team captain and Gunnery Sergeant Scott as team coach. They entered the matches at Sea Girt, N. J., placing 4th. This was a somewhat better showing than had been made by the Marine team heretofore, but the Marines were still handicapped by a lack of long range facilities at their various posts, which would enable them to get long range practice throughout the year. Captain Evans and First Lieutenant D. C. McDougal were shooting members of this team. Lieutenant McDougal was high team member in the match with a score of 401.

Two members of the team squad won medals in the National Individual out of a total of 649 competitors. First Sergeant John M. Ketcham, U. S. M. C., placed second in the match.

The Marine team won the Regimental Skirmish Match with the highest score ever made over that course. This was their second consecutive victory in this match and gave them permanent possession of the cup.

These matches were considered a very essential stimulant to qualification firing and created considerable interest throughout the Corps in rifle shooting.

The 1906 National Match Team was organized under Captain Frank E. Evans (retired), and trained at Creedmoor, New York, where they participated in five New York State matches, placing second in four and third in the fifth.

The National Matches were held at Sea Girt, N. J., and the marines placed 6th. Two places were won in the National Individual by members of the marine squad.

liminary training and completed their training at Sea Girt, N. J., in August. They left Sea Girt and proceeded to Camp Perry, Ohio, where they participated in the National matches, placing 4th among a group of 50 teams. Captain McDougal was high Marine Corps team member in this match with a score of 243. Three Marines won medals in the National Individual and several places were also won in other Individual and Team matches by members of the squad. Upon completion of the National Matches at Camp Perry, the squad returned to Sea Girt, N. J., and entered the New Jersey State matches, winning several and placing in many.

This year was the best year the Marine Corps squad had ever had and for their excellent work they re-



MARINE CORPS RIFLE TEAM, 1930. WHO ARE THEY?

At the beginning of 1907 the Marine Corps was still handicapped in qualifying men due to many small posts lacking long range facilities. The National Team was again organized this year under Captain Frank E. Evans, U. S. M. C., and trained at Camp Admiral Harrington, Williamsburg, Va., later transferring to Creedmoor, New York, to compete in the New York State matches. Upon the completion of those matches the teams entered the National matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, where they placed in 14th place. Two officers, First Lieutenants Holcomb and Edward Greene, were shooting members of this team. Lieutenant Holcomb was high Marine Corps team man in this match with a score of 240.

The records do not show that any Marine won a place in the National Individual in 1907. There is, however, an item of interest in that this was the first year that the U. S. Naval Academy had a team in the National matches.

The 1908 National Match Team was organized under Captain William C. Harlee as team captain and Captain D. C. McDougal as team coach. The squad was assembled at Williamsburg, Va., in June for their pre-

ceived a letter of commendation from the Navy Department.

Of intense interest to the Marine Corps in general was the fact that the number of qualifications had about doubled over the year 1907. All of this goes to show that officers and men alike were becoming intensely interested in the shooting game.

The year 1908 marked another important advance in the shooting game for the Corps, in that approval was given for members of the Marine Corps to qualify as distinguished marksmen, which, needless to say, was an added incentive stimulating target practice. However, the lack of proper instructors began to be felt due to this increased interest and presented a new problem to the Corps as a whole.

In the year 1909 there was considerable comment relative to the bad condition of the rifles then in use. However, qualifications increased over previous years due no doubt to the fact that members of the Marine Corps rifle team at the end of the season were sent to various posts as instructors. Also, Sea Girt, N. J., had

been opened up to the Marine Corps, which gave an opportunity to train a great number of additional instructors among both officers and enlisted men.

A Marine Corps team was organized with Captain William C. Harlee, U. S. M. C., as team captain and Gunnery Sergeant Henry Baptist as team coach. The National matches this year were fired at Camp Perry, Ohio, the Marine Corps taking 9th place. Gunnery Sergeant Lund was high marine individual in this match with a score of 312. There is no record of any member of the marine squad placing in the National Individual. There were two officer shooting members of this squad, Captain D. C. McDougal and First Lieutenant William D. Smith. The National Match course remained the same with the exception that there was a slight change in the manner of scoring the skirmish run.

In 1910 the new Springfield rifle was issued to the Marine Corps. This increased the Marines' advantages in the various matches in which they engaged from year to year.

The National team was organized again under Captain William C. Harlee with First Lieutenant William D. Smith as coach and shooting member. The National Match was fired at Camp Perry, Ohio, the Marine Corps placing second. Gunnery Sergeant Lund again topped the Marine team with a score of 250. The Marines this year began increasing their places in the National Individual, winning five places.

There was a change made in the National Match course, in that the 800 slow fire was dropped and the skirmish run scoring again changed.

In 1911 we find 1,260 men had qualified with the rifle. Interpost, Division, and Marine Corps matches were held for the first time. Marines were entered in a championship match of North China, held at Tientsin.

Appropriations sufficient to completely outfit the Marine Corps with the new type rifle were authorized.

In June, 1911, a Marine Corps National team was organized and trained at Wakefield, Mass., with Captain D. C. McDougal captain and First Lieutenant William D. Smith, team coach. They proceeded to Camp Perry, Ohio, where they won the National Match. Only three places were taken in the National Individual this year by Marines, but the winning of the National Match itself was sufficient success. Three officers were members of this team, Captain Thomas Holcomb, Jr., First Lieutenant Ralph S. Keyser, and Second Lieutenant Marion B. Humphrey. Again the National Match course was changed, the 800 slow fire going back in the course and the 600 slow fire being dropped.

In 1912, there were 215 entries in the open championship of North China, held at Tientsin, Marines winning the first six places. The Marines also won the International Legation guard match at Peking. There were no National Matches held this year but a team squad was organized and trained at Wakefield, Mass., under Captain Harry R. Lay, U.S.M.C., to compete in the New England matches. The Marines won eight out of the eleven matches entered. Following these matches, they proceeded to Sea Girt, N. J., and entered the New Jersey State matches.

The Marines won the open championship of North China in 1913 for the third consecutive year, also taking 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th places. This match was won by Sergeant John J. Andrews, U.S.M.C. The International Match was also won by the Marines.

A Marine Corps team squad of forty men was assembled at Wakefield, Mass., with Captain D. C. Mc-

Dougal, team captain, and First Lieutenant William D. Smith, team coach. From these forty men twenty-six were selected to go to Camp Perry, Ohio, for the National matches. Two officers were firing members of the National team this year, First Lieutenant Andrew B. Drum and Second Lieutenant L. W. T. Waller, Jr. The Marines took fourth place in the National team match and Lieutenant Waller took second place in the National Individual. Marines won three places in this match.

There was a change made this year in the National Match course, the course being changed to 600 and 1,000 yards slow fire, 200 yards surprise fire, and the skirmish run.

In 1914, statistics show that 41.5% of the strength of the Corps were qualified marksmen, which was considerably more than in previous years.

For the fourth consecutive year a Marine won the open championship of North China. First Sergeant F. Wahlstrom won the match.

There were many new matches entered by Marines at various stations this year, including the Elliott Trophy Match, which is still competed for each year at Quantico, Va.

Twenty men were selected and assembled at Winthrop, Maryland, under First Lieutenant C. B. Matthews as team captain. From Winthrop they proceeded to Sea Girt, N. J., firing in the New York and New Jersey State matches.

In 1915 our qualification course underwent a radical change, which resulted in an increase of expert riflemen and marksmen and a decrease in sharpshooters. The National Match course was also changed, the skirmish run being eliminated and the course being fired at 200, 300 rapid fire and 300, 600, and 1,000 yards slow fire.

The team squad was again assembled at Winthrop, Maryland, under First Lieutenant C. B. Matthews as team captain and First Lieutenant Ralph S. Keyser as team coach, thence to Wakefield, Mass., where they competed in the New England matches. From Wakefield they proceeded to Sea Girt, N. J., for the New Jersey State matches and then to Jacksonville, Florida, where they took second place in the National Team match. Gunnery Sergeant Andrew Hagen won the President's Match and Marines won eight places in the National Individual. One officer, First Lieutenant H. L. Parsons, was a shooting member of this team.

The 1916 National team was assembled at Winthrop, Maryland, under Captain W. G. Fay as team captain and First Lieutenant William D. Smith as team coach, proceeding to Wakefield, Mass., for the New England matches. After these matches the Marine squad went to Jacksonville, Florida, to compete in the National match, which they won. One officer, First Lieutenant D. L. Brewster, was a shooting member of this team. Marines also won six places in the National Individual match.

In 1917, due to the World War, the strength of the Marine Corps doubled, but it is gratifying to note that the qualification percentage increased accordingly.

There were no National Matches held this year and no team squad organized.

The year 1918 saw the completion of the Quantico rifle range. The percentage of qualifications increased from .39% in 1913 to .67% in 1918, together with several hundred that were qualified as expert pistolmen.

A Marine Corps National team was organized under Major H. L. Smith as team captain and Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach. The National matches were held at Camp Perry, Ohio, the Marine Corps winning the match. They also won the President's match, the Wimbledon Cup match, the Marine Corps Cup match and several other lesser matches, together with twelve places in the National Individual. Two officers fired on the team squad this year, Captains Joseph Jackson and Archie Farquharson.

In 1917 it was announced that those who failed to qualify would not be sent overseas, which resulted in an extremely high percentage of qualifications in 1918; 82.8% qualified. Over 300 officers and men qualified as pistol experts. Marines in the A. E. F. won the majority of events in the A. E. F. matches held at Le Mans, France.

The National Match course was 200 rapid fire (one string, 10 shots kneeling from standing, followed by one string, 10 shots kneeling, sitting or squatting from standing), 500 (10 shots prone, 5 shots kneeling, 5 shots sitting or squatting) and 1,000 slow fire.

Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Harllee was the Executive Officer of the National Matches and Lieutenant Colonel W. G. Fay was an Assistant Executive Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Harllee was the first vice-president of the National Rifle Association. Lieutenant Colonel Fay was on the National Rifle Association Executive Committee as an additional member and representative of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The 1920 National Match team, with Major C. B. Matthews as team captain and Captain H. L. Smith as team coach, was organized and trained at Wakefield, Mass., entering the National Matches at Camp Perry,



NAME THEM

The 1919 team squad was organized and trained at Wakefield, Mass., with Major William D. Smith as team captain and Captain H. L. Smith as team coach, and entered the New Jersey State matches at Sea Girt, N. J., and the National Matches at Caldwell, N. J. The Marines won 27 of the 34 matches entered, including the National Individual, President's, United Service, National Team and Sea Girt Championship. The National Team had six officer shooting members: Captains H. L. Smith, Joseph Jackson, Eugene Mullaly, Second Lieutenant Claud Thompson, and Marine Gunners J. J. Andrews and Otho Wiggs. Twenty-two places were won in the National Individual that year.

The A. E. F. Team fired in the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, placing second and giving the winning Marine team strong competition. The following Marines were firing members of the A. E. F. team: Captain Wesley W. Walker, Gunnery Sergeant Lester V. Hensen, Second Lieutenant James F. Coppage, Sergeant Theodore B. Crawley, and Corporal Leland K. Repton.

Ohio. The Marines entered two teams in the National Match this year. Number One team placed 3rd and number two team, sixth. Eleven places were won in the National Individual. Five officers fired on the National Team: First Lieutenant Charles C. Simmons, Jr., Second Lieutenant Eugene Mullaly, and Marine Gunners J. J. Andrews, Otho Wiggs, and J. J. Faragher. Four Marines placed on the Olympic Team.

The National Match course was again changed to 200 rapid fire, 600 and 1,000 yards slow fire.

Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Harllee was a member of the National Board for promotion of rifle practice in 1920 and Major L. W. T. Waller was an additional member of the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

The 1921 team squad was organized and trained at Wakefield, Mass., with Major Harry L. Smith as team captain and Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach, going from there to Sea Girt, N. J., for the New Jersey State matches, thence to Camp Perry, Ohio, for the

(Continued on page 59)

MEMORIES OF FIVE YEARS

Who is Who Among the Old-timers

COLONEL FRANK E. EVANS
U. S. Marine Corps

■ In drawing on my fugitive memories of the rifle days ranging from 1904 to 1908 I find myself handicapped by the absence of records over that stretch of five years. Only in the case of 1907 have I records at hand. That year stands out sharpest for then I led a fine team of shooters to outstanding defeat through a blunder in windage on the skirmish run, toppling them down from high ranking to fourteenth place.

As alternate on the 1904 team, as captain and shooting member on the 1905, 1906 and 1907 teams, and as adjutant of the 1907 Palma Trophy team and of the 1908 Olympic International Match team there may be something of interest in my recollections to the members of those teams, and to officers and men who have since then fallen for the lure of the range and its shifting fortunes.

The rifle game in 1904 was in a state of evolution. The Navy in that year forged up to take its recognized place among the service teams. New York, Massachusetts, Ohio and New Jersey were the acknowledged leaders, with the service teams slowly closing up the gap with those veterans.

Throughout the Marine Corps the use of the sling and the peep sight was practically nil except for its rifle team members. The manual of the Army forbid their use and its photographs illustrating the correct positions for firing showed the sling on the rifle as issued. The great majority of marine officers scoffed openly at the idea that their men could make intelligent use of the peep sight in the heat of action. Knowledge of wind-jamming or doping mirage to follow a changing wind was unknown except to a few coaches who kept that knowledge to themselves. Only two officers in the Corps could be classed as experienced on the range, Colonel Charles H. Lauchheimer and Second Lieutenant Thomas Holcomb. The year before the latter officer was a shooting member on the Palma Trophy team, and high gun in the match.

Wind doping was confined almost wholly to the reading of wind flags, and all experienced shots have faced the dilemma of a flag showing right wind half-way down the range, while a flag over or near the butts registered a left wind. Micrometers, with their accuracy of sight-setting, were non-existent. Hygrometers were not in use and many unaccountable shots in practice and in competition were common, for without them there was no way of checking unsuspected moisture in the air. The absence of these valuable aids, now common to all rifle shots had discouraging results until they came into general use in 1906 and 1907. Extreme variations and unaccountable misses upset the natural confidence of the men, and added materially to the difficulties of selecting men for the final lineup.

Another discouraging factor that persisted throughout my experience was the extremely limited number of officers and men available from which to build up a


twelve-man team. In none of those years the total available for the team tryout exceeded eighteen men. As a result we never had more than eight thoroughly competent men, with the remainder doing their dogged best but dragging down the team total. Where we entered four, six or eight-men teams the marines were always dangerous contenders and won their share of those matches.

My first experience was with the team of 1904, including training on the Creedmoor range in Long Island, the National Match at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the Sea Girt matches at the end of the year.

Major Rufus H. Lane was team captain and First Lieutenant Giles Bishop, Jr., the only officer. I was the alternate, a "makee-learn" role. Sergeant Major Thomas Hayes, a fine type, was one of the best and most experienced shots in the small squad.

We finished in fifth place at Fort Riley, New York, winning handily, and the Navy turning in a sensational skirmish run that lifted it out of the ruck into second place. It would be putting it mildly to say that the old-timers from Riley who came out to see the match were scandalized at the results. They had taken it for granted that any infantry team would show the way to the militia, and the Navy was not even considered a contender. The match that year covered slow fire at 200, 600, 800 and 1,000 yards, rapid fire at 200 and 500 yards, and two skirmish runs.

With the sole exception of the New York State team all others were quartered in tents close to the range. The days were as hot as Kansas plains



AMERICAN PALMA TROPHY TEAM, 1907

can be in the summer and the nights were bitterly cold. The drinking water was alkaline and raised havoc with sleep. New York, living in a special Pullman car on the railroad siding, and drinking only bottled water, was generally regarded in camp as the lowly pansy is now granked. Their men were city-bred and office-workers and the conditions under which they lived closely approximated their normal routine. The service teams, inured to the discomfort of canvas, likewise approached their normal, but undoubtedly the mental and physical condition of

the state teams was lowered by their new mode of life.

One of the memories that Riley will always bring back to those of us who were there is that of the famed Captain Tommy Tompkins of the Seventh Cavalry. With sweeping yellow moustaches and a command of pungent and picturesque profanity that was the pride of the cavalry, Tommy Tompkins was consumed with but one ambition at the time. His gospel was "Anything to beat the Infantry!" Since the cavalry team was equipped with carbines, a decided disadvantage at the long ranges, he decided that the Marines were the best bet to beat the infantry. Each day the team woke to chuckles as he swaggered down the company street and saluted us with "Well, how are you—sea serpents? Are you going to trim that—infantry outfit?"

Our coach that year was Dr. Scott, a famous shot in his day, and his brother Ed Scott was coach of the Navy team. We carried Dr. Scott on our rolls as a sergeant and Brother Ed wore the undress whites of the Navy with some special rating badge on his sleeve. For some reason, however, the army contingent was firmly of the opinion that he was a chaplain. One day, while running the skirmish, Brother Ed's team was decidedly below form. The shots were easy to spot on that range and Ed flew into a rage at the poor firing. Down the range he went with his telescope and at each halt launched into a hair-raising volume of barbed invective. The gallery stood entranced at the supposed Navy's chaplain proficiency and none more so than Tommy Tompkins.

With the end of the National Match, in which the team stood well up in the final score, Major Lane was detached to duty in Washington, and I took the team to Sea Girt for the New Jersey State Rifle Association matches. I can look back on those matches with satisfaction. Most of them called for from four to eight-men teams. Up to that time we were wholly in the hands of our professional coach. He alone knew how to dope mirage and no change in trigger pull or readjustment of the bands was allowed except by him. Naturally, Dr. Scott's value to us was enhanced by his expert knowledge of all such things, and he kept it jealously to himself.

At Sea Girt, however, with two or three teams entered in each match it was impossible for our professional coach to run things with an iron hand. We were on our own for the first time. Unconsciously we had absorbed more knowledge of the mirage, of what change was necessary when a bright target was momentarily obscured by a passing cloud, and other tricks, than we had realized. At the end of the matches our teams had won more than their share, some had done splendid work in the individual matches, and the day of the professional coach for a marine team was over. The knowledge gained at Sea Girt began to seep through the Corps and grew steadily with the years. In this connection, however, I would be remiss if I did not give full credit to the aid we received the following year from the New York squad at Creedmoor. Such wizards with the rifle as K. K. V. Casey, then the admitted ace at the long ranges, and Sergeant George Doyle in particular, taught us many of the tricks of the trade and every man on the squad when he returned to straight duty spread the growing expert knowledge with fruitful results.

The intensive experience at Sea Girt, and training on the Creedmoor range in 1905 with our men going

freely and unhampered to the New York experts, landed us in fourth place in the National Match of that year. Here we faced more teams and more skilled riflemen. Again we had to face the season with a minimum number in the squad, but were materially strengthened by the detail of First Lieutenant Douglas C. McDougal. Back of that is a story. With a list of officers and men whom I considered were promising material I bearded the office of Major General Commandant before the training season opened. General Elliott, himself intensely interested in the development of rifle practice, ran his eye over the list of ten officers, arranged in rank. "You can have Second Lieutenant Blank," he said, putting his finger on the junior name of the list. "We can spare only one officer this year."

Limited to one officer by service requirements I decided that McDougal was the most promising on the list. Two days later the orders for McDougal to join the squad were inserted in the mail of the day. General Elliott signed it and then looked sharply up. "I stand by what I sign, Evans," he said, "gray eyes twinkling," but if you've chosen McDougal just because you are old friends, and you want him to make liberties into New York. God help you!

In the National Match that year McDougal was high gun in the entire field and for the next two years was, in my opinion, the best shot in the Corps. He was equally strong at rapid fire, the skirmish and at the long ranges. Few shots are thoroughly skilled in those radically different types of fire. Later, in the New Jersey matches, where we entered two six-men teams in a match of two skirmish runs for each team, his men with himself as team captain and shooting member, smashed all previous skirmish run figures by a wide margin, a world record in its total.

The events in the National Match of 1905, shot at Sea Girt, were the same as in 1904 with the exception of a slight change in the skirmish runs. Previously all ranges were shot in the prone position. This year the shortest range was fired from the kneeling position.

After training at the Creedmoor range, with its shifting light winds, mainly of the fishtail variety, firing at Sea Girt was comparatively easy. There the prevailing match winds were rather steady side winds, rarely fishtailing. In the other matches our entries did excellent work, and there were few of the team not thoroughly capable of doping the wind with expert skill.

The season of 1906 was, so far as I recall, unmarked by any outstanding feature. Each year the number of teams increased and the going was harder. I am un-



AMERICAN TEAM ON PRACTICE RANGE,
BISLEY, ENGLAND, 1908.

able, however, to give the number but it was so large that Sea Girt would no longer be able to accommodate the National Match with ease. The rapid fire at 500 yards was dropped, the only change in the course. The match was won by Infantry 3251, Cavalry 3191, New York 3158, Massachusetts 3176, Navy 3131, Marines 3113.


At the 1,000 yards, then the final event, a radical change, reflected only in the hygrometer readings, raised havoc with many teams. There had been heavy rain throughout a part of each day. The 1,000 yard match had to be carried over to the morning of the third day and the micrometer readings for the 800-yard event shot the previous afternoon, were valueless. All up and down the line the red flags were signaling misses in sighters and in record shots.

Our leading pair was myself and Gunnery Sergeant Charles E. Clark, in reality our team coach. It was our job to turn over accurate elevation and windage data to the following pairs. Four sighters landed somewhere in the Atlantic and on our first record shots Clark made a radical change in elevation. Through the 'scope I caught splinters flying in the wooden butts a full two or three feet below the target. It seemed incredible but on my record shot I made the correction. Up came a three and we had found the elevation. Several teams, less fortunate, ruined all chances with their many zeros. In our scorebooks we had religiously entered all data in our firing at Creedmoor and in our preliminary work at Sea Girt. There was nothing to compare with the elevations recorded, and nothing in apparent conditions to warrant the radical change necessary to find the target.

The year 1907, while for the Marine Corps a disappointing one through a heart-breaking skirmish run at the Camp Perry National Match that dropped the team total to fourteenth place, was in other respects a notable one. That year, following the National Matches, the United States rifle team won the Palma Match at the Rockcliffe range near Ottawa, Canada, with a score that smashed all previous records, either with a military rifle or match rifle, by a sensational margin. The new type of pointed bullet that was to a great extent responsible for the Palma score, was adopted for all future matches. Its tremendous superiority over the old blunt-nosed bullet gave a needed impetus to interest in rifle firing in the services. Its flatter trajectory and superior accuracy were immediately translated into higher scores, a surer confidence, and from that date the work of the Marine Corps teams in competition ranked with the best in the country. Furthermore the old drudgery of cleaning rifles was reduced to a minimum as metal fouling, the bane of the old bullet, practically disappeared.

This bullet was developed by W. M. Thomas of the Union Metallic Cartridge Company and Dr. W. G. Hudson, both ballistic experts, while Dr. Hudson was in addition a noted rifleman. Compared to the old bullet it was slightly longer and ended in the sharp point of the Spitzer type which had just then come into vogue in Europe. It differed radically from the Spitzer type, however, in which everything had been sacrificed to high velocity and flat trajectory. The Hudson bullet, as it was familiarly known, was designed with accuracy as its main consideration. This it attained through its perfect balance, long bearing and well-formed base, all of which were absent in the Spitzer.

The weight of the new projectile was $203\frac{1}{2}$ grains, and the diameter of the bullet was .3085, this diameter continuing for about six-tenths of an inch from the base, from whence it sloped sharply to a point. The



THE U. S. OLYMPIC TEAM OF 1908—WINNER

powder charge was $36\frac{2}{10}$ grains of W. A. powder which gave a muzzle velocity of 2,140 feet per second, as compared with the old velocity of approximately 1,800. Through its high remaining velocity the wind allowance required was from 35 to 50 per cent less than with the old bullet.

The writer's connection with rifle shooting ended with the season of 1907, but in the course of Sea Girt matches in 1908 he had the pleasure of seeing the first possible at 1,000 yards scored in competition made by Captain D. C. McDougal in the last stage of the Herick Match. Possibles had been scored at this range in practice, but the nearest approach to Captain McDougal's feat was the 74 out of a possible 75 in the 1907 Palma Match. Prior to the introduction of the Hudson-Thomas bullet all teams counted scores by "over centers" or fours. Any score at the longer ranges that was above the forties in a ten-shot match was considered as so much desirable velvet. With the new bullet this custom died a quick death, and the measuring stick for an outstanding score was that of so many "below possible."

The 1907 match, shot for the first time at Camp Perry, Ohio, began with the single skirmish run, four teams in each relay. Ohio shot into the lead at its finish with a score of 907, far above the figures for the best team in the previous year. The Cavalry was second, with a score of 873. The Navy landed third with 870, a full 68 points ahead of its 1906 score. Fourth came the Infantry, scoring 867 as against 831 for the prior year. Fifth was Massachusetts with 860, an improvement of 94 points. These scores are given in detail to show that the improvement over the 1906 figures was marked in the majority, few of the 48 teams failing to better the mark.

It was unfortunate for the Marine Corps team that the match began that year with a skirmish run. At the end of our run we had scored the pitiful total of 693 as against our 1906 run of 803, a drop of 110 points. In the order of the event we stood in 23rd place, a full 214 points behind the leader. That year I dropped out as a shooting member and took the run down. Gunnery Sergeant Clark and I doped the wind and through the scope the first shots appeared correct for windage and elevation. Two days before, in our final practice, we had far exceeded our 1906 total. As I recall it my mistake in correcting windage and elevation as we approached the target was apparently trivial, but when

(Continued on page 57)



MELVIN J. MAAS, Republican, of St. Paul, Minnesota; graduate of St. Thomas College and University of Minnesota; served overseas in the World War in Marine Corps Aviation; major in the Marine Corps Reserve; now represents the Fourth Congressional District of the State of Minnesota; member of the House Naval Affairs Committee and Pensions Committee.

FORMER MARINES NOW IN CONGRESS




JOHN M. HOUSTON, Democrat, of Newton, Kansas; attended St. John's Military School, Salina, Kansas; and Fairmount University; served in the Marine Corps during 1917 and 1918; honor guard for President Wilson and later in charge of the Marine guard in the State, War and Navy Building, after which he was sent to the Officers' Training Camp, Quantico, Va.; now represents the Fifth Congressional District of the State of Kansas; member of the Joint Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House Public Buildings and Grounds Committee, House Committee on Claims, and House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.



RICHARD J. TONRY, Democrat, of Brooklyn, N. Y.; graduate of Pratt Institute; served in the Marine Corps as a sergeant during the World War; member of New York State Assembly, 1922-1929; member of board of aldermen, City of New York, 1930-1934; now represents the Eighth Congressional District of the State of New York; member of House Committee on Education, on Printing, and on Election of President, Vice-President, and Representatives in Congress.

LAWRENCE E. IMHOFF, Democrat, of St. Clairsville, Ohio; graduate of Ohio State University; probate judge of Belmont County, 1925-1933; served as a private in the 5th Regiment, U. S. Marine Corps, during the World War; wounded in the second battle of the Marne; now represents the Eighteenth Congressional District of the State of Ohio; member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.



COLGATE W. DARDEN, JR., Democrat, of Algonquin Park, Norfolk, Va.; graduate of University of Virginia and Columbia University; Carnegie Fellowship, Oxford University; served overseas with Marine Corps Aviation in 1916 and 1917; also served with French Army; member of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia, 1930-1932; now represents the Second Congressional District of the State of Virginia; second lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps, retired; member of House Naval Affairs Committee.



THE LANDING AND OCCUPATION OF SEAPORTS

Some familiar shores we have touched

LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. H. UTLEY
U. S. Marine Corps

■ We lead up to weakness, teach our pitchers to throw whatever is thought hardest for the player at bat to hit, and advocate delivering our main blow at the weakest part of the hostile position; yet in Small Wars, time after time we have landed at the custom house or main wharf, or wherever defenses there are located, and move from there to the capture of the city, fort or whatever area we propose to occupy. That we have been successful may be attributed to the unwillingness of the forces ashore to commence hostilities, since it is self evident that our scheme of maneuver invites resistance, placing our troops in a most vulnerable position while approaching the shore and disembarking from their boats and then, as we advance through the city, leaving a clear line of retreat into the country behind them open to the defenders.

The Landing Force Manual United States Navy 1927 lays down this sound doctrine:

"Ordinarily it is not safe to attempt to land in the heart of the city at the customs or other municipal wharves. To do so may incur severe losses from well established hostile fire. A feint may be made in this locality while a sudden surprise landing is effected on one or more beaches flanking the city to be taken."

Such a procedure permits the attack force to encircle the city, seize such commanding ground as the terrain affords and jump off in the most advantageous direction for a methodical capture of the town. By so doing seaport facilities are secured, the hostile (or potentially hostile) forces will not have an opportunity to escape to the country where they will subsequently have to be pursued, and our own force will have the choice of direction and time of attack. It may be objected that this method by trapping the hostile forces within the city, will tend to intensify the resistance encountered, on the theory that even a rat will fight when cornered. However, it is generally known that, in such situations, our forces will not fight unless they are attacked, and if the natives are at all conversant with past performances they will know too, that if we are attacked we will do a pretty thorough job of cleaning up.

Nor should we overlook the psychological factor. The keynote of the hostile morale in Small Wars is the fact that, as a general thing the native is governed by his emotions. Of all the emotions, *fear* was the first, the strongest and the most unreasoning. It still remains the strongest influence that governs man's actions. With many primitive people it is exemplified in their customs and affects their tactics. They will seldom await the steady methodical approach of a disciplined force. While a few individuals may be rendered desperate by the absence of any avenue of escape, the great majority will fight only so long as they believe they have a chance to retreat, and as soon as they realize that their line of escape to the country is cut off, they will give up without any resistance, or at least

confine their resistance to sniping at us from positions of concealment which they imagine render their detection impossible.

Should however, the town be garrisoned by an organized and comparatively well disciplined force, or, what is more probable, should our force be too weak to block all avenues of retreat and at the same time capture the city, the landing outside the city and advancing in the direction of our choosing is still believed to be the sound plan. In such cases a single avenue of retreat should be provided our opponents, and a *mobile* column strong in fire power stationed *on the flank* of this line of retreat, to complete the destruction of the hostile forces after they have left the city. For such a force, aviation, if present, would be invaluable, both for reconnaissance and for the actual attack on the retreating hostile force.

Having reached the jumpoff line, whether or not a complete envelopment is made, the next step is the actual occupation of the city. We will first consider the operation of taking a city the general characteristics of which are regularity of streets, rectangular blocks, low buildings set close together and to the street and having flat or nearly flat roofs. A few buildings may be found to be more detached, higher and larger. These will usually be churches, public buildings and a few foreign owned office buildings and when encountered must usually be handled as separate centers of resistance.

The amount of resistance encountered will seldom be uniform through the city, being most serious in those parts frequented by the more lawless and younger elements, although there will often be citizens of considerable standing and wealth who are not adverse to risking their lives and property by taking pot shots at our troops if they can do so from a position of concealment. In general however, the Redlight district and the Plaza district with its cafes, clubs and public buildings are the danger points. The police seem nearly always against us and the police barracks should be carefully observed. Moreover we must bear in mind that all people are becoming more and more learned in things military and we must be prepared for organized resistance throughout the city. This may take the form of strong points, barricades in the streets, small groups or individuals—perhaps apparently unarmed—sniping at our troops from concealed positions in the buildings or on the housetops, or of a combination of some or all of those methods.

For the actual advance through the city the formation advocated is Line of Columbus, each column being in three waves—assault, support, and reserve. The advance is made by bounds. Where the resistance is at all stubborn the bounds are one block in length. The zone of advance of each column is one street and one half of the adjoining block on each side. Following the usual tactical doctrine a street is not made the boundary between adjacent units (columns). Zones of advance should extend clear across the city and there should be a column on each street so that the entire front of the city will be covered.

The assault echelon is charged with the clearing away of opposition within its zone of advance; i. e., the capture or destruction of hostile positions and personnel therein. It is divided into three detachments; the street detachment, the roof detachment and the searching detachment. The first operates in the street and clears it of opposition; the

second is divided into two groups one of which moves along the roofs of the buildings on each side of the street; while the third named, likewise divided into groups, searches and clears the interiors and back yards of the buildings abutting the street.

The support echelon reinforces the elements of the assault echelon when necessary, either by overhead fire from selected commanding positions, or by joining the assault echelon.

The reserve is charged with furnishing the guard for prisoners and captured arms and providing for the security of the area in rear of the support. While the reserve of tactical units such as battalions or regiments advancing along several streets may be concentrated on one or two streets, it must have small patrols behind *each* assault echelon.

The duties of each group and the general scheme of maneuver are discussed in detail in the Landing Force Manual, U. S. Navy and do not require repetition here, but it would appear that both the authors of the Manual and Major Harrington in his treatise on the subject have leaned too heavily on the experience gained in a single landing, that at Vera Cruz in 1914, and did not give sufficient consideration to the fact that this operation was undertaken with an unusually large force, whereas history will show that in the great majority of cases it has been necessary to occupy towns with a force much smaller than that contemplated in the Landing Force Manual and by Major Harrington.* The problem that presents itself therefore, is how to modify the sound doctrine they lay down to suit the limitations imposed by the size of the force available.

The minimum force desirable for the assault echelon on each street would appear to be a Marine Corps Rifle platoon; one squad for the street detachment, one squad for the roof detachments and two squads for the searching detachments. A rifle section with a machine gun or howitzer squad attached does not appear to be any too strong for the support echelon on each street. Four blocks would therefore appear to be the limit of front for a Peace Strength Battalion (and we will be using Peace Strength organizations in these operations). It is evident that it will require many battalions to overcome any determined house-to-house resistance even in one of the smaller cities if the city is to be mopped up in a single operation. The solution is, of course, to divide the city into several areas and mop up each area in succession, being careful to prevent our opponents from entering the areas that have been mopped up.

ARMAMENT

Infantry Weapons. Tanks, Armored Cars and trucks with improvised armor are exceedingly valuable for the street detachments of the assault echelons. If present in numbers in excess of the requirements of the assault echelon, they will be valuable adjuncts to the reserve.

Machine Guns, Trench Mortars and One-pounders are of the most value in the support echelon, firing from advantageous positions on top of selected buildings, or even from the street level, over the heads of the assault echelon they can materially assist its advance.

Rifle Grenades and Automatic Weapons should be distributed normally throughout the echelons. A plentiful supply of hand grenades should be provided the assault echelon.

Artillery. The value of artillery in an operation of this

description is problematical. Its use as an accompanying gun seems limited to those cases where fire can be brought to bear on a hostile strongpoint from a position within the city. In most cases the infantry weapons can perform its functions equally well. As supporting artillery it may be used where the situation permits the guns (field, boat or ships') to fire up the street one block ahead of the advancing line and *across* the front, on signal from the troops that stubborn opposition has been encountered or is anticipated. The greatest objection to its use is that its affect is too general, falling alike on the just and the unjust, whereas that of the infantry weapons will be more nearly restricted to those actually hostile to us. When the population is divided into several factions one or more of which may be friendly to us, or at least neutral, it is particularly important to avoid inflicting unnecessary loss to life or private property. When, as frequently is the case, there is some particularly strong position or key point clearly defined, such as fort or barracks, the placing of artillery concentrations thereon is not only logical and tactically sound, but is unobjectionable on humanitarian or political grounds.*

Chemical Defense. With the police of practically every civilized city of any size equipped with tear gas, there does not appear to be any logical reason why our forces should not use it in seizing a city. Certainly it would be the most humane method, and probably the most efficient. It would be of the most valuable in the assault echelon. But the propaganda against the use of any form of chemicals is so widespread that it is probable that our use of any form of gas would be distorted in the reports and seized upon as an example of our inhumane methods. It is one of the peculiarities of human nature that the very people who laughed the loudest when they read of the "Castor Oil" treatment said to have been used in a European country a few years ago would be the strongest in their denunciation of any commander who employed teargas against foreigners engaged in shooting down our own troops!

Aviation. Aircraft, if present and operating, will be of the greatest value in scouting missions,—locating hostile concentrations, strong points and movements. Attack and bombing missions, strafing and bombing clearly defined centers of resistance and concentrations may be practicable but care must be taken to restrict such missions to objectives that are clearly hostile and not to needlessly endanger neutral or friendly lives and property, as to do so will merely serve to lay up considerable grief for the commander at some future date. The use of a plane by the commander as a command plane, issuing his orders from the air by dropped messages or prearranged signals will often be feasible. But if the city has not been completely encircled, the great value of aviation as a part of the striking force operating against hostile retreating columns must be borne in mind when assigning air missions.

Cavalry. Against unorganized mobs on the streets or assembled in the plazas or parks, mounted troops, if on manageable mounts, can be advantageously employed, but if resistance from within or on top of the building is anticipated, a foot troops are better. Mounted troops will rarely be present at this stage of the operations of a Marine Expeditionary Force, but if available, should be employed as a mobile reserve or as a part of the striking force operating against retreating hostile columns if the city has not been completely encircled.

Engineers. Engineer troops and pioneers in small de-

*The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars, by Major S. A. Harrington, USMC. (published in part only), Marine Corps Gazette.

*For further discussion of the use of supporting artillery and plans for its use see comments on the landing at PUERTO PLATA, D. R., and of the occupation of SANTO DOMINGO CITY, D. R., and of PORT AU PRINCE, HAITI, sequi.

tachments equipped with their special tools will be of value in removing barricades and other obstructions and in opening the way into buildings.

Signals. It may be possible to establish radio communication between the command post ashore and the flagship of the naval force present. In some cases it may be practicable to maintain telephone communication between certain elements of the force ashore by cutting in on existing commercial lines. The main reliance for communications must, however, be placed on visual signals and foot messengers.

Nowadays we frequently find one or more tall detached buildings, usually under government or foreign control. These may serve as strongpoints and require special detachments to reduce them, but once occupied they offer, as a rule, excellent fire positions and observation posts for our own forces.

We have been mainly concerned with cities whose characteristics are regularity of streets and low buildings set close to the street and without intervals between them. In cities of irregular plan and with detached buildings predominating some modifications of our basic plan are necessary but they are surprisingly few. Roof detachments cannot operate, and advances of exactly one block cannot be made in every case. We can, however, still divide the city into areas and carefully comb each area before passing to the next while occupying commanding buildings with special groups. We must prevent our opponents filtering back into an area we have mopped up, and be particularly careful to prevent one group of our force firing in the direction of another group.

With the foregoing in mind the reader need only to visualize any of the coastal towns in the probable theater of our operations which he has visited, in order to realize that if determined resistance is anticipated a considerable amount of man and fire power must be landed. Fortunately the occasions when we have encountered such desperate resistance have been rare and we have been successful with comparatively weak forces. It should be borne in mind, however, that in these countries, the carrying of arms is habitual, and that the availability of modern weapons is increasing. We should prepare for the worst, a house to house resistance, whenever we plan a landing.


Let us now consider several actual operations of this nature, and the methods adopted by the commanders to

meet the situations. First there is Vera Cruz. Vera Cruz lies at the apex of a triangular shaped flat sandy plain (See Plate H). In 1847 General Scott landed his army about 11,000 strong from ships' boats on the open beach south of Vera Cruz, invested the city, and, its surrender being refused, bombarded it and its defenses for six days, declining to adopt the recommendations of some of his division commanders that he take the place by assault, although he risked losing valuable time by this decision. The ships of the navy present under command of Commodore Connor cooperated to the fullest extent, not only in effecting the landing, participating in the bombardment and maintaining an effectual blockade, but they also landed and manned ships' guns powerful enough to bring effective fire on portions of the Mexican line that were out of range of the army guns. Scott's losses during the entire operation were less than 100 killed and wounded. The city surrendered with about 5,000 Mexicans and 400 guns. This operation which one writer characterizes* as "Our First Expeditionary Force Across the Seas," furnishes an excellent example of fine cooperation on the part of the Navy, although it may be argued that it was not strictly speaking a "Small War" situation. It exemplifies the advantages of a steady methodical attack (in this case by gunfire alone, since the infantry was used only to hold the investing lines) with the city completely invested. It is doubtful, however, if the situation at the beginning of one of our Small Wars of the present day would permit us to undertake siege operations, particularly the bombardment of a town, but encircling the town and an aerial bombardment if aviation were present might be practicable, if restricted to known centers of resistance, as our own losses would be minimized and those of our opponents limited to those actively hostile to us.

Again, in 1914 a naval force consisting of about 800 sailors and marines landed at the waterfront (Custom House Pier) at Vera Cruz for the purpose of occupying the customs house and cable station. Opposition was encountered in the advance to the cable station, no duly constituted Mexican authorities could be located, and it eventually became necessary to occupy the entire city. The force ashore had meantime been augmented, and, supported by the ships' guns, occupied the entire city. It was considered that the situation did not permit the delay that would have been entailed by the adoption of Scott's tactics and that the original objective was a limited one (it being intended to occupy only the customs house and the cable station). The subsequent occupation of the entire city was a development which was not foreseen. The lessons to be drawn from this operation appear to have been embodied in the Landing Force Manual and do not require further comment here. The casualties were about equal to those suffered by Scott's force.

At Puerto Plata, D. R. (See Plate U), a provisional battalion consisting of the Marine Detachments of the USS *New Jersey* and of the USS *Rhode Island* reinforced by one company of sailors and two machine guns from the USS *Sacramento*, a total of 200 officers and men, landed from the USS *Sacramento* on June 1, 1916.

The original plan called for a surprise attack at dawn in the belief that it could be effected without loss of life to either side, but as it was considered necessary to notify the revolutionary authorities who were in possession of the city and fort of the intention to land, surprise had to



R.D. NO. 629.

*Our First Expeditionary Force Across the Seas, by Major James R. Jacobs, USA. (ret.), Infantry Journal, July, 1928.

be sacrificed and a naval bombardment of the defensive works substituted. The revolutionists had erected some trenches in addition to the old fort (Fort San Felipe) and had reenforced the garrison by some troops from Santiago and by opening the local jails. They were estimated to number about 500 men—armed, mainly, with Winchester rifles and plentifully supplied with modern NMC ammunition.


The *Sacramento* was anchored, as nearly as can be ascertained now, about on a line between West Pt and Fort San Felipe and in prolongation of a line passing through the center of the wharf. The Landing Force embarked into the boats at 0600 but remained alongside until 0630 while the *Sacramento* fired fifteen 4-inch and fifteen 3-pounder common shell at the fort and the entrenchments. This bombardment forced the evacuation of the fort and entrenchments. During the bombardment the ship was subjected to a heavy rifle fire from snipers concealed in the houses and along the piers on the waterfront of the town. As soon as the boats shoved off from the ship this fire shifted to them. Neither during the time it was directed at the ship nor while it was directed at the

of the water in one company and to the passing of command in the other seems to have slightly delayed the Marines so that they landed after the sailors.* All made the advance up the hill together, the sailors on the left of the Marines.

The revolutionists retreated to the eastward but kept up their fire for a short time, then retreated through and around the town and occupied their fortified barracks and continued firing. Upon signal from the force ashore the *Sacramento* fired eleven 4-inch common shells at the barracks, which was sufficient to cause the natives to evacuate the place, and shortly thereafter all firing from the city ceased. At 1100 the blue jacket company returned to the ship.

A delegation of citizens informed the battalion commander that there would be no further resistance and the city was occupied without incident.

There has been some criticism of the place selected for landing, but from the scanty information now obtainable it appears to have been sound, if the Intelligence then available indicated that the capture of the fort would compel the evacuation of the town (as turned out to be the



boats, was this fire returned, as to do so would endanger the lives of women, children and foreigners in the town.

There is some variation in the reports and accounts of the actual landing, but it is evident that it was made either directly in front of, or just north of, the west face of the fort (or both). The boat towing the *New Jersey* Detachment grounded and a number of men disembarked prematurely into 12 to 14 feet of water. They and their arms were rescued with difficulty. At about the same time Captain Hirshinger, U. S. Marines, commanding the *Rhode Island* Detachment, was mortally wounded. The confusion incident to fishing the men and arms out

case). The small force available rendered anything like encircling the city impossible. To have landed anywhere else in the bay would have entailed an advance through the city, and, unless made in the vicinity of West Pt near the road to Maimon Bay, would have subjected the Landing Force to fire from town for a longer period than it was while proceeding from the ship to the landing selected. A glance at the chart shows that the northeastern shore of East Point is impracticable as a landing place. Further study of the chart indicates that there is one practicable landing place about a mile to the eastward of the city, but to have landed there would have involved an advance for a mile along a single road and a movement through the town before reaching the fort. With the small force available an advance through the city in the

*This statement is contrary to some accounts, but is based on the Log of the *Sacramento* and on the official reports of Commander Bulmer (commanding the *Sacramento*) and of Major Hatch (the battalion commander).


face of superior numbers would have been particularly hazardous. The real danger was from the city which could not be shelled indiscriminately, not from the fort which could be shelled. In the supporting gunfire directed first at the fort and subsequently at the barracks we have an example of the great value of such support laid on clearly defined centers of hostile resistance. Although notice of our intention to land had been given and fire was directed against our ship and boats from within the city itself, it is probable that Commander Bulmer and Major Hatch were correct in refraining from returning that fire. Once more we were not at war, merely on expedition where the bullets were flying.

During the preceding month (May, 1916) a landing was effected on the opposite side of the island. The city of Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic (See Plate S), was in the hands of about 600 rebels under Desiderio Arias and was besieged in a half hearted manner by about an equal force under President Jimenez. The United States Legation, situated between the two armies in the midst of the battlefield, was under fire especially from the rebel 3-inch field pieces on the wall of the

United States Legation again came under fire. The American Minister called for protection.

The first plan for providing this protection deserves more than passing notice although it was not put into execution. Two Marine Lieutenants with two squads armed with pistols (which they were to conceal beneath their shirts) were to pass the rebel stronghold of Fort Ozama in open boats, land at the wharf in the river just above the fort, proceed through the city "as though on liberty," hire or commandeer sufficient native carriages for the party and drive through the city, pass out through the rebel front lines, out between the hostile forces to the legation, which they were "to defend at all cost."* Any further discussion of this plan seems superfluous. It was protested by the senior Marine officer present and the receipt of a dispatch directing the landing of all available force to protect the legation prevented an attempt at its execution.

After receipt of the dispatch just referred to, the Naval commander still wished to make the landing at the wharf in the Ozama River but the Marine Commander advocated landing at Jaina Beach (not shown on Plate S)



city. The USS *Prairie* with the 6th and 9th Companies, U. S. Marines (about 150 men) aboard was sent to Santo Domingo City and anchored about 5,000 yards off the radio station during a temporary armistice between the two Dominican forces. As usual there were no maps and but little Military Intelligence available. A party of Marine and naval officers were allowed ashore *once* "on liberty" and were received without hostility by the rebels. They made a limited reconnaissance of the city and obtained a few inferior inaccurate maps. They also succeeded in smuggling a hand driven radio set and operators to the Legation much to the relief of the Minister. Hostilities between the Dominican parties were resumed shortly thereafter, and, due to lack of discrimination, poor marksmanship or malice on the part of the rebels the

*Such a plan seems almost too fantastic for belief but it was recounted to me separately by each of the two lieutenants (now field officers) detailed to lead the party.

several miles west of Fort Ozama in order to be behind the forces of President Jimenez, as the Marine officers were not at all convinced that Jimenez would not oppose our movements. The final decision was in the nature of a compromise, the landing being made at Fort Geronimo which was in the hands of Government troops. This beach was small and presented no opportunity to land on a broad front. The sea was running high rendering handling of small boats difficult. Boatswain Johnson, USN., by a clever piece of seamanship, effected the landing of the Marine battalion with their battery of 3-inch Landing Guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. He anchored a sailing launch off the beach beyond the breakers and ran a line from this launch to a cocoanut palm on the beach. Troops were embarked in whaleboats, towed to the sailing launch and hauled their boat in hand over hand through the surf to the beach where the Marines landed and the boatcrew hauled the boat out through

the breakers for another trip.

There was no opposition to the landing. Had any resistance developed at the beach it is extremely doubtful if the landing could have been effected as there was no provision for naval gunfire in support of the landing, it being considered dangerous to bring the *Prairie* near enough the beach for her battery to be effective since to do so would likewise bring her within range of the guns of Fort Ozama.

The battalion moved from the beach to the Legation without encountering serious opposition although it was subjected to some sniping from the rebel forces when it crossed open spaces. It must be noted that this movement entailed crossing the fronts of both the rebel and government forces simultaneously, one being on each flank of the line of march!

In studying this operation the student is first struck by the contrast between the rashness of the plan of landing a weak practically unarmed patrol at the wharf in the river and the extreme caution displayed in keeping the ship beyond the range of the guns of Fort Ozama when the landing was made. It is generally accepted that unarmored ships are at a great disadvantage when engaging fixed batteries ashore and although Farragut at New Orleans, Porter at Vicksburg and Dewey at Manila Bay took the risk, they were at war and everyone cannot be a Farragut or a Porter or a Dewey. It is a difficult to justify, in retrospect, the decision to land at Fort Geronimo although it was a skillful piece of seamanship that accomplished it, and it was successful. The narrow front available for the landing and the physical difficulties encountered in getting ashore would have rendered any sort of opposition at the beach a very serious matter and jeopardized the success of the whole venture. Moreover it imposed upon the Landing Force a flank march in the presence of a (potential) enemy on *each* flank.

The American force was too weak to attempt to take and to hold the city unaided, an attempt to mediate between the opposing forces failed and two proposals for joint attacks on the city by the Government and American forces came to nothing. Three more companies of Marines,—the 4th, 5th and 24th,—arrived and were landed together with the Landing Forces of the American ships present,—the *Prairie*, *Castine*, *Dolphin* and *Culgoa*. The rebels having refused to accede to our demands were informed that at 0600 May 15 we would take possession of the city. It was reported that General Arias with his "regular" troops had left the city during the night of 14-15 May but that some of the Republican Guard remained under arms and some resistance might be expected from them and from irregulars and civilians.

The main effort was made from the north by the Marines organized into two battalions. The 1st Battalion (Wise) consisting of the 6th and 24th Companies was assigned the sector from the Ozama River to Calle Morino (inclusive) and was directed to occupy the ruins of old San Francisco (a relic of the days of Columbus). No record of the formation adopted by this battalion is available. The 2d Battalion (Low) consisting of the 4th and 5th Companies plus the Pioneers of the *Prairie* was assigned the sector from Calle Hostes to Calle Sanchez, both inclusive, and was to enter the city upon signal from the 1st Battalion. It had 6 Colt Machine Guns and 1 Benet Mercier Machine Rifle. It entered the city at Calle Duarte near the left of its zone and detailed a machine gun with a small infantry support to each street within its zone. Each battalion protected its own rear and all patrols were to halt upon reaching Calle Separacion. The 9th Company from a position in the vicinity of the Receptoría was prepared to support the advance upon call with

artillery fire. It also furnished a guard for the Receptoría and, extending south to the Legation, prevented armed men from entering the city through its sector. The 3d Battalion (Stiles) consisting of the Seamen Companies from the *Prairie* and the *Culgoa* plus 11 enlisted from the *Castine* was assigned the sector west of Calle Sanchez (exclusive) with a limited objective of manning the entire West Wall. It was to advance to the wall upon signal from the 2d Battalion. The Dolphin's Seaman Company (Patterson) occupied the sector between the Legation and the sea to the south with the task of preventing armed men from entering the city through that sector. The Seaman Company (less 11 enlisted) from the *Castine* (Sherman) occupied Fort Geronimo and prevented armed men from passing on the Carretera del Oeste. A Machine Gun was emplaced on top of a two-story stone house near the Legation. There was no general reserve. There was no preliminary bombardment and no provision for supporting fire from the ships present.

The advance was made as planned without encountering any serious opposition. As soon as the city was completely occupied a column was sent across the river to pursue the rebels who had retreated to the eastward during the night.

This operation furnishes an excellent example of a partial envelopment. The ultimatum delivered to the rebel general gave him notice of the impending attack and opportunity to escape with his troops, which opportunity he embraced. Since his escape was apparently known to the Marine Commander who anticipated only "resistance and sniping - - - from civilian and irregular troops" his plan of covering two sides of the city and advancing down the north and south streets simultaneously appears sound, although the small size of the detachment on each street, necessitated by the weakness of the force available, might have been embarrassing had any determined resistance requiring a house to house advance developed. The uncertainty as to the actions of the Government troops outside of the city and behind our lines further complicated the situation, making it necessary to hold out about one third of the attacking force to prevent them from attempting to enter the city while the American forces were engaged in its seizure. A bombardment of the city was considered undesirable. Fire from the ships present, unless very carefully controlled would have endangered the attacking force. The value of artillery fire of the 9th Company is problematical. It too would have had to be most carefully controlled and communications were not of the best. The main weakness, however, was the absence of any reserve. With the limited force available it is difficult to suggest a means for having obtained a reserve unless the *Dolphin* and *Castine* Companies could have extended their lines so as to include the 9th Company Sector and that company, less gun crews, constituted a reserve available to support either the Marine battalions or the seaman companies opposing the federal troops.

Desirable though it would have been to have occupied the east bank of the Ozama River before the attack on the city, and thus have prevented the escape of the rebel garrison, it is evident that such a disposition would have resulted in a great overextension of the small force available for the operation. Whether or not one of the smaller ships might have run by the fort and taken up a position in the river where it could have closed the passage across the river by gunfire, is problematical when it is considered how close she would have been to Fort Ozama and that every ship present had her Landing Force ashore and consequently was short-handed.

(Continued on page 54)

PEEP SIGHT

What Do You Say?

MAJOR JACOB LIENHARD
United States Marine Corps

■ We, of the Corps, have long been proud of the rifle shooting record of the Marines. There is a distinct thrill in learning, that, again the Marines have won this or that match, that Private Smith or Lieutenant Brown made a score of 347 over the qualification course with the rifle. We also feel elated when our organization, post or station qualifies, as marksmen or better, some ninety per cent of the command and feel sorry for those ranges that qualify but seventy per cent or less.

There has been a great deal of time and thought given to the training of teams to win the National, State and Rifle Association Matches. Higher and higher go the scores, records tumble and we feel secure in the belief that the Corps has the best marksmen in the world, and it has.

What have we done toward training to hit the target in Battle? Many of us, no matter how long and varied our service, know little or nothing about musketry or other forms of combat firing, but we do know how to blacken the sights, set them with a micrometer sight adjuster, study the force and direction of the wind with the aid of a powerful telescope, adjust the sling and fire at the rate of one shot per minute at 600 yards and hit inside the VEE ring. All of which indicates that we are highly trained for that class of firing; but what about hitting the target in battle with its unknown range, indistinct and poorly designated. There is no time to blacken sights and it is practically impossible to set them, even in broad daylight due to the present construction of the rear sight. No windage is given so we leave the setting at zero, (if we know the zero).

The target having been designated, range given etc., the results would probably be something like this: nearly all men will try to set their peep sights; very few will have them correctly set, due to the small interval between range graduations at short and mid ranges. A few will use the battle sight. The ones using the peep sight will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to locate the target, (try it sometime) which will have disappeared before they get on it. The ones using the battle sight will locate their target much quicker, despite the front sight cover which tends to hide it, and the No. 6 battle sight notch which is too small to accommodate the No. 10 front sight properly. These few men will get some hits on the target before it disappears.

All men have been trained to get into a good position, on a good firing line, aim deliberately and fire slowly, all of which tends to make VEES at a thousand yards, but very few at battle ranges (Up to 600 yds.) and under battle conditions as the target ceases to exist by the time they are ready to fire.

There has been a great deal said and written about a new semi-automatic shoulder rifle and it has about passed all tests and will soon be produced in limited quantities for further service tests. What type sights does this rifle have? For any emergency in the near future (short of a major conflict), we will continue to

use the present rifle. We might equip this rifle with a battle sight at relatively small cost by fastening to the moveable base, an adapter with two or three steps on it. With sight leaf down and with the draft slide to the rear, the battle sight setting is about 200 yards. Moving the drift slide forward upon the next step gives a setting of about 400 yds., the next step about 600 yds. The wind gauge would not be used as it seems to be of little use under battle conditions. The battle sight notch should be widened to about a No. 8. For the sake of simplicity and cost, the front sight should remain as at present, including its cover. This battle sight could be set at 200-400, and 600 yards, or so made as to be set at any other setting decided upon. These settings could be accurately and quickly made by anyone, as the shooter can see, and feel the drift slide as it drops into place. This adapter would not interfere, in any way, with the use of the present sights, their setting with or without a micrometer sight adjuster or with the use of the wind gauge, neither does it alter the laying down of the sight leaf. It does interfere with the use of the wind gauge with the battle sight.

It is not believed that any of us wish to abandon the present qualification course. It teaches the recruit the mechanics of firing, the extreme accuracy of both the rifle and ammunition and stimulates interest in competitive firing, (as we now know it) and which we will always have with us, and otherwise teaches a man how to shoot. Certainly the recruit should fire the course as at present, using the present sights, but this should be followed by some simple combat course with the battle sights. The recruit having fired Course "A" and a simple combat course, he is now ready to take his place in combat firing as a member of a group. The Corporal is to conduct the fire of a squad, the Sergeant a section, the Gunnery Sergeant a platoon and the Lieutenant a Company. This combat course is to suit local conditions, it may be complex and realistic where terrain permits; or it may use only a few bobbing, moving, and surprise targets where only the present range is available. Unknown ranges and E targets are to be used.

The question arises; What course shall the Marine fire annually and what extra compensation shall he receive, if any? Probably something like this would do. Individual firing at known ranges with the battle sight as follows:

- 200 yds.—Standing—Target E-10 rounds—bobbars, same as pistol. No sling.
- 300 yds.—Sitting—Target E-10 rounds—bobbars, same as pistol. No sling.
- 500 yds.—Prone—Target D-10 rounds—1 minute, 10 seconds. With sling.
- 600 yds.—Prone—Target D-10 rounds—1 minute, 20 seconds. Sand bag w/sling.
- 200 yds.—Standing—Slow fire as now conducted.
- 600 yds.—Prone—Slow fire as now conducted. Sand bag.

No sighting shots will be allowed at any range. Hits on the E target to count five. Total rounds 60; total score 300. Just what score should be expected must be worked out; however, for the sake of discussion, say 250 for expert; 225 for sharpshooter; 200 for marksman; and a discharge for inaptitude for less than 175 and no promotions for less than 200. Of course age and other physical factors should be considered, as well as special qualifications such as radio, artillery, clerical, etc.

This suggested course is to be fired wearing the combat pack, no pads. The shoulder strap acts as a pad, and the shirt and dungaree coat as an elbow pad.

(Continued on page 56)

IN RE SPRINGFIELD

A Bit of Interesting Research

LIEUTENANT M. M. JOHNSON, JR.
U. S. Marine Corps Reserve

■ The Civil War was fought with almost every type of rifle available, from muzzle loaders to breech-loading repeaters. The lesson on the necessity of interchangeable ammunition was bitterly learned as a result. Books have been written on the multitudes of small arms used in that conflict; it is unnecessary therefore and contrary to the purpose of this paper to discuss them in detail.

By the end of the next decade our ordnance department had developed the famous "single-shot" Springfield B. L. model of 1873 rifle, using the 45-70 black powder cartridge. This arm was used generally in service until after 1900, although it was obsolete from the standpoint of comparative ordnance before the Spanish War. In its day the old Springfield was an excellent weapon, and capable of extreme accuracy. Many famous marksmen "hung up" surprising scores with it. Freeman Bull, of Springfield arsenal fame, and others, obtained comparatively excellent scores on the thousand-yard range. Ballistically the ammunition was slow and heavy, and not noted for its flat trajectory. However, the ammunition is still in use today, especially in improved smokeless powder loads, and it has excellent game-killing propensities in heavy brush country. The bullet commonly used in service weighed 500 grains, propelled by 70 grains of black powder, at a muzzle velocity of about 1250 foot seconds. From a military standpoint it produced relatively few "walking cases."

It is hardly necessary to point out the tactical disadvantages of black powder; and those who find the present service rifle rather severe in recoil are urged to fire several dozen rounds from the old '73 model in the prone position. Although of "single shot" action the '73 is capable of remarkable rapidity of fire, and it is especially simple to instruct the novice to manipulate the "falling-block" mechanism effectively. In brief, the hammer, a monstrous component, is cocked or half cocked, the latch on the side of the breech block is tripped up, opening the breech and ejecting the fired shell, the fresh cartridge is pushed into the chamber and the block slammed shut. As the hammer travels some distance to the firing pin, the "lock-time" is not notably rapid. This rifle will not stand the strain of the breech pressures generated by smokeless powder and shells so loaded should never be used. But even in 1934 it is interesting to play with an old '73 rifle and some freshly loaded black powder ammunition; nor is one so doing in danger of sunburn on a hot summer day, for "in a few rounds" the sun is eclipsed.

Our ordnance department experimented with many types of rifles at the close of the last century, and for a time adopted the Krag-Jorgensen. (For a brief illustrated survey of some of the arms tested refer to Bannerman's Catalogue). In a word the "Krag" model of 1898, was and still is an excellent weapon. Many units in the Spanish War would have profited materially by such equipment. However, as usual we did not have enough to go

around, so the Spanish Mausers were sighted in on many a black smoke puff from the then outranged '73 model. The "Krag" is a five shot "box" magazine bolt action rifle, using the cal. .30-40 cartridge. In this connection it is observed that the figure "40" designates the powder load, in this case 40 grains of smokeless approximately. Thus we have the .45-"70," .25-20, .32-20, .30-30, .38-40, .44-40, .45-90, etc. The only exception is the 250-"3000" Savage which develops about 2900-"3000" foot seconds muzzle velocity. On this basis our present service ammunition is technically .30-"50" as it is loaded with about 50 grains of smokeless of various brands. Many authorities state that the Krag has the smoothest bolt action of any arm of that class. In general it is like the present service rifle, having a similar type safety and the conventional bolt handle, etc. The Krag bolt, which need not be discussed in detail here, is not capable of withstanding as much breech pressure as the 1903 model, in fact, not over 43,000 foot pounds with safety. Thus the ammunition for it is limited in power. The magazine is peculiar; it really is a box, located externally on the right side of the breech. When closed the "follower" is released, forcing the cartridges around under and up past the bolt, thus feeding them in from the left side of the receiver. This magazine facilitates unloading, for when the "box" is opened the shells fall out. The Krag bullet weighs 220 grains and is rounded at the point. It was one of the first so-called "lead-pencil" bullets, having also a lead core, nickel-jacketed. It develops about 2,000 foot seconds at the muzzle, and in range and accuracy compares excellently with some of the most highly developed modern arms. The Krag is certainly an excellent hunting rifle and the ammunition is considered by many authorities as superior to the average "hunting" loads on the market. In fact, Winchester chambers it in their 1895 model lever action rifle. The Krag-Jorgensen in a different caliber is at present used in the Norwegian army. It was the last service rifle in the United States to be made both in rifle and carbine form, the rifle barrel being thirty inches, carbine twenty-two inches.

It is hardly necessary to call attention to the adoption of the Springfield rifle, model of 1903 chambered for the cal. .30 model of 1906 and the new Mark I ammunition. Paul Mauser created a great stir in military circles at that time, to the extent that our ordnance department adopted a slightly modified Mauser bolt action. One of the main features in this action was and is its strength, especially in connection with high breech pressures up to 55,000 foot pounds. Another was the clip loading magazine with "cutoff." [Note: The Krag 1898 model has this "cut-off" feature.] Accounts of the Boer War include comments on the "devastating magazine fire" emanating from Boer Mausers when, after using the piece as a "single loader," the "cut-off" was turned "on" with the approach of assault units. At least the modern rifleman can profit by keeping his magazine full at all times during combat. Moreover, the clip was a great aid in increasing the rate of fire.

Books and articles are available on the service rifle alone, full of arguments pro and con. This discussion is confined to certain general aspects of the subject only.

It is no longer a rumor that the present Springfield is to be replaced in the future by either a Garand or Pedersen "self-loading" or "semi-automatic" rifle. Those who are sentimental about guns will miss the old 1903 model. It is submitted that it will linger on for various purposes for many years to come, at least while we use the present type of ammunition. The action can probably never be superseded by anything short of a "semi-auto" arm.

It is argued, however, that the bolt is too slow, especially the 1903 bolt. It is said that the so-called United States Enfield type, model of 1907 rifle, is superior in that respect. This was omitted above in discussing other service rifles. This Enfield, to digress briefly, was made in our factories for the British in .303 caliber. When we needed rifles in 1917 we did not even have tools enough to make the model 1903, so Remington and Winchester calibered this model of 1917 for the .30-06 cartridge. It appears that the British were never armed with this so-called long Enfield; they used the "short Lee Enfield." However, most of the American drafted and enlisted units used the 1917 model. It has, in the writer's opinion, a superior type of rear sight, chiefly because it is a "receiver" sight on the "peep" principle. This will be considered in another connection. The bolt handle on this model is "crooked," chiefly to bring it back, as it would seem, to a point directly above the trigger. This is said to facilitate rapid fire. However, the piece cocks on the closing stroke, rather than on the raising of the handle as in the 1903 model. Those who are interested in commercial arms will find an almost exact reincarnation of this rifle in the Remington bolt action "express" rifle, which that wily organization has evolved with the aid of their 1917 tools. This piece cocks on the opening stroke, a distinct improvement. It has also the Enfield "thumb safety." It is submitted that there is but little difference in the potential speed of bolt manipulation due to this feature mentioned above as compared to the 1903. The Mannlicher type of bolt represents the extreme of the misplaced-bolt evil, for the handle is several inches in front of the trigger. The "rate of fire" of the 1903 is of course to be found in the manual. That is an individual matter, primarily. At any rate the important factor is potential accuracy in rapid fire. Another factor is the adaptability of this action to green troops. In general manipulation of the bolt in "dry" guns will bring about expert bolt handling. On the 200-yard rapid fire stage using the "A" [slow fire] bulls-eye the writer has witnessed 907° plus scores, fired from prone in less than forty seconds, consistently obtained. On one occasion a score of 44/50 was recorded from the standing position in 29 seconds on the slow fire bull; also a 50 on the rapid fire bull from prone in less than forty seconds. The writer has witnessed effective use of the 1903 bolt on aerial "snap" shooting, a small empty can being put in the water, fired at so as to "hoist" it approximately fifteen to twenty feet in the air and hit usually just as it reached its "ceiling." On these, and many other occasions which the writer has witnessed, the rifleman was not in any way professional. As for "professionals" most of them prefer the "lever" or "trombone" action for such demonstration, primarily because they are representing the makers of those arms. We can ignore them, however, because neither type of arm has sufficient strength to accommodate the powerful ammunition required in service. In passing, it is suggested that since many of our citizens use rifles in hunting, primarily, it is unfortunate that more do not use the service rifle generally, a thorough knowledge of which is so indispensable in wartime. This was especially a lesson learned in the World War, and one is reminded graphically of this point in several of the various service publications. [On pages 119 and 120 of the Infantry School Mailing List 1931-1932, Vol. IV, is an express reference to this training problem. The excellent results of such a thorough knowledge and the use of the hunter's skill is found in "A Marine Tells It to You," Colonel Frederick Wise.]

It would seem that the 1903 continues to have possibilities for the above and other reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it tends to prevent useless wasted fire un-

der excitement. There are many instances of lack of ammunition in the late war for this reason. It would be unwise for the writer in this connection to start any controversy on the relative merits of the so-called "moral effect" of many "cracking" bullets as compared to a few accurate "hitting" bullets; or no bullets at all for either of the above reasons. At least the German morale was troubled and casualties suffered on more than one occasion by accurate rifle fire at 800 yards. The bolt was quite fast enough in such emergencies.

In connection with this question of rapidity of manipulation it is respectfully submitted that the stock of a rifle plays a most important part. Of course the stock is important in other connections as well, such as holding, aiming. The shape of the stock, or rather the dimensions of the stock are of prime importance in selecting a shotgun, but less attention is paid to the rifle.

The writer once saw a "1776" muzzle loader, the stock of which much resembles that of the 1903. However, it must be observed that no two men are alike, hence the service stock must fit all, or, rather, all men must fit it.

That brings up the question of "gun fit," which has great importance in other connections as well, especially on the possibilities of effective anti-aircraft fire by "ground-strafted" units which will be considered later.


As observed above, the service stock must fit the average rifleman. Thus a stock of average dimensions is likely to be too small for the very large men and too large for the very small men. From trigger to butt plate the length of the 1903 stock is about 12.7 inches, the "drop" or "crook" is about 2 inches. While it is submitted that the length of an ideal service stock should not be over 13.6 inches it is suggested the present stock is too short for the most efficient handling of the 1903 bolt, if for no other reason. The expert on rapid fire resorts to the accepted methods of avoiding the bolt when drawn to the rear, but with many this is unnatural and often cases are reported of cuts and bruises about the head near the eye. With the admission that such matters as these are subject to much argument and individual variation, the writer submits that a service stock having a length of 13.2 inches plus is generally a solution to this problem, in addition to the factor of improved balance, a feature quite lacking in the 1903. Certainly it is not necessary to fortify this opinion by citing the reasons why such contact with the bolt mechanism is undesirable. It is submitted that when the head and eyes are in the normal and comfortable position with respect to the line of sight, the bolt should not be in contact with the face when drawn to the rear. One reason why many men are unable to line their sights properly in a hurry is because they instinctively draw the head too far away from the proper natural position on the comb to avoid the bolt. Others who desire the utmost advantage of light and "field" from the peephole in the rear sight, place the head too close to the bolt and hence are obliged to resort to unnatural contortions in manipulation. With longer stocks the movement of the head need be very slight.

There is thus a disadvantage in the inadaptability of the short stock when rapid alignment of the sights is necessary. In part this may be cured by an improved rear or, technically, "receiver" sight which will be considered later. The writer is constantly aware that he is venturing into a field of conflicting opinion on many of these questions. He is prepared to assert that the ability to align and realign sights rapidly is a most important feature in any field of combat, and that any steps which can be taken in the way of design to satisfy this requirement are abundantly justified by the results. Therefore, it is submitted that a stock 13.2 to 13.6 inches in length is justified since

it tends to fit the average man standing in a natural position. He is better able to adapt himself to such a stock. With the present stock it is easier to get "lost" in seeking quickly the line of sight.

Assuming that this is a desirable feature from a military standpoint, attention is called to the shotgun stock in this connection. It may be asserted that by the great weight of authority a shotgun stock for brush, field, trap or skeet shooting must fit the shooter. The fastidious hunter is actually fitted for a stock by measurements; or else he tries a variety of stocks and selects the one which fits him best. Assuming that at least some of the readers have not

field it is common to see the clay targets, travelling at an average speed of 60-75 miles per hour, shattered before they have passed the 20-yard mark, the gun having been off the shoulder when the target was released. The writer has often witnessed clay targets travelling at this speed (60-75 mph) shattered within 10 yards of the trap-house. On several occasions the gunners stood facing the trap-house from 7 yards to 10 yards distant, gun off shoulder, breaking the target before it had passed their position. At several informal tests stop watches registered (0.25) one fourth of one second from the instant the bird was released, which was not "called" by the shooter, until the



MARINE BARRACKS, CAVITE, P. I., 1904

Sitting, left to right: T. C. Treadwell, F. M. Wise, J. H. Pendleton, J. W. Broach, C. J. Guggenheim. Standing, left to right: G. H. Mather, N. P. Vulte, J. A. Hughes, H. M. Howard, R. O. Underwood, T. A. Mott, J. F. Dyer.

played with shotguns, it may be said that the whole basis of wing shooting lies in "pointing." The gunner snaps the piece to his shoulder as his eyes and body in coördination follow the moving object. He does not use any sights; he is hardly aware of the barrel. But where he looks the barrel of his gun must point. Of course he may have to lead the target if it moves across his front, etc., but even then he points ahead by instinct. Most gunners use both eyes and a majority fire their piece by the above process. Two eyes are better than one and the speed which can be developed by "gun-pointing," which is so inevitably dependent upon the fit of the gun which makes the barrel or line of sight coincide with the object on which the eyes are focussed, is quite adequate proof. Thus on a "skeet"

shot was fired. This time was checked mathematically. All of which may be taken to illustrate the effectiveness of gun fit where rapid alignment plus accuracy are demanded. Thus with a properly stocked rifle the piece may be quickly thrown to the shoulder, the eye finding the sights directly in line, or approximately so. Then it is merely necessary to check up or correct the front sight while squeezing the trigger.


It would be unfair to the artisans at Springfield, Mass., to overlook the improved stock with which they equip the "National Match" and N R A sporting type rifles, as well as the M. I. 22 calibre target rifle with which many are familiar. Attention is parenthetically called to the type of receiver sight used on the M. I. 22 and N R A sporter.

The disadvantage of slight extra weight in such a stock is at least partially offset by the increased effectiveness of the piece.

It is not the purpose here to attempt to redesign the service rifle. It is not unlikely that the ordnance department will incorporate certain changes in a future model along such lines. The purpose here is rather to dis-

"peep" and cutting off the side rays which cause some blurring on the other type of slide. This in itself is a tacit admission that there is room for improvement in the issue sight.

In general there are three types of rear sights: the technical "rear" sight, the "receiver" sight which is there mounted, and the "tang" or "peep" sight. The two latter



MARINE BARRACKS, OLONGAPO, P. I.—1904

First row, left to right: R. M. Cutts, A. T. Marix, C. A. Doyen, P. S. Brown, Harry Lee. Second row, left to right: C. Campbell, Dr. Munson, F. C. McConnell, J. C. Beaumont, T. Holcomb. Third row, left to right: Seth Williams, W. A. Pickering, E. A. Green, Dr. Benton, Dr. Fourth Row, left to right: T. C. Turner, E. R. Beadle, R. B. Creecy. Top Row, left to right: C. F. Williams, S. W. Brewster.

cuss briefly some of these points for the stimulation of interest in this general subject. Statements which raise any controversy will be justified for that reason at least. Let us then consider the present service rear sight. Eminent writers have advanced opinions for and against this sight, especially on principle. It is observed that the aperture on the slide used in the Marine Corps is larger and the "notches" dispensed with, thus giving more light in the

utilize the aperture principle which is generally accepted as superior to any other type of iron sight. In a word you simply look through the rather small aperture *near* your eye as through a keyhole; the closer you get the more you can see. But the point is that, unlike the present service sight, your eye is normally close to the aperture, thus enlarging the field of vision. In theory the eye seeks the center of the peep, but when "field" is not essential

the aperture may be appreciably reduced, thus insuring greater accuracy of alignment. As has been suggested with this type of sight the piece may be laid very quickly. The tang sight is used on many sporting rifles, and sporting bolt weapons are normally equipped with the receiver type sight, such as the Lyman No. 48, which is found on most of the Springfield sporters. The great difficulty from a service standpoint is the weakness of many of these sights. It seems that this difficulty could be corrected, however. The receiver sight on the 1917 rifle, while not ideal, partially fulfills this requirement. There are some difficulties with the 1903 due to the design of the receiver, there being little space on top for a firm sight base. Thus the base must be on the side, causing complications.

Attempts have been made to hunt with the 1903 as issued. It is most difficult. As a result modifications on the lines discussed above have been made. It is submitted that except for stationary targets the 1903 imposes severe handicaps. The battle sight is surely difficult to use expeditiously except against cavalry charges or on other targets moving directly toward or away from the firing point. A few old-timers still use the open sight in hunting, but it is rapidly falling into the discard, though some are still found in shooting galleries. The writer once saw a black duck flying "across the bow" pulled down dead with the service rifle, leaf up, but the butcher who committed this "fowl" deed would not disclose whether he used the peep or notch sight in the slide. At least several practical analogies can be drawn between hunting and military requirements, and these may be especially marked when the combat zone is in rough territory. All wars are not waged on the plains of Armageddon. It is also significant that even the B. A. R. and the Browning machine gun are equipped with receiver sights, yet this type of sight is as yet absent on the weapon which needs it most. It will probably be found on the new "semi-automatics."

Some of the philosophers tell us that everything happens from a combination of factors, some of which are controlling, some merely passive yet none the less essential. Thus with the completed rifle the barrel is a controlling factor, yet without superior ammunition it is not comparatively effective. Keenly aware of this, the ordnance department has developed the .30 calibre cartridge to a marked degree, especially during the decade following the World War. One of the most outstanding developments is the "coat-tail" bullet. Back in 1900 the "spitzer" or pointed bullet was adopted for the purpose of reducing air resistance, hence aiding materially "continued" velocity and consequently range. This bullet, however, had the conventional flat base. The new bullet is designed to add to these features decreased air resistance resulting from what may be called "stern drag." This principle will be obvious to those who have driven a sedan automobile through soft snow or dry dust at high speed. The snow or dust eddies around the back of the car and the rear window is covered with it. The new service bullet has a nine degree boat tail which is made near the base quite abruptly since the projectile must have an efficient "bearing" on the lands of the rifling. The reduction of the diameter at the base decreases the friction encountered, actually reducing the suction caused by its rapid passage through the air.

It appears that this bullet alone does not effect a greater muzzle velocity. In fact the present service load of the Mark I ammunition develops 2650 + foot seconds as compared to the 2700 f. s. figure on the old 1906 loads. However, powder charge and bullet weights are to be considered in this connection. The important feature is the reduction of "the rate of the falling off of velocity," or increase of the retained velocity, which results in a marked

increase in range. Thus in tests at Dayton it was shown that when fired at angle of thirty degrees the 1906 ammunition reached the 3300 yard mark, while the Mark I hit the 5900 yard mark. It is observed that the practical effect of this is to reduce the amount of elevation necessary to reach a given point. Up to the 200-yard plus mark there is little difference. Beyond that it becomes increasingly noticeable. The writer has witnessed firing tests at 1800 yards using both types of ammunition. These tests were made with a Lyman 48 sight having the long slide. This sight operates by minutes of angle. Each "click" or quarter turn of the elevating knob equals one minute of angle. One click makes a change of one inch at one hundred yards, and so on. An elevation of 155 minutes or two degrees and thirty-five minutes was required to adjust the point of impact with the 1906 flat base loads; whereas only 123 minutes or just over two degrees were required using the boat tail loads. It is to be observed that the weight of the new bullet is 172 grains while the flat base weighs 150 grains. Tests have shown that for accuracy at extended ranges the projectile must not be too light. In other words a "well-balanced" load is essential. Neither accuracy nor range are the direct result of high muzzle velocity alone. Thus in the International Matches several years ago the best 300 meter load developed from exhaustive tests contained a powder charge of approximately only 36 grains, propelling the 172 grain bullet used at a correspondingly lower velocity over a higher trajectory. It was stated at the time that these loads made groups at 300 meters which could be covered by a silver half dollar. Thus also it is noted that the .30-06 110 grain 3,500 foot-second load available for vermin hunting, though most effective at shorter ranges begins to lose its effect past the 350-yard plus mark, and exceptionally accurate results have been obtained in certain .30-06 220 grain loads at 1,000 yards.

Improvements were made in the jacket of the new bullet. The excessive metal fouling which was so noticeable from the cupro-nickel jacket of the old bullet is happily lacking in the "gilding metal" or copper alloy jacket of its boat-tail successor. Just what the next bullet will be like is conjectural. The "Gerlick" invention may be developed to a practical degree later. It will have many difficulties to overcome, at least from a practical standpoint. However, the factor of penetration will be of future military importance. It is not likely that the rifleman will be burdened with a much heavier type of cartridge than the present one. In fact, at one time it appeared that a smaller cartridge of about .27 calibre was being considered seriously for the semi-automatic, partially for the reason that it would afford increased fire power because the rifleman could carry more rounds.

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THE EDIFICE OF LEADERSHIP

FIRST LIEUTENANT A. R. PEFFLEY
U. S. Marine Corps

*(The morale of an army is as delicate a thing as the reputation of a woman; it is easily destroyed and without it victory is impossible. Those who lightly set out to loosen the bonds of confidence which must unite a general and his troops do a work more deadly than is accomplished by all the shells and poison gas from an enemy's lines.)**

■ In a military or naval library there will be found a great deal of material pertaining to the profession of war; much concerning tactics, strategy, weapons, and drill; much about supply and communication; a great deal on previous campaigns; in fact, text for every science concerning the profession of arms. There will be volumes on how to maneuver regiments, massive technical works on how to build and repair guns, but woefully lacking, there will be little or nothing on how to maneuver a man or how to build and repair soldiers.

It is unfortunate that officers learn how to handle a brigade before they learn how to handle a man. Napoleon placed the value of the moral element in war to all others as three is to one. Knowledge of man was responsible for the successes of Hannibal, for those of Caesar. Only a slight knowledge of history is necessary to know that iron men in wooden ships will beat wooden men in iron ships. The quality of one unit in comparison with another be the units squads or regiments is determined fundamentally by the nature of its leaders. Hence, the reason why one battalion will march into position cheerfully and in good order, while another, operating under exact circumstances will be straggled along the road to the rear. *There are no bad regiments—only bad colonels; there are no bad squads—only bad corporals.*

Before daybreak on the 15th of August, 1870, the French 10th Infantry regiment of the line descended into the plain south of Longville—les-Metz, where a halt was made and coffee prepared. Hardly had arms been stacked when shells from a German cavalry patrol, supported by two field pieces, exploded in the midst of the troops.

Immediately the Colonel disposed his regiment north of the road, he himself, standing in front to lend courage to the men, who had become slightly demoralized by the sudden baptism of fire.

Suddenly, a shell bursting a few feet away badly mutilated his legs. When he had been taken to a position of cover, without uttering the slightest cry of pain, in spite of his horrible injury, he said: "My regret is to be struck in this way, without having been able to lead my regiment on the enemy."

When the surgeon arrived, the Colonel showing him his leg open in two places, said, "Doctor, it is necessary to amputate my leg here." Simultaneously, a wounded man nearby groaned. Ignoring his own suffering the Colonel directed: "See first, doctor, what is the matter with this brave man; I can wait."

Four days later, August 19, 1870, this gallant soldier gentleman, Colonel Ardant du Picq died. There was no complaint in his last words, only a cry of affection for

those things he held dear: "My wife, my children, my regiment, adieu."

Colonel du Picq had devoted a great part of his life to a study of man in battle. The great wisdom resulting therefrom was the heritage of an unappreciative France and an uninterested general staff. It was for Ardant du Picq, burning with a passion for the common good, to do a work which should have been a job for the staff and higher commanders. Though ridiculed at the time by seniors who, content with laurels of former campaigns, neglected their opportunities, du Picq's work lived to be the gospel of the great French leaders to come later. From it we learn why the Fochs, Joffres, Petains will succeed; why the Bazaines, a typical French Commander of the Franco-Prussian war, will fail.

To understand Foch is to study du Picq. Du Picq was such a keen military thinker that with uncanny accuracy he predicted an engagement in which the strategic errors of the Prussians would be counter-balanced by energy plus French passivity and lack of control. Two decades later in the Ecole de Guerre, Foch explained why the strategy of Moltke, wrong in all respects, ended in victory instead of the catastrophe which it deserved, solely because of absence in the French High Command of precisely that "Creed of Combat" the lack of which du Picq deplored. Though he died in 1870, he lives through his writings, his doctrines being the basis of the understanding of a war fought nearly half a century later.

To Du Picq the most insignificant detail concerning the actions of a soldier in the heat of battle was more instructive than library of all the Thiers and Jomini in the world. Inventions, circumstances, and conditions, make great changes in the conduct of war, but the human element, man (which is to all others as three is to one), capable of just so much effort, endurance, sacrifice remains the same. Thus, the nature of the soldier, the essential factor in battle goes unaltered throughout the ages.

Lee once said in describing the principles which governed his conduct in battle. "I think and work with all my power to bring the troops to the right place at the right time. When I order the men forward into battle, I leave my duty to them and to God." He meant that the actual battle is in the hands of the men, but he never disregarded the principle that men fight in accordance with the manner in which they are led. Not neglecting the necessity for co-operation between elements of a command and cohesion within the elements, it is basically true that men fight,—regiments maneuver. Foch has stated that the most powerful element in the strength of an Army is moral force. Inasmuch as moral force is determined essentially by good leadership, those traits, methods of management, and actions of an officer which tend to promote good leadership are well worth studying. It is not enough to achieve a mediocre degree of success when dealing with warm-clad, well-fed, contented men living in barracks. The justification for a military organization is the ability to win battles, and we must strive for a leadership which brings success when men are tired, cold, hungry, and suffering from one of the most predominant of instincts—fear.

In an Army text on "Training Management," one short paragraph is devoted to leadership. It says: "Leadership involves possession by the individual of professional qualifications and those personal characteristics which


*(Sir Frederick Maurice in "Robert E. Lee, the Soldier.")

inspire confidence and loyalty in subordinates." A discussion of the above statement should provide a wealth of text beneficial to all leaders. Many people are natural leaders. They automatically get results. Their regiments march. Others are not; by great diligence or other means they may manage to extract a little sour obedience from their commands, but in an emergency their regiments will be straggled along the road.

Why did the men of a battalion which had done badly in a battle beg Napoleon for a chance to redeem themselves by being put in the van the following day? How did Lee with a meager army, badly equipped, hurl back in shattered remnants five splendidly planned invasions?

to expose them to certain suffering on an uncertain issue." It was this unclad army, suffering from cold and exposure which fought so courageously in the desperate battles of the WILDERNESS and of SPOTTSYLVANIA. The devotion of the Tenth Legion to Caesar was scarcely greater than that of the Army of Northern Virginia to Lee.

History teems with amazing tales of valor inspired by great leaders—men not necessarily born to greatness but men who through diligence, and keen perception have acquired the qualities which inspire cold, suffering, barefooted, men to march. No doubt, Napoleon was a splendid genius, but before that he was an ardent toiler. It is



SCHOOL OF APPLICATION, MARINE BARRACKS, ANNAPOLIS, MD., 1906

Sitting, left to right: W. G. Fay, D. P. Hall, J. H. Russell, F. J. Moses, G. C. Thorpe, H. C. Reisinger. Standing, left to right: W. W. Buckley, J. P. Willcox, B. B. Gossett, Jr., H. B. Pratt, B. Puryear, R. L. Denig, J. E. Semmes, Jr., H. S. Green, R. Coyle, C. F. B. Price, W. C. Wise, C. S. McReynolds.

What force impelled Pickett's men at Gettysburg to charge to certain death across a fire swept ridge? Not superb equipment or splendid uniforms, but a combination of qualities in the leader which inspire men to the greatest heights of devotion to duty.

In a letter to his wife in telling of a maneuver Lee writes as follows: "I could have thrown him ((Meade commanding the Federal right) back further, but I saw no chance of bringing him to battle, and it would only have served to have fatigued our troops by advancing further. If they had been properly provided with clothes, I certainly would have endeavored to have thrown them north of the Potomac, but thousands were barefooted, thousands with only fragments of shoes and all without overcoats, blankets, or warm clothing. I could not bear

true that the ability to lead is more highly developed, naturally, in some than in others. *However, unsuccessful commanders can become good leaders, and natural leaders can improve by a study and development of those qualities on which good leadership is based.*

Before delving into an analysis of those qualities let us pause a moment for a glimpse of the average American soldier—let us see what his instincts are, what things he admires, what he dislikes, what makes him do his best work?

Briefly he is loyal, optimistic, and enthusiastic. He appraises an officer keenly, and is quick to respond to reason. He cannot be bullied or bluffed. If his respect and loyalty are once established by a good officer he will be loud in his plaudits to the extent of exaggeration and he

will forgive mistakes. Conversely, he will be quick to sense incompetency and somewhat harsh in his judgment. Ninety-five times out of a hundred he wants to do his duty, and achieve advancement, and three or four times of the remaining five he could be saved by intelligent leaders with enough interest to practice a little loyalty down. The percentage of men beyond reform is small. If greater than five in a hundred the leaders are either stupid or lethargic in doing their duty. He dislikes familiarity but greatly appreciates friendliness. He is sentimental and affectionate although he will usually try to conceal these traits by strong language and a spirit of bravado. He gets into trouble principally through three things, all of which he is grossly ignorant; namely, (1) drinking, (2) women, (3) signing chits. In most cases he could be saved by a little friendly instruction. All in all he's a pretty good fellow and mighty fine company in a tight place.

Although men throughout the ages are in general the same, methods of leadership, constant in principle, must vary in accordance with the nature and intelligence involved. A different kind of leadership is required in dealing with enthusiastic, thinking, troops, than with those ignorant and mutinous. That is, Wellington's "gang of cut-throats" at Waterloo required a different type of leadership than the "King's Own." Likewise, methods must be varied in accordance with the individual. Some men respond by being kicked, some by being complimented. Punishments should be in accordance with circumstances, to a great extent being based on whether the offense was wilful or innocent, whether caused by maliciousness or ignorance. Though men are essentially the same throughout the ages each is different from the other.

We are interested primarily in the type of leadership best suited in dealing with the young, intelligent, American soldier, and the following effort has been made to portray those qualities best suited to our work. No effort has been made to give them relative importance except in a general way.

Most men no doubt are too frail to possess all of the enumerated qualities. In fact many successful leaders have only a few—but these few highly developed. However, the more of the qualities an individual possesses the better his chance to achieve greatness. Let us now refer to the figures and discuss the qualities as there depicted.

Heritage, Environment, and Training. These are in the foundation and are the factors which determine charac-

ter. Needless to say, however, lack of the above is not necessarily fatal—the world will always gleam with the brilliance of self-made men who would by sheer determination, hard work, and personal ambition have succeeded. Even in the exceptional cases, though, it will usually be found that the heritage of the successful man, although perhaps obscure, is thoroughly sound.

Honesty, Truthfulness, Cleanliness, and Honor. The basis of greatness is character—fundamental moral character. Without the above qualities an individual for a time may appear to achieve some success, but eventually the dishonest will be caught and the untruthful found out. By cleanliness is meant moral as well as physical cleanliness. A mind respecting things sacred will be more susceptible to acquiring keenness of perception, and will tend to absorb and be influenced by things worth while more than the mind fettered with the rubbish of unclean thoughts. A clean body is the basis of health, the most precious of all gifts. Cleanliness and health are fundamental in the efficiency of an army. Honor embodies the foregoing virtues. It means doing what is right. It is the very fabric of character. No man can become great unless he is honorable.

Professional ability. This quality alone will compensate for lack of many things in a leader. It means knowing how to do your job. Such knowledge automatically creates respect.

Force does not mean a strong arm and a loud voice. It means a quiet firmness, an ability to punish swiftly and justly, to applaud when possible, and to take charge when necessary.

Courage falls into two classes—moral courage and physical courage. Having moral courage means possessing ability to perform a distasteful duty—it means doing what is right even though the task is difficult. Physical courage even though the task is difficult. Physical courage implies the conquering of fear. A man without fear is either dull mentally or suffering from lassitude. Fear is one of the most predominant of man's instincts. There is no disgrace in being afraid. However, it is incumbent upon a leader to conceal any feeling of fear he may have and to do his duty in spite of danger. Hesitancy, indecision, and lack of courage in a leader will quickly reflect in the man.

Assiduity is closely associated with toil. It means working devotedly with enthusiasm. It is the mother of genius.

Enthusiasm, Energy, Perseverance, and Earnestness.



CAMP ELLIOTT, CANAL ZONE, 1908

Enthusiasm derived from the Greek, meaning "God striving within us," means working gladly and energetically for accomplishment. It is the difference between the man who watches the clock and gets ready to rush away five minutes early and the worker who, enthusiastic about his task, looks at the clock in surprise when the whistle blows. Work and duty should be made so interesting that enthusiasm will come automatically. An officer can accomplish this by having a keen knowledge of the work at hand, by friendly competitions among the units of his command, by imagination in creating new "wrinkles," and by a sense of humor.

Energy means capacity for doing. Many times it will compensate for mediocre ability. It is a derivative of good health and enthusiasm.

Perseverance is nothing more than the ability to stick with a job until it is finished. It is the enemy of "Can't." It means having a hole in the target rather than a reason why it couldn't be done. It means a bull's eye, not an alibi.

Earnestness. This quality means working seriously and loyally. It implies interest and enthusiasm.

Tact, Courtesy, and Diplomacy. These are the products of common sense and good breeding. Tact is the quality tending to produce harmony in human relationship. It is the oil of military machinery. It implies a knowledge of human nature. Courtesy is nothing more than politeness. It means being a gentleman. It indicates no lack of firmness. In fact it suggests strength. As an example in the case of a reprimand the commanding officer who addresses the offender in a courteous, intelligent manner, will find he has done a much better job and has made much more of an impression than he who blasphemes and beats his desk.

Diplomacy is an art in itself. It is closely associated with tact. It means not giving offense unintentionally.

These three kindred virtues are nothing more than pleasant qualities of gentlemen in human relationship.

They must not be confused with sycophancy.

Justice means giving a man what he rates. It is one of the traits an officer must possess. It is the very fibre of morale and discipline. An officer will do well to study a situation carefully, though it involve promotion or punishment, before making a decision.

Loyalty is something more than carrying out regulations. It means devotion to the scheme of the commander. It means having an interest in subordinates and seeing that they get what they deserve. It means enthusiasm and affection for an organization be it a nation or a squad. There can be no greatness without it.

Self-Discipline. An officer who loses control of himself in petty emergencies will be incompetent in a great crisis. Display of temper and profane language do nothing more than clog the wheels of accomplishment at a time when they should be functioning the best.

Common Sense, Acumen, and Judgment. The word common means not unusual, ordinary. Yet common sense is really rare. It means logical, fundamental intelligence. Acumen is the ability to perceive keenly. These are the fore-runners of good judgment which is vital in making decisions. The estimate of the situation is the military application of the above qualities.

Dignity and Neatness. "The apparel oft proclaims the man." Dignity is closely associated with good taste. It means acting in a manner worthy of one's position and rank. It involves cleanliness and neatness in dress and person. It pays large dividends as it is reflected in the actions and appearance of an officer's troops. It gives an officer confidence and keeps his morale high.

Sense of Humor. This trait is placed last to emphasize its importance. It is a balm for wounds. It eases many trying situations and saves individuals a lot of grief. He who has it is fortunate.

METHODS OF MANAGEMENT

Let us now analyze the situation which should exist

between an officer and his unit for the production of the highest state of efficiency. Let us view the mental processes an officer should go through before attempting to command. Too often a commander does too little thinking—too little scheming in his management; perfunctorily he carries out regulations, adheres to a schedule, and in a general way does his duty. This is not enough. He should devote a great deal of thought to his command; he should scheme and plot and plan how to make things function better. First he should have a clear idea of the mission of his commander and should strive to fit his unit to perform that mission. Too frequently he growls over



SITKA, ALASKA—MARINE BARRACKS IN FOREGROUND, 1910

(Continued on page 53)

SELECTIONS

Selection Board Data

The following recommendations have been made by the last two Selection Boards. These recommendations have been approved by The President:

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL (LINE)

Colonel James T. Buttrick

TO BRIGADIER GENERAL (STAFF—ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR'S DEPARTMENT)

Colonel Clayton B. Vogel

FOR RETENTION (LINE)

Colonel John C. Beaumont

Colonel Presley M. Rixey

TO COLONEL (LINE)

Lt. Col. John R. Henley

Lt. Col. Ross E. Rowell

Lt. Col. Paul A. Capron

Lt. Col. John Potts

Lt. Col. Edward A. Ostermann

Lt. Col. John Marston

Lt. Col. Samuel M. Harrington

Lt. Col. Harold L. Parsons

Lt. Col. Julian C. Smith

Lt. Col. Charles J. Miller

TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LINE)

Major David L. S. Brewster

Major Harold S. Fassett

Major James T. Moore

Major Louis W. Whaley

Major Thomas E. Bourke

Major LeRoy P. Hunt

Major Clifton B. Cates

Major Leo D. Hermle

Major Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr

Major Frank Whitehead

Major Roswell Winans

Major Robert Blake

Major Alfred H. Noble

TO THE GRADE OF MAJOR (LINE)

Eugene Francis Crowley Collier

Jesse Lee Perkins

Harold Douglas Shannon

Prentice Selden Geer

Richard Oulahan Sanderson

Edwin James Mund

Lee Hoxie Brown

Robert Eunson Mills

Richard Livingston

Harold Cornell Major

Fred Sevier Robillard

Blythe Gold Jones

Herman Reinhold Anderson

Clarence Monroe Ruffner

George Thomas Hall

Robert Charles Kilmartin, Jr.

Edward Arthur Craig

Julian Pragoft Brown

Bernard Dubel

Leland Stanford Swindler

Howard Neville Stent

Ford Ovid Rogers

Walter Greatsinger Farrell

Ralph Redmond Robinson

Hamilton Maxwell Harry Fleming

Frederick Edmund Stack

Merritt Austin Edson

Curtis Wade LeGette

Joseph Howard Fellows

Louis Glass DeHaven

Lester Adolphus Dessez

George Walker Shearer

Claude Andrew Phillips

John Wesley Beckett

John Halla

Kenneth Alan Inman

Lester Nash Medaris

Frank Bryan Goettge

Donald Guthrie Oglesby

Byron Fillmore Johnson

Alfred Charles Cottrell

John Taylor Selden

Elmer Edwards Hall

Henry Arthur Carr

Solon Caldwell Kemon

Harry Bluett Liversedge

Merton Jennings Batchelder

George Edward Monson

James Winfield Flett

William Carvel Hall

Arnold Conrad Larsen

William Jennings Wallace

Amor LeRoy Sims

Moses Joseph Gould

George Riley Rowan

Theodore Hamilton Cartwright

Richard Henry Schubert

William John Whaling

Herman Henry Hanneken

Daniel Russell Fox

William Ulrich

Vernon Melvin Guymon

Edward Gillette Hagen

James Lambie Denham

Floyd Wesley Bennett

TO THE GRADE OF CAPTAIN (LINE)

Leslie Howard Wellman

Guy Bernard Beatty

William Conrad Lemly

Maxwell Howard Mizell

Charles William Kail

Arthur Theodore Mason

Reginald Herber Ridgely, Jr.

Caleb Thayer Bailey

Robert J. Straub

Clarence Joseph Chappell, Jr.

John Dwight Muncie

Philip Lenard Thwing

William Ernest Burke

Robert Gordon Hunt

James Edwin Kerr

William Grant Manley

Albert Dustin Cooley

Theodore Anderson Holdahl

(Continued on page 34)

GENERAL MYERS RETIRES

BRIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN T. MYERS, USMC

Place and date of birth: Germany—29 January, 1871.
Usual residence: California.
Next of kin: Wife.
Appointed from: Georgia.

SERVICE RECORD

Appointed Naval Cadet—27 September, 1887.
Honorably discharged—1 July, 1894.
Appointed Assistant Engineer, U. S. Navy—22 August, 1894; 2d Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.—6 March, 1895;
1st Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.—11 August, 1898;
Captain, U.S.M.C.—3 March, 1899; Major—1 April, 1905; Lieut.-Colonel—15 October, 1915;
Colonel—29 August, 1916; Brigadier-General (T)—1 July, 1918.
Reverted to Colonel—5 August, 1919; Brigadier-General—5 July, 1929;
Major-General (T)—1 October, 1931; Major-General—1 September, 1933.

HOME STATIONS

1895-1896—M.B., Washington, D. C.
1905-1906—M.B., Washington, D. C.
1909-1912—M.B., Mare Island, Cal.; Ft. Leavenworth, Kas.; M.B., Philadelphia, Pa.
1913-1915—M.B., Mare Island, Cal.; San Francisco (Naval Training Station).
1916—M.C.B., San Diego, Cal.
1918-1919—M.B., Parris Island, S. C.; M.B., Quantico, Va.; Headquarters, U.S.M.C.
1924—M.C.B., San Diego, Cal.
1928-1933—Headquarters, Marine Corps.
1933—Headquarters, Dept. Pacific, San Francisco, Cal.

FOREIGN STATIONS

1898—Olongapo, P. I., and Guam, L. I.
1899—Philippines.
1900—China.
1901—Philippines.
1906-1907—Philippines.
1913-1914—Honolulu, T. H.
1919—Honolulu, T. H.
1925-1928—Haiti.

DECORATIONS

1898—Spanish Campaign.
1899—Philippine Campaign.
1900—China (Boxer Campaign).
1901—Brevet Major (China).

1903—Expeditionary (Syria).
1914—Mexican Campaign.
1917-1918—Victory Medal.

SCHOOLS ATTENDED

1895-1896—School of Application, Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C.
1896-1905—Naval War College, Newport, R. I.
1911—School of the Line, Fort Leavenworth, Kas.
1912—Army War College, Washington, D. C.
1922-1923—Field Officers' School, Quantico, Va.

SEA DUTY

1898-1901—USS *Charleston*, USS *Baltimore*.
1904—USS *Brooklyn*.

1907-1909—USS *West Virginia*, USS *Tennessee*.

1913—USS *Buffalo*.

1916-1917—USS *Wyoming*, USS *Pennsylvania*.

REMARKS

Forty-seven years and three months of service.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Office of the Secretary
Washington

2 January, 1935.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Major General John T. Myers, U.S.M.C.

Subject: Retirement.

1. On 29 January, 1935, you will have attained the statutory retiring age of sixty-four years and, in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 384, made applicable to the Marine Corps by the Act of Congress ap-

proved 29 May, 1934 (Public No. 263, 73rd Congress), and those of U. S. Code, Supplement VII, Title 5, Section 47a, will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Marine Corps from 1 February, 1932.

2. You will, therefore, on 1 February, 1935, stand detached from Headquarters, Department of the Pacific, San Francisco, Calif., and from all active duty and will proceed to your home, reporting your arrival and address to the Major General Commandant.

3. For over forty-seven years you have served your country well, at home, at sea and abroad. Following participation in the Spanish-American War on the U.S.S. *Charleston*, you distinguished yourself in battle in the defense of the foreign legations at Peking, China, during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. For eminent and conspicuous conduct on that occasion you were advanced four numbers in grade, and were appointed Major by brevet for distinguished conduct in the presence of the enemy. In the fighting at Peking you were

(Continued on page 51)



"* * * your devotion to your Corps and country has been outstanding. * * *"

PROMOTED



BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS HOLCOMB

Delaware can well boast of her native son, "Tommy" Holcomb, for he has carried her colors to all seven seas. He hoisted them in Canada—when but a youngster he invaded that country with our rifle team and returned with the world's long distance rifle shooting record. Having chalked that up to his credit, he became interested in China and her problems, and today we find him as our authority on that country, especially as concerns Marine Corps affairs. Again as some thousands of young Americans have grown into middle age and have scattered themselves throughout the United States, in their memories will linger long the great work and fine friendships of General Holcomb when in France, back in 1917 and 1918, they all soldiered together in our famous Sixth Regiment, particularly around Bois de Belleau and Blanc Mont.

General Holcomb's elevation to flag rank was only a matter of time—it just had to be; the Corps is fortunate and we all rejoice with him!

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES CARSON BRECKINRIDGE

As time tolled General Myers to the retired list on the last day of January, it added another star on the shoulder of General James C. Breckinridge, and made him the Commanding General, Department of the Pacific. Last September, when the Admirals' Board looked around for a new Major General, they settled upon him—it was natural. They all knew him—they grew up with him—and their recollections carried them to him as a shipmate on one ship after another, first in the J. O.'s mess and later in the wardroom.

His marine guards were all of the "Breckinridge stamp"—business-like, quiet and smart—they could be none other with him as their example.

When rank and service no longer permitted him to say, as he always gloried in saying, when a shipmate inquired as to the time he had left to do on his present cruise, "Sir, I am just beginning my cruise!" he turned his attention toward "bringing up the youngsters properly." This he did through his Seagoing School policies, which have made their influence felt already and have won the heart of many a young officer.

Arkansas may well be proud of her son who has carried her name far and wide. Our wish is that his flag may continue to wave success.



SELECTION BOARD DATA*(Continued from page 31)*

Lewis Burwell Puller
 Ernest Edward Shaughnessey
 James Edward Jones
 Herbert Peter Becker
 William Charles Purple
 Robert Osborne Bare
 Perry Kenneth Smith
 Charles Laird Fike
 George Harcourt Bellinger, Jr.
 Raymond Algot Anderson
 Charles Frederick Cresswell
 Walter James Stuart
 James Henry Natt Hudnall
 Charles Griffith Meintz
 Alexander Walter Kreiser, Jr.
 Thomas Cothran Perrin
 Lenard Baker Cresswell
 Thomas Jackson McQuade
 St. Julien Ravenel Marshall
 Tilghman Hollyday Saunders
 LePage Cronmiller, Jr.
 Kenneth Baldwin Chappell
 Samuel Kennerly Bird
 Walter Irvine Jordan
 Arthur William Ellis
 Edwin Cooper Ferguson
 Homer Laurence Litzenberg, Jr.
 Wilburt Scott Brown
 Theodore Baldwin Millard
 Floyd Albert Stephenson
 Samuel Smith Ballentine
 James Patrick Sinnott Devereux
 David Kerr Claude
 Edward John Trumble
 Harold Douglas Harris
 Martin Stuart Rahiser
 Frank Julins Uhlig
 Adolph Zuber
 Robert Edward Hogabloom
 Francis Harry Brink
 James Snedeker
 John Dean Blanchard
 John Neely Hart
 Lionel Claudius Goudeau
 Alfred Reed Pefley
 Sidney Roosevelt Williamson
 John Hillard Stillman
 Hawley Chapel Waterman
 James Ogden Brauer
 Thomas Cleland Green
 Andrew James Mathiesen
 Joseph Charles Burger
 Calvin Rush Freeman
 Verne James McCaul
 Leslie Ferdinand Narum
 Ion Maywood Bethel
 John Francis Hough
 Robert Lee Griffin, Jr.
 Archie Vernon Gerard
 Edward Lawrence Pugh
 Lawrence Norman
 Earl Henry Phillips
 Paul Albert Putnam
 Matthew Charles Horner
 James Marsh Ranck
 Presley Morehead Rixey, 3rd

Lee Norris Utz
 Francis Jennings McQuillen
 Edward Walter Snedeker
 Kenneth Wachter Benner
 John Somerville Eaton Young
 Kenneth Hall Cornell
 Arthur Howard Butler
 Hartnoll Jackman Withers
 Nels Herning Nelson
 Russell Nelson Jordahl
 Chester Baird Graham
 Mortimer Shepard Crawford
 Benjamin Franklin Kaiser, Jr.
 Elmer Henry Salzman
 Thomas Andrews Wornham
 Thomas Branch Jordan
 Earle Sutherland Davis
 Roy Moyer Gulick
 Con David Silard
 Ward Elliott Dickey
 William Dabney Saunders, Jr.
 David Monroe Shoup
 Lofton Russell Henderson
 Walter Howard Troxell
 Thomas Grady McFarland
 John Ralph Lanigan
 Raymond Earle Hopper
 Francis Butler Loomis, Jr.
 John Harry Coffman
 Robert Haden McDowell
 Thomas Donald Marks
 Wallace Oscar Thompson
 John Houghton Griebel
 Peter Paul Schrider
 James Fullerton Shaw, Jr.
 Edward Theodore Peters
 William Wallace Benson
 Carroll Williams
 Raymond Conklin Scollin
 Samuel Sloan Jack
 Henry Reid Paige

Of this list of officers the first 6 Lieutenant-Colonels to Colonel, 5 Majors to Lieutenant-Colonel, 3 Captains to Major and 9 First Lieutenants to Captain will, as far as can be foreseen, make their numbers on or before July 1, 1935.—Ed.

The "Fleet Marine Force" is to the Marine Corps what "The Fleet" is to the Navy.

CAPTAIN HORAN ADVANCED

■ Captain Leo F. Horan, U. S. Marine Corps, legal aide on the staff of Rear Admiral W. C. Watts, U. S. Navy, Commandant, Fourth Naval District, at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, was on 7 January admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States.

Captain Horan is a graduate of Temple University Law School and has been a member of the Bar of the Philadelphia County courts since 1919. He lives with his wife, the former Rena P. Fox, at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. He is a member of the American Bar Association, Military Order of Foreign Wars, Penn Athletic Club, and has been in the Marine Corps since 1917. While on duty in St. Thomas he was legal aide to the first three Governors of the Virgin Islands; a Government Attorney, and also for a short time District Judge.

SUPPORTING THE FLEET MARINE FORCE

A Plan to Have "Marine Minute Men"

■ The Marine Corps Reserve is composed, in the majority, by men who have served valuable time in the regular Corps, and the group of officers who compose the commissioned and warrant register number among them a large percentage who have served a considerable period upon active service or whose most prized possession is a Good Conduct Medal. In addition there is a scattering of former Army, Naval Militia, and National Guard officers who have served with Marines or who through association and fraternity have been well moulded to the pattern, leavened by younger officers who know the Corps only through contact at camps, and from reading and brief associations. Taken in the mass the commissioned group represents a valuable adjunct to the regular service and it is most desirable that these individuals be used to the greatest advantage in time of emergency or war; but it is especially important that they fit into an expanded Marine Corps in the early days of mobilization, to the least detriment on both sides, that they themselves be not discouraged nor cast in minimized roles as amateurs but also that the Corps shall not fail to utilize to the utmost the capabilities of many when the need is greatest.

It is a foregone conclusion that there is some "essence" that makes a Marine, some "esprit" or pride or bravado; some mental attitude is inculcated in the Marine that we do not always find in the mass of men in other walks. Just as the old time Non-Com goes on forever shaping the Corps to its destiny, in spite of change, and innovation and improved technique continues to mould in new form the same old mental attitude of the Corps, so also has this leaven worked in the earlier days of a large number of the officers in the reserve. It is too valuable to waste and dissipate in the haste and urgency of complete mobilization, and infinitely too precious to stifle during long periods of peace.

At the present time the Reserve is organized into a Fleet Reserve and a Volunteer Reserve; in general the former consists of the organized reserve battalions, regiments and aviation units, the latter being the large mass of officers and men loosely grouped into casual companies and "paper" regiments, this group is now all assigned to the Volunteer Reserve. It is true that the Fleet Reserve also contains those invaluable non-commissioned officers who have transferred thereto after sixteen or twenty years' service whose abilities in emergency will be especially in demand because while in technique of drill they will be behind the times they do grasp and hold that sacred flame "esprit de corps" to impart to and leaven the mass of new men who will be taken in the ranks. There are, however, now in the Volunteer Reserve many former Fleet Reserve officers who in much resemble these transferred men, being former officers or non-commissioned officers with perhaps four or more years in the regular Corps, who have performed both in the "old" reserve and the new, considerable active duty, who still maintain contacts and associations with the regular service, and who remain at heart and in spirit a living part of the Corps, feeling that their civil life is just a long indefinite assignment away from duty until needed.

This group offers an extremely valuable service, it affords the Corps a "cadre" of loyal, devoted officers to the number of perhaps forty or more, not as skilful of course as the regular officers in function and routine, but certainly just as much Marine Officers. Many of these men have for years kept constantly prepared for active service with military gear in readiness to move, and always knowing just how they would arrange or dispose of business affairs that they might report if called upon with minimum of delay. Many would instantly sacrifice business or position within twenty-four hours upon receipt of a telegram from Headquarters.

These officers of the present Volunteer Reserve would welcome a new obligation if offered by Headquarters: the creation of a FLEET MARINE RESERVE FORCE, to be composed of those members of the reserve who upon selection by Headquarters would obligate themselves to report for duty with the least possible delay, fully equipped for general duty, upon receipt of telegraphic orders. The suggested group would serve as part of the replacements or reinforcements to the newly created and thoroughly splendidly conceived Fleet Marine Force.

While the more complex Fleet Reserve battalions and regiments were being mobilized, with some men dropping out and new ones coming in (as has happened to National Guard units to the demoralization of the whole unit for a time) and while these larger bodies are being transported, encamped, and brought to combat efficiency, they cannot be expected to take the field or embark within the week or month.

With the opening of a campaign, enlistments will be pouring into the regular Corps, that vast army of "Ex-Marines" will be clamoring for their old roles, and the facilities and personnel will meet great demands of expansion, as combat units of regulars are organized to serve as supports or further instalments of the Fleet Marine Force. To picture further the scene when an emergency arises, there is first the mobilization of the Fleet Marine Force and its departure with the Fleet, an authorized increase in the Corps and the mobilization of the Reserve. This latter will necessarily be too slow to serve the immediate needs of the Fleet mission, and the gathering and training of the Volunteer Reserve will tend more toward strengthening the organized reserve units, replacing specialists and naval shore station detachments than splicing out the Fleet force. Upon the regular Corps, the Ex-Marines and new recruits will the brunt of first operations fall—and just here is a mission many officers of the reserve can fulfill.

Officers designated for the Fleet Marine Reserve Force would report for duty as individuals to posts and commands designated in advance, their probable duties known and prepared for, lacking of course the skill in technique which daily practice makes perfect, but full of that proud self confidence and that basic training which in every Marine makes for fulfillment of any assignment. Instead of being a unit of reservists they would as individuals be assigned duties with the increased Corps, old habits of discipline and training would reassert themselves among their brother officers of the regular service, it would not take many days to become thoroughly capable, for the drill and tactics of the day would find a quick placement upon the strong old foundation that had always existed. When

(Continued on page 53)

CONGRATULATIONS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington, D. C.

29 December, 1934.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Brigadier General Louis McC. Little,
U.S.M.C.

Via: The Major General Commandant.

Subject: Special letter of Commendation.

1. I have read with gratification a letter from the Major General Commandant, dated 30 October, 1934, recommending special recognition of your services in the Republic of Haiti as described in the following citation:

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in the line of his profession in a duty of great responsibility as Brigade Commander and Commanding General, First Marine Brigade, on duty in the Republic of Haiti from June 3, 1931, to August 15, 1934, at which time the American Forces of occupation were withdrawn from Haiti. During this period General Little displayed marked intelligence, diplomacy, tact and judgment in the execution of his duties, and through his thoughtfulness and interest for betterment in all public services, his general friendliness and whole-hearted concurrence in matters of grave or minor importance, won for himself and those under his command the sincere admiration and respect of the Haitian people, which was so plainly manifested in the peaceful withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti."

2. The Major General Commandant's recommendation was forwarded to the Board of Awards in the Navy Department and that board, after careful consideration, recommended that you be addressed a special letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy, such letter to become a part of your official record.

3. Your performance of duty in command of the Marine Brigade in the Republic of Haiti was marked by those qualities of character and leadership essential to the successful accomplishment of an important and responsible mission, and merits and receives my approbation. I take pleasure in commending you for exceptionally meritorious service.

4. A copy of this letter will be made a part of your official record.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON

The Association desires to congratulate:

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Schmidt on having obtained the greatest number of members during the year 1934.

Lieutenant Colonel Holland Smith on his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Commanding General, Department of the Pacific.

The State Department notified the Major General Commandant's office that the Commander's Cross of the Order of the Crown of Yugoslavia was awarded by His Majesty King Alexander to Captain Louis Cukela, U.S.M.C., for World War service. The decoration will be held in the State Department pending action of Congress.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Washington, D. C.

31 December, 1934.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: First Lieutenant Robert H. Rhoades,
U.S.M.C.

Via: The Major General Commandant.

Subject: Special letter of Commendation.

1. I have read with gratification a report from the Squadron Commander, VS Squadron 14-M, Aircraft Battle Force, dated 15 October, 1934, relative to a highly commendable action on your part in saving the life of a young woman at Willoughby Beach, Ocean View, Virginia, on 8 August, 1934. That report, together with the reports of eye witnesses, was forwarded to the Board of Awards, Navy Department, and the board, after careful consideration, recommended that you be addressed a special letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy, such letter to become a part of your official record.

2. It appears from the Squadron Commander's report that the young woman, who was unable to swim, accidentally got beyond her depth and cried for help. Another member of her swimming party went to her assistance but was unable to bring her in to safety and lost his own life in the attempt. Immediately upon seeing their distress, you and another Marine officer swam to the spot where the couple was struggling and after considerable difficulty succeeded in pulling her ashore. After that you both returned to the spot and dove for over half an hour endeavoring to locate the man who had disappeared beneath the surface. Testimony of eye witnesses brings out the further fact that the rescue was made much more difficult because of the treacherous currents and strong undertow prevalent at that point. Not the least commendable feature of your gallant action was your unwillingness to make any report of an incident which was most creditable to you.

3. Your prompt and courageous action which resulted in the saving of one life and your determined efforts to bring the other bather to the surface were in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service and merit and receive my warm commendation.

4. A copy of this letter will be made a part of your official record.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON

The Marine Corps Association congratulates General Myers on his long and distinguished career as a Marine officer and wishes to assure him of the fact that his many friends and admirers regret exceedingly that they will no longer have the pleasure of serving in his commands, and that they wish him a most happy cruise on the retired list.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY
Washington, D. C.

29 December, 1934.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Colonel Clayton B. Vogel, U.S.M.C.
Via: The Major General Commandant.
Subject: Special letter of Commendation.

1. I have read with gratification a letter from the Major General Commandant, dated 30 October, 1934, recommending special recognition of your services in the Republic of Haiti as described in the following citation:

"For exceptionally meritorious services in the line of his profession while in a position of great responsibility as Assistant Commandant and Commandant of the Garde d'Haiti from November 12, 1930, to August 15, 1934, at which time the American Forces of occupation were withdrawn from Haiti. During the whole of this service, and particularly during the period of his incumbency as Commandant of the Garde d'Haiti, Lieutenant Colonel Vogel distinguished himself by his efficiency, tact, and fine cooperation with other activities in Haiti, and aided in obtaining and maintaining a high standard of discipline essential to the welfare of the Republic. He inspired the officers and enlisted men under his command, and greatly affected the peak of efficiency attained by the Garde. As Commandant of the Garde d'Haiti during the period of its complete Haitianization he rendered to the Republic remarkable service, the effect of which will remain for a long time."

2. The Major General Commandant's recommendation was forwarded to the Board of Awards in the Navy Department and that board, after careful consideration, recommended that you be addressed a special letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy, such letter to become a part of your official record.

3. Your performance of duty as Assistant Commandant and Commandant of the Garde d'Haiti was marked by qualities of efficiency, tact and cooperation which made possible the accomplishment of an important and responsible mission in a manner reflecting credit upon the Naval Service and upon the United States Government. I take pleasure in commending you for a service which was outstanding, both in leadership and in administrative ability.

4. A copy of this letter will be made a part of your official record.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON

JOHNNY BECKETT AT IT AGAIN

He came to us as an All-American tackle from the wooded State of Oregon—he starred on our Big Teams—he coached a score of them with success—he was drafted to assist in coaching the midshipmen—he won a nice reputation for his work in Haiti, and now to cap things he has won the right to paint an "E" on each and every one of the guns manned by his Marines on the U.S.S. *Idaho*.

Congratulations to you, Captain Beckett, also to you, Lieutenant Claude, and finally to the smart gun crews. We touch our caps to you all.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY
Washington, D. C.

31 December, 1934.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Captain Francis Kane, U.S.M.C.
Via: The Major General Commandant.
Subject: Special letter of Commendation.

1. I have read with gratification a report from the Squadron Commander, VS Squadron 14-M, Aircraft Battle Force, dated 15 October, 1934, relative to a highly commendable action on your part in saving the life of a young woman at Willoughby Beach, Ocean View, Virginia, on 5 August, 1934. That report, together with the reports of eye witnesses, was forwarded to the Board of Awards, Navy Department, and that board, after careful consideration, recommended that you be addressed a special letter of commendation by the Secretary of the Navy, such letter to become a part of your official record.

2. It appears from the Squadron Commander's report that the young woman, who was unable to swim, accidentally got beyond her depth and cried for help. Another member of her swimming party went to her assistance but was unable to bring her in to safety and lost his own life in the attempt. Immediately upon seeing their distress, you and another Marine officer swam to the spot where the couple was struggling and after considerable difficulty succeeded in pulling her ashore. After that you both returned to the spot and dove for over half an hour endeavoring to locate the man who had disappeared beneath the surface. Testimony of eye witnesses brings out the further fact that the rescue was made much more difficult because of the treacherous currents and strong undertow prevalent at that point. Not the least commendable feature of your gallant action was your unwillingness to make any report of an incident which was most creditable to you.

3. Your prompt and courageous action which resulted in the saving of one life and your determined efforts to bring the other bather to the surface were in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service and merit and receive my warm commendation.

4. A copy of this letter will be made a part of your official record.

CLAUDE A. SWANSON

NOTICE!

The following back numbers of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE are needed for the files of the Marine Corps Association:

- 1918: March, June, September.
- 1919: September, December.
- 1920: March, June, September and December.
- 1921: March, June, September and December.
- 1922: March and June.
- 1923: September.
- 1925: June, September and December.
- 1927: September.
- 1928: December.
- 1929: March and June.
- 1930: March, June, August and November.
- 1931: November.
- 1932: February, May and November.

A standing offer of from \$2.00 to \$5.00 per copy will be paid upon the receipt of any of these back copies.

NICARAGUA HONORS COL. DENIG

■ Juan B. Sacasa, President of the Republic of Nicaragua, has graciously seen fit to confer the Presidential Medal of Merit on Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. Denig, United States Marine Corps, for services rendered to the Republic, as set forth in the following *Service Record*:

Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. Denig, United States Marine Corps, rendered very important services while holding the grade of Colonel in the Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua. From 1929 to 1930, he was in command of the Northern Area, and in 1931, he served as Chief of the General Staff of the above mentioned organization.

During the earthquake which occurred in Managua on March 31, 1931, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Livingston Denig suffered a broken leg, and in the discharge of his duties displayed notable energy, contributing to the work of salvation and assistance in the area affected by the 'quake. Obligated to leave Nicaragua on account of the serious accident which had befallen him, Lieutenant-Colonel Denig has demonstrated his affection for Nicaragua; for he has put in a great deal of time compiling data for a Monograph on Nicaragua, and for making an excellent map of the Republic. In view of what has been set forth, and in recognition of his valuable services lent to the Republic of Nicaragua, he is granted the *Presidential Medal of Merit*.

Managua, D. N., January 2, 1935.

LEONARDO ARGUELLO, Juan B. Sacasa,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

To Colonel Robert Livingston Denig,
Washington, D. C.

The Association wishes to add its hearty congratulations.

ADMIRALTY S. W. LONDON

13th December, 1934.

My dear General,

The final for the United States Marine Corps Cup was decided at Chatham yesterday the 12th. The Plymouth Division beat the Chatham Division by 2 goals to 1 after a fast and exciting game played on a muddy ground. Thus Plymouth retains the much prized Cup. The semi-final round, Plymouth versus Portsmouth, was only won 3-2 after a replay, there being no result (2-2) on the first day—this was a real needle match and great to watch. Captain W. S. Anderson, U.S.N., kindly presented the Cup to Plymouth yesterday and we were all delighted to have Mrs. Anderson with him at Chatham.

May I thank you very much for your kind message in your letter of 1st December to Capt. Anderson—this message is being promulgated to the Corps.

The Plymouth Division thank the United States Marine Corps for their congratulations on retaining the Cup and can assure them that they hope to go on drinking their health out of the great Cup for many a year to come.

On behalf of all ranks of the Royal Marines I send to you and all ranks of the United States Marine Corps our heartiest good wishes for Christmas and every success and happiness for 1935.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

R. JUTER,
Adjutant General,
Royal Marines.

Major General Commandant J. H. Russell,
U. S. Marine Headquarters,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.



Presentation of the United States Marine Corps Association Football Trophy to the Captain of the winning team, Royal Marines, Plymouth Division, by the American Naval Attache, Captain Walter S. Anderson, U.S.N., who was representing the United States Marine Corps, 12 December, 1934. Reading from left to right: Lieutenant P. G. Solbe, R.M.; Lieutenant-General R. F. C. Foster, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.M., Adjutant General, Royal Marines; Captain Walter S. Anderson, U.S.N., Naval Attache to the American Embassy; Ply/22134 Marine V. T. Powell, Captain of the team, and Ply/X.106 Corporal R. J. Heap.

Army Gets Yangtze Medal

Having the approval of the Navy Department and the War Department, the award of the Yangtze Service Medal to officers and men of the 31st Infantry, U. S. Army, who participated in naval operations ashore in Shanghai, China, between February 5 and July 1, 1932, will begin. The particulars will be covered by detailed instructions later. Both these Departments in the past have rendered similar service to the personnel of the Marine Corps. Colonel W. P. Upshur, USMC, initiated the idea.

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION SHOOTS

■ The sharp-shooting riflemen of the Marines collected a lot of medals and a large share of the prize money when they acted as hosts to the National Rifle Association Regional Matches for the Middle Atlantic Area on their ranges at Quantico, Va., September 26 to 29, inclusive.

This was one of sixteen state and regional matches held this year, with the sanction of the association, to determine the National champions in all types of .30 caliber rifle shooting. These titles and trophies are usually awarded at the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, which have been temporarily suspended by Congress as part of the Government's economy program. This is the third year the winners have been decided at regional shoots.

The Quantico matches were ably handled by a staff of Marine officers. Lieut. Col. C. F. B. Price, commanding officer of the newly organized Fifth Marine Regiment, the Fleet Marine Force, was chief executive officer. Lieut. Col. S. Smith Lee and Capt. Merritt A. Edson acted as assistant executive officers while Capt. E. C. Nicholas handled the duties of the chief range officer.

Results of the first day's matches indicated that a bitter duel was in prospect between the picked teams of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard. Individuals from both teams were outstanding, and when the medals were awarded by Maj. General M. A. Reckord, executive vice-president of the National Rifle Association, on Saturday afternoon, nine of the eighteen first-place awards were claimed by shooters of each branch of the service, but the Marines had more than their share of the runner-up medals.

One record was broken during these matches when Chief Boatswain's Mate Paul Goulden, of the Coast Guard, dropped only two points in the Navy Cup Match, giving him a score of 98 x 100 in twenty shots at 200 yards, standing, the highest score ever made in the twenty-four years' history of this match. Unfortunately this score will not count in the national rankings because Goulden had previously fired this match at Wakefield, Mass. Lieut. John R. Pugh and Sergt. S. W. Dinwiddie, both of the Virginia National Guard, placed second and third with 95 x 100; Gunnery Sergeant W. J. Lee, and Private E. N. Amos, both of the Marines, placed fourth and fifth with 93 x 100.

In the Marine Corps Cup Match, the opening match of the tournament, five of the 104 competitors were able to score 98 out of a possible 100 points at the 600 and 1,000 yard ranges. When this five-man tie was broken in accordance with the rules, the Marines held first, third and fifth places, while Coast Guard shooters placed second and fourth. The rankings: first, Corporal Joseph Gulino; second, Chief Boatswain's Mate Paul Goulden; third, Corporal A. R. Coffey; fourth, Quartermaster First Class D. A. Brown; fifth, Corporal R. E. Schneeman.

The two oldest events on the program were the competitions for the Leech and Wimbledon cups. Both of these trophies were first awarded in 1875. The course for the Leech Match consists of seven shots at each 800, 900 and 1,000 yards. Private R. R. Richards and Gunnery Sergeant C. J. Cagle, both Marines, placed first and second with possibles, 105 x 105; three more Marines followed in order: Lieutenant W. A. Scheyer, 104;

Gunnery Sergeant John Hamas, 103, and Private John E. Heath, 103. In shooting for the Wimbledon Cup, which was won in 1933 by Private G. W. Walker of the Marine Corps, the best showing was made by Gunnery Sergeant W. A. Lee, of the Marines, with a possible 100 x 100. This match is fired at 1,000 yards.

An interesting shoot-off occurred in the Camp Perry Instructors' Match, a 200-yard rapid fire event, after five competitors had put all ten of their shots in the five-ring. Boatswain's Mate M. N. Cobb, Coast Guard, repeated in the first shoot-off to take an undisputed hold on first place, but a second shoot-off was necessary before the others were ranked as follows: second, Yeoman C. F. Collins, Coast Guard; third, Corporal A. A. Roman, Marines; fourth, Corporal A. R. Coffey, Marines, and fifth, Private E. N. Amos, Marines.

Collins scored another possible in the Scott Trophy Match, a rapid fire event at 300 yards, to take first place without argument, but three shoot-offs were held to unscramble the five men who tied for second position with 49, the fifth place medal was finally given to Lieutenant W. A. Scheyer, of the Marines, on the flip of a coin. Coast Guardsmen Jones and Goulden ranked below Collins, followed by Private J. E. Heath, Marines.

All the team matches were hotly contested. In the A. E. F. Roumanian Match the Marine team under Gunner C. A. Lloyd won out from a second Marine team and a Coast Guard team by a single point, 561 to 560. The Coast Guard turned the tables in the other six-man team event, the Championship Regimental Match, when they piled up a score of 554 against the 553 of the first Marine team. The same close rivalry continued during the firing of the Herrick Trophy Match, a ten-man team event with fifteen shots per man on the 800-, 900- and 1,000-yard ranges. A Marine team under Capt. M. A. Edson did some good shooting and managed to win with a total score of 1,766 x 1,800. A second Marine team captained by Lieut. W. A. Scheyer outranked the Coast Guard for second place by having a larger score on the 1,000-yard range. Each team totaled 1,745. The Coast Guard placed first and second in the remaining team event, the National Match Team Course, when their "A" and "B" teams shot 1,678 and 1,677 x 1,800 against the 1,675 and 1,671 compiled by the Marine "C" and "M" teams.

The Marines won three of the four pistol events on the program. They lost the fourth match when Capt. W. P. Richards, who had already won the Service Individual Pistol Match with a score of 254 x 300, placed second to Chief Boatswain's Mate Paul Goulden of the Coast Guard in the NRA Individual Pistol Championship. Their scores were 268 and 266 x 300. Corporal McMahon, of the Marines, placed third in this event. The Marines won both pistol team events, scoring 1,220 x 1,500 to place first in the Service Pistol Team Match and 1,275 x 1,500 to lead the way in the NRA Pistol Team Match.

The feature of the last day was the President's Match when 119 shooters made their bids to get on the President's Hundred. Boatswain's Mate First Class E. C. Jones placed first with 147 x 150. Four Marines, McMahon, Richards, Cagle and Schneeman followed him in that order and are almost sure to find their names well up on the list when the National rankings are compiled.

ARMORED CARS FOR THE F. M. F.

FIRST LIEUTENANT J. OGDEN BRAUER
U. S. Marine Corps

INTRODUCTION

■ On one of the recent recruiting posters is depicted a bull-cart beside a Ford Transport plane to demonstrate the extremes of transportation utilized by the Marine Corps in performing its expeditionary duty. Between these two extremes are included other types of vehicles too numerous to recount, and representative of many foreign lands, all of which, have at sometime or other been applied to a military purpose when necessity required. On the next poster demonstrating the subject, extremes of transportation, let us place a pack-mule beside a modern armored car. Both have seen previous service with the Marine Corps. The pack-mule is as primitive a means of military transport as the bull-cart and the armored car is now coming into full development along with the airplane for military purposes.

In any consideration for the provision of additional auxiliary arms and military vehicles, or units thereof, for use with an expeditionary force of the Marine Corps, it is well that serious thought be given to the adoption of the armored car. It is not intended to proclaim a comprehensive knowledge of the subject presented here and neither is there any thought of being conclusive in presenting the propositions. The ultimate purpose entertained is the abduction of ideas which will engender interest in the organization of an efficient armored car unit for employment with the Fleet Marine Force.

Armored cars have already established their military value for maintaining order and quelling trouble, and in a large per cent of cases, have accomplished this merely by virtue of their presence. The earliest designs were nothing more than motor busses or trucks, to the sides of which were attached iron platings, and, from this practical improvisation they have been gradually developed into the present modern type, completely protected by armor plate and mounted with one or two turrets for all around protection by, and delivery of machine gun fire.

At the outbreak of the world war the possibility of using armored cars was apparent to the several nations engaged. However, owing to the numerous and pressing requirements for motor transportation in other directions it was not found possible to supply them in any numbers while mobile warfare lasted on the western front. Nevertheless the armored cars of the Royal Naval Air Force rendered invaluable service on the Belgian coast before stabilized trench warfare became established. Armored cars were again effectively employed in 1918 when the mobility of the allied armies was partly restored even though they were confined entirely to the improved roads. They are now so well perfected that they can traverse open country. Armored cars were further employed during the world war by the British in Egypt, Iraq, East and South West Africa, Rumania and southern Russia. The French Colonials, whose duty closely resembles that performed by the Marine Corps on expeditions, are augmented by armored car units and have successfully employed them in French Indo China, China, Syria and French Morocco. The expedition which Spain sent against the Riffs in Spanish Morocco would perhaps not have failed and surely the losses suffered would not have been nearly so great had armored car units been employed as they were by the French and

British in executing similar expeditions. A detailed study of such employment can only be made by recourse to the military publications of the countries concerned and therefore cannot be included here. However, there is much of value to be gained by the study of the general facts which are known concerning these operations.

Information relative to the development, organization, and tactics of armored car units in use by our military services is limited since they are still in practically an experimental stage of development. Only a small amount of experience has been gained due to their short time in service also because military maneuvers, whereby observation of their powers and limitations is best obtained, have been restricted in range by limited appropriations.

Armored cars are armed and armored motor vehicles. Usually they are specially constructed but to meet emergency requirements they may be constructed or improvised from available motor vehicles and materials. They are generally classified into three types: light, medium and heavy, and range in weight approximately from one-half ton for the light type to six tons for the heavy type.

Medium and light armored cars are, at present development, primarily reconnaissance vehicles; however, they may be employed successfully in minor combat actions to increase the fire power and shock action. Because of their great mobility and fire power, they are particularly adaptable for delaying and harassing actions. In combat their employment should be characterized by a sudden appearance, the immediate development of their maximum fire power, and followed by rapid change of position. In general, the heavy armored car has considerable combat power and, depending on whether it is equipped with tracks, and can maneuver efficiently across open country, may or may not resemble a tank. In any case it is a powerful auxiliary which may be employed to break down resistance and be closely supported by troops operating with it. Armored cars may be further classified according to equipment, armament, and crew, with two main divisions:

- a. Command (cross country cars).
- b. Fighting (armored cars).

In the assignment of missions, objectives, or in devising tactical methods for the conduct of armored car units, the class of car, together with its powers and limitations should be constantly borne in mind, otherwise serious difficulties will arise which may result in failure when it is time to put theory into actual practice.

CHARACTERISTICS

All armored cars possess certain general characteristics common to each other.

Mobility is the greatest asset which armored cars possess. This permits the assignment of long distance missions to them, allows the maximum use of surprise and moral effect, and is their best protection against direct hits. The mobility of the cars however varies directly with their weight, the condition of the roads and bridges, and whether their traction is furnished by wheels or tractor treads.

Gun crew protection is afforded to considerable extent by the armor and this is highly conducive to accurate and well observed fire as well as much greater boldness in action. The present armor plate, due to its weight, can seldom exceed .30 inches in thickness and is not effective protection against a direct hit from armor piercing bullets at ranges under 500 yards. The

mobility of the cars therefore furnishes greater protection than the armor to the crew. Nevertheless we must not overlook the fact that with the quantity of armor of good quality which may be placed on armored cars, it will generally protect against shrapnel bursts, the ordinary .30 caliber ammunition, and against armor piercing .30 caliber ammunition at medium and long ranges.

Fire power may be delivered while the car is either moving or halted. When the car is in motion the accuracy of the fire is impaired to a varying degree, and, when practicable, firing at medium and long ranges should be accomplished when the car is halted. The ideal method is a heavy burst of surprise fire from a concealed car followed by a quick get-away to another suitable and well concealed firing position.

Observation is permitted in the armored vehicle through observation ports which if opened give unrestricted observation to the car crew and if closed restricted observation through eye slits. Unless part of the car is exposed, observation from within the car is difficult. Extended observation, without exposing the car, may be obtained by requiring the personnel to leave the car for a ground reconnaissance from suitable observation points while the car is held under suitable cover. Observation from within the car at night is quite limited, also the danger of discovery is great due to the occasional use of lights and the noise of the motor. Where the situation demands their use, and where the terrain permits, armored cars can well be used at night to reconnoiter a road net or maintain continuous contact with the security detachments of a hostile force in bivouac.

Armored vehicles are subject to the usual motor and mechanical difficulties of all motor vehicles and depend upon their mechanical adjustment for their sustained efficiency. Their radius of action must always be considered and time allowed for refuelling and a check up on their mechanical condition. They cannot be used indefinitely without proper attention to this characteristic. Also might be included here the consideration required due to the fatigue of the crew. Due to the limited space in the car and its construction, fatigue caused by long continued operation, or operations at high speed, must always be borne in mind.

In using armor for protection of combat motor vehicles there must always be a compromise between the opposing factors of protection and mobility. The weight of one inch armor is approximately 45 pounds per square foot. The attempt to provide absolute protection for armored combat vehicles against the effect of direct hits of hostile small arms fire, by heaping on armor, results only in decreasing the mobility of the vehicle to such a degree that it becomes practically valueless for the originally intended functions. Consequently, it becomes necessary to apply only so much armor as is necessary to provide a reasonable degree of protection and thereafter, to rely upon their maneuverability and the initiative and judgment of the crew for further protection. If more complete armor protection is desired, tanks should be adopted for the purpose. Tanks possess greater power than armored cars in delivering shock action. However, they are limited to a much shorter radius of action and slower rates of speed.* The amount and type of armor required to give reasonable protection for these combat vehicles might best be learned by a study of the penetrative effect of the service ammunition now in use.

*NOTE: The latest tank developed by the Army, the T-2 type, which runs on tracks, has made a speed of 52 miles on hard roads, and 35 miles across country.

.30 caliber service ammunition will not penetrate .30 inch armor plate.

.30 caliber, armor piercing, service ammunition will penetrate .30 inch armor plate.

.50 caliber service ammunition will penetrate .05 inch armor plate up to 500 yards range.

.50 caliber, armor piercing, service ammunition will penetrate one inch of armor plate at least up to about 300 yards range and one-half inch armor plate at 1,000 yards range.

.37 mm gun projectiles at normal impact will penetrate one inch of armor plate at 500 yards range.

It must be remembered here that the disabling effect of the service ammunition and the armor piercing ammunition is very materially reduced following penetration, even at point blank range.

The present organization of the armored car units in use in our military service, is in a state of constant change due to the necessity of alteration to meet the requirements of new conditions established through experiments and tests. There is submitted here a tentative table of organization of an Armored Car Company to furnish a basis for further development.

ARMORED CAR COMPANY TACTICAL ORGANIZATION




TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

	1	2	3	4	5	6
UNITS	Special- ists Rating	Com- pany Hdqs.	(1) One Pla- toon	(2) Two Pla- toons	Total Com- pany	
Captain (Commanding)		1			1	
1st Lieuts. (2nd in command) ..		1			1	
2nd Lieuts.			1	2	3	
TOTAL COMMISSIONED		2	1	2	5	
1st Sgts.		1			1	
Staff Sgts. (Repair)		1			1	
Sergeants, including		1	3	6	7	
Platoon			(1)	(2)		
Section			*(2)	*(4)		
Supply		(1)				
Corporals			*2	*4		
Privates and Privates 1st Class ..		19	12	24	43	
Armorer	4th	(1)				
Chauffeur, C. C. Cars	6th	(3)				
Chauffeur, Trucks	5th	(3)				
Clerks	6th	(1)				
Drivers, Armoured Cars	4th		(4)	(8)		
Gunners, Machine Gun	5th		(4)	(8)		
Gunners, Sub-Machine Gun	6th		(4)	(8)		
Mechanics, General repair	3rd	(3)				
Ass't. Mechanics & Gunners		(8)				
TOTAL ENLISTED		22	17	34	52	

TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT—
Continued

AGGREGATE	24	18	36	57
Cars, Armoured		4	8	8
Cars, Cross Country	1	1	2	3
Trucks, 2- to 3-ton Cargo	3			
Trucks, tank gas	1			
Pistols	24	18	36	57
Rifles		8	16	16
Sub-Machine Guns	1	5	10	11
Machine Guns, .30 Cal.	†2	4	8	10

*Each platoon is divided into two sections of 2 cars each. Each section is commanded by a section sergeant who acts as the commander and observer of his car, the other being commanded by a corporal. Each car has a crew of one sergeant (or corporal) as commander and observer, and three privates (driver, gunner, machine gun, and gunner, sub-machine gun).

†For use as immediate replacements.

COMBAT PRINCIPLES

The platoon is the basic unit of maneuver or combat. However, in minor engagements or where an inferior hostile force is encountered the section may be employed as such. The principle of using two car teams should be strictly adhered to, therefore the latter division of the platoon is the furthest which should ever be attempted. The danger of mechanical trouble or of a car becoming ditched, and the need of mutual supporting fire makes this apparent. In any tactical employment of armored cars, the officers making the dispositions should constantly bear in mind the powers and limitations of these cars and should make constant reference to their general characteristics. In view of the fact that only the light and medium types have, up to the present time, been introduced in our military service, and because of the dearth of information concerning them, this discussion can only include the two types.

Commanders of armored car units must rely upon their own judgment and initiative. The actual fighting and the performance of assigned missions must be entrusted to the platoon commander. He should be assigned a single mission, and thereafter, be left to his own judgment and ingenuity in deciding upon the formation, method of maneuvering, speed or any other factors essential to the accomplishment of that mission.

There is no rule governing the location of the platoon commander within the platoon. He may ride in his cross country car, using it as a command or liaison car or he may find it more to his purpose to ride in the leading, or point, armored car of his platoon.

If reconnoitering a road or an area in the direction of the enemy, the platoon commander, platoon sergeant, or section leader, may sometimes best ride in the second car, from which prearranged signals can be given, with the leading car acting as the point, and moving at increased speeds between critical points. The second car moves as support to the point car, keeping it within observation and supporting distance at all times by variations in speed similar to that employed by the point car. The other section may be used as a supporting unit to the leading section or may be held at the headquarters in readiness to receive other assignments.

In advancing along one route with the platoon concentrated, the unit should normally assume a staggered formation and advance by bounds from one suitable firing position to another. When the terrain permits and the situation requires, the platoon may leave the road. In this circumstance they should adopt some variation of a normal line or echelon formation or a combination of both. The idea being to dispose the cars over a wide front to permit mutual protecting

fire and to minimize the effect of artillery or anti-armored car fire. In this formation it is desirable that the cars of the platoon commander and the other section commander be contiguous. The tactical handling of armored car platoons, or sections, in the various situations which may arise depends wholly upon the immediate circumstances and few rules can be given to govern their action. The best rule is to leave the solution of the assignment up to the platoon or section commander and make no attempt to prescribe his action beforehand. In general the platoon must move by bounds. Where secrecy is essential or the danger of ambush is great, the cars should be held under cover at the end of each bound and the personnel should be required to dismount and observe carefully to the front and flanks.

Where it is necessary for the platoon to pass through a town on the axis of its advance, the leading section or platoon should pass through by the most direct route. The remainder of the platoon should halt outside of the town to observe and to cover the advance of the leading unit. Upon reaching the far side of the town one of the cars of the leading unit should return and signal "all clear" when the remainder of the unit will advance.

When a barrier is encountered on the axis of advance the leading unit will certainly find itself surrounded with difficulties. When the barrier is encountered, and, assuming that it is covered by suitable weapons, there is no alternative for the leading section but to back out of action to the nearest cover. This maneuver should be covered by fire from the remainder of the platoon and, if at all possible, care should be taken to clear the road for the retreating car. The withdrawal having been effected, the leading unit should then select an alternate route and continue the advance as early as possible.

In offensive action in conjunction with other troops the armored car platoon may be required to assist by attacking an enemy flank or rear. Its objective should be the most critical points and the most effective firing positions should be selected. When employed on this mission, armored car units should make careful observation and reconnaissance at all times in order to preclude all possibility of being cut off. Similarly in withdrawals and delaying actions against a superior force, the armored car platoon may be required to cooperate with other troops. The platoon commander must be familiar with the general plan and must have a thorough knowledge of the road net in the area of the operation. Every advantage must be taken to delay the enemy at natural obstacles. Firing positions suitable for withdrawal should be readily taken and the maximum fire power of all cars within the unit established as soon as possible.

DEFENSE AGAINST ARMORED CARS

The best defense against armored cars is the armored car itself. Hostile cars may be put out of action by superior fire power, by clever maneuvering they may be cut off from their main body of troops, or may be disabled by collision. Cars which depend on wheels alone for their traction, and operating in terrain which prevents movement cross country, are easily halted by obstacles or barriers across the road. These obstacles may be natural, such as logs, fence posts, railway ties, boulders, any wheeled vehicle, or trees fallen across the road. Where time and information are available

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DIPLOMATIC SPURS

Our Experiences in Santo Domingo

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHARLES J. MILLER
U. S. Marine Corps

INTRODUCTION

■ This article is presented in two parts: The first part serving as a means of demonstrating the momentous position held by the Second Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps, during the tenure of the Military Government of Santo Domingo prior to the installation of the Dominican Provisional Government, and also as an introductory to the second part; part two is devoted to the events leading up to the installation of the Provisional Government and those problems that confronted the Military Governor and Brigade Commander; the solutions of which were the subject of written agreements between the U. S. State Department and Dominican Government, and which characterized the Brigade's later status.

Some difficulty has been encountered in the preparation of the following pages, in view of the many diversified items composing their text, while still endeavoring to give a brief, yet clear description of the services and position of the Second Brigade. However, these pages are not intended to furnish a history or formal record of the Brigade, but rather designed as a study of certain

aspects of the Occupation as directly related to the armed forces. Such comments or deductions as are given, may offer a few useful lessons, even though many of the subjects discussed admit of considerable difference of opinion.

To avoid involvement in matters beyond the knowledge of the writer, he has, whenever practicable, refrained from discussing such events of the Occupation as require an interpretation or application of the laws and rules of military government. Any encroachment on this particular phase of the Occupation will appear in the nature of explanations, which are indispensable to a clear understanding of parts of the article.

PART I

In anticipation of the installation of some form of Dominican Government to actively replace the Military Government of Santo Domingo, and eventually cause its evacuation, certain events arose, which were later the occasion of completely changing the status of the Second Brigade, U. S. Marine Corps, in its position as the armed force of the United States Military Government of Santo Domingo. On October 21, 1922, the Dominican Provisional Government was inaugurated, and concomitant to this event occurred a transition which gave rise to certain interesting and instructive precedents. They now form an absorbing study for Marine officers interested in the administration of purely military features of an armed occupation.

In order to arrive at a correct and proper appreciation of the dominant part formerly played by the Brigade as compared to its later status it will be necessary to review briefly the cause and purpose of the Occupation, the organization of the Military Government, the proposals submitted to the Dominican people by the United States for the dissolution and withdrawal of the Military Government, together with a complete resumé



GENERAL HARRY LEE, U.S.M.C., MILITARY GOVERNOR OF SAN DOMINGO, AND HIS STAFF—1923-24.

Sitting, left to right: J. C. Fegan, E. W. Banker, B. H. Dorsey, Harry Lee, C. T. Westcott, C. J. Miller, J. D. Murray, C. G. Sinclair. Standing, left to right: J. J. Popham, A. J. Burks, V. E. Bleasdale, T. A. Tighe, F. R. Hoyt, M. L. Ring, D. H. Nicholson, P. R. Cowley, _____.

of the missions entrusted to the Brigade. It would not be possible in this short space to give a complete recital of the nature and origin of all the duties assigned to the Brigade, and of the many tasks accomplished. However, some idea can be gained of its activities by careful attention to summarization.

From November 29, 1916, to October 20, 1922, the Military Government conducted the military and civil affairs of the Dominican Republic. During this time it performed many of the functions normally associated with a force occupying alien territory, but its position could hardly have been termed absolute in character. All the phenomena attendant to a strict military occupation were not evidenced or accredited to this Government, and it was manifestly never so intended. Certain restrictions in the form of reversals of verdicts, and modifications of the acts of the Military Government were imposed by cabinet departments of our Government as to leave conjecturable the true extent of authority vested in the Military Governor. Furthermore, the organized opposition not only conducted by the Dominican politicians and certain pseudo-Americans residing in Santo Domingo, but also by certain agencies and persons at home, did inevitably weaken the position of the Military Government. It was a formidable weapon against which the Occupation seemed powerless to act.

The primary cause for the Occupation must be traced to failure on the part of the Dominican Government to adhere to the convention between the United States and Dominican Republic, concluded February 8, 1907, which provided for the assistance of the United States in the collection and application of Dominican custom revenues.

These revenues or the greater portion of them were to be applied to the liquidation of the national indebtedness created both by regular and revolutionary governments, much of which was of doubtful validity, and amounting in all to over \$30,000,000, nominal or face value. A large part of this amount was in the nature of foreign loans. The pressure exerted by certain European countries for the payment due its citizens, together with the exhaustion of Dominican credit, and the unsettled condition and internal dissension that had long existed in the Republic induced the United States to order the Occupation for the purpose of restoring tranquillity, and exacting a compliance to the provisions of the Convention of 1907. Moreover, the culmination of this decision on the part of the United States effectually eliminated any complications that might imperil the Monroe Doctrine through European intervention.

The primary cause of our intervention was reflected in the chronic state of internal strife into which the Dominican Republic had fallen, and its apparent inability to set its governmental house in order. From 1865 to the time of the Occupation, revolutions and counter-revolutions were the order of the day. During a period of sixteen years, from 1900 to 1916 there were twelve presidents and all, with one exception, were either elected or deposed by revolution. Each political faction with the assumption to power, used the governmental offices for personal material aggrandizement to the exclusion of any conscientious effort to restore peace and prosperity to a poverty stricken country. Plunged into revolution, and chained by a pernicious and parasitic system of authority, the governmental prerogatives were delivered inoperative, and the national activities paralyzed. The installation of a permanent constitutional government, capable of fulfilling its obligations, seemed impossible under these conditions.

The Proclamation of the Military intervention as promulgated on November 29, 1916, by Captain H. S. Knapp, U. S. Navy, commanding the American forces in Santo Domingo, probably gives the reasons and purposes of the Occupation in clearer and more concise terms than any other single document. The proclamation was declared in unmistakable terms, and while firm and positive in address, there is found running through it a tone of friendliness, and an affable impression to extend helpful assistance to the Dominican people. It is possible that the Proclamation was intended, though in general terms only, as a policy of operation for the Military Government, and did give some intimation of the duties that would devolve upon the Brigade, particularly as referred to the restoration and maintenance of peace and order.

This Proclamation cited Article III of the Convention of 1907, relative to the national indebtedness and modification of import duties; the violation of this article by the Dominican Government with the explanation of the Dominican Government that such violation had occurred through the necessity of incurring expense incident to the suppression of revolution; that the United States, with a friendly desire to enable Santo Domingo to maintain domestic tranquillity and observe the terms of the Convention, had urged necessary measures which the Dominican Government had been unable or unwilling to adopt; that domestic tranquillity had been disturbed and not then established, and that the time had come to enforce the observance of the Convention of 1907 and insure and maintain domestic tranquillity in the Dominican Republic.

The proclamation declared the Republic in a state of military occupation by the forces of the United States, and subject to the military laws applicable to such occupation not with the object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic, but to restore peace and order so as to enable the Republic to observe the terms of the Convention.

It further provided that the Dominican statutes would remain in effect in so far as they did not conflict with the objects of the Occupation; that their lawful administration would continue in the hands of duly authorized Dominican officials under the supervision of the Military Government and that the ordinary administration of justice, both in civil and criminal matters, through the Dominican courts would not be interfered with by the Military Government, except that cases to which a member of the United States Forces in Occupation was a party, or in which were involved contempt or defiance of the authority of the Military Government, would be tried by tribunals instituted by the Military Government.

It also provided that all revenues, import and internal, accruing to the Dominican Government would be paid to the Military Government, which would hold same in trust for the Dominican Republic in order that the proper legal disbursements could be made for the administration of the Dominican Government and for the purposes of the Occupation.

Lastly, it called upon the citizens, residents, and sojourners in Santo Domingo to cooperate with the Forces of Occupation; and stated that the Military Government would govern its conduct in accordance to military laws with due respect to personal and property rights.

Military Governors have been officers of the United States Navy or Marine Corps, and according to the usual established system of military government administration, both the executive and legislative power have been vested

in these officers. Soon after the proclamation was issued, efforts to induce the Dominican authorities to conduct the Government in a manner satisfactory to the United States having proved of no avail, the Military Governor was obliged to order American officers to administer the affairs of the cabinet offices; these positions having been vacated by the Dominican officials with the distinct purpose of embarrassing the military authorities. The following secretaries of state were appointed at the time or created later in conformity to the Dominican Government portfolio system, and were assigned such duties as were consonant with the name of the office, and necessary to reestablish order within the departments:

Secretary of the Department of Interior and Police
(In charge of War and Navy portfolio).

Secretary of the Department of Justice and Public Instruction.

Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communication.

Secretary of the Department of Foreign Relations.

Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Immigration.


Secretary of the Department of Sanitation and Beneficence.

Officers were not always available for these positions nor were the duties of each Department under the reorganization that followed of sufficient extent as to warrant the detail of one officer to each secretaryship. Frequently the affairs of several departments were administered by one officer as for example; it was customary for one officer to perform all the duties in connection with the Department of Justice, and Public Instruction and the Department of Foreign Relations, and in a like manner, the Department of Public Works and Communication and

the Department of Agriculture and Immigration. For a considerable period of time the Brigade Commander or the senior Marine officer present in command of troops acted also as the Secretary of Interior and Police.

The Military Government consistently endeavored, whenever practicable, to manage the public business of the Republic in accordance to the Dominican Constitution and did display a fine consideration for Dominican customs and sentiments in the enforcement of its orders. However, certain corrective and protective measures were necessary to the establishment and object of the Occupation, in order to provide adequate protection for the Military Government against moral and physical aggression, establish the finances of the Republic on a sound and enduring basis, organize and train a native constabulary force, institute economic, public and educational reforms, and restore peace and order to the Dominican people. To this end, it was essential to amend and supplement the Dominican laws, which was accomplished by the enactment of Executive Orders and Regulations promulgated by the Military Governor as the necessity arose or in anticipation of any unusual executive or administrative requirement. These orders and regulations, to all intents and purposes, had the full force and effect of the laws enacted by any national legislature.

Where practicable and as contemplated by the proclamation no changes were made in the lower Dominican office forces, and in fact, all the lesser officials were encouraged to remain in their positions. The Dominican judiciary retained its functions in nearly all instances. The civil law of the land was not suspended, but continued in force, and the provinces, communes and municipalities continued to carry on their local and civil affairs under the sanction and supervision of the Military Gov-



CARRETERA DUARTE KMG4
SANTO DOMINGO RD.

BUILT BY AMERICAN ENGINEERS IN 1920

ernment. Civil officials were not disturbed in their offices, nor restrained in their authority unless in case of unmistakable proof of malfeasance.

During the active operations of the Military Government, the Brigade was the medium through which the Military Governor and his cabinet officers executed their orders and decisions. The secretaries of the various departments, devoid of the physical means, or lacking the proper agencies to carry out the judgments pertaining to but outside of their immediate departments, resorted to the assistance of the Brigade. This, of course, was but one of the fundamental functions performed by the armed instrument of a military occupation.

DUTIES OF BRIGADE IN GENERAL

It would be rather difficult to define, classify, and trace clearly the origin of duties assigned to and performed by the Brigade, for in some instances definite tasks were not prescribed, while other duties were executed only upon a tacit understanding with the Military Governor or his Staff, and, then again, certain practices grew up only to be discontinued later, because the necessity for their employment no longer existed. Whereas, a comprehensive outline of tasks might have materially assisted the Brigade in the performance of its work, this was not always feasible. Frequent changes in the higher commands and offices, differences as to interpretation of policy or the absence of a well defined policy to cover all contingencies, variation in methods, and lack of coordinated control, which resulted from the fact that instructions were received from several sources at widely separated points, all militated against a succinct schedule of missions. A number of officers, who served with the Occupation have deplored the lack of a clearly defined policy, which they believed would have produced some uniformity of method and priority, applicable to the many problems presented to them for solution.

Many of the duties enumerated below might properly be included under a more appropriate heading, while others even partake of a civil character. However, the following classification will at least suffice to show the extensive and varied nature of the work delegated to the Brigade, and for want of a better classification these duties are given under three headings: (a) Military, (b) Constabulary, (c) Military Government Administration:

(a) Military duties:

1. The garrisoning of Santo Domingo.
2. The suppression of organized banditry and individual outlawry.
3. The organization, training and disposition of the Policia Nacional Dominicana.
4. The organization, training and employment of civil guards.
5. Preparation of topographical and military maps and handbooks of Santo Domingo.

(b) Constabulary duties:

1. The collection and confiscation of firearms and other dangerous weapons.
2. The arrest of Dominicans and sojourners, offenders against the authority of the Military Government.
3. The care and custody of native prisoners, civil and military, confined in the National

Penitentiary and public carcels in charge of Brigade.

4. Issue of firearm and explosive permits and execution of all orders pertaining thereto.
5. Detail of armed guards or escorts for public officials intrusted with government funds or valuable documents, and for private individuals who had incurred the enmity of bandits or outlaws.
6. The storage of ammunition and explosives, belonging to bona fide merchants.
7. The importation of firearms, ammunition, and explosives.
8. The observation of native officials as to performance of duties and degree of efficiency.
9. Prevention of smuggling.
10. Deportation of sojourners.
11. Introduction and enforcement of sanitary measures.

(c) Military Government administration:

1. Provost marshal duties.
2. Appointment to provost, superior courts, and military commissions and trial of civil offenders against the Military Government by these tribunals.
3. Investigation of claims against the Military Government.
4. Execution of orders relative to censorship.
5. Investigation of important friction cases, arising between sojourners or sojourners and Dominicans.

GARRISONING OF THE REPUBLIC

As far as can be ascertained no restriction was ever imposed upon the Brigade as to the manner, or method to be pursued in establishing and maintaining its garrisons in Santo Domingo. The general rule, however, was to place troops in civic and economic centers, and in sections known as hot beds of political unrest, or within areas notorious for banditry and revolutions. The matter of supply, transportation, and communication was also a determining factor in troop disposition. The Brigade always had to depend upon the home base for military supplies of all classes, and it was necessary to establish subsidiary bases in Santo Domingo where these supplies could be received, stored and issued. While this alone required the stationing of troops in the more important sea port towns for the security of bases of supplies, this was not, however, the only controlling feature in troop disposition in regard to sea port towns. These towns were points of strategical importance, commanding as they did the routes of trade and communication, and were the main entrances to and exits from Santo Domingo, through which the Republic must pass her marketable products, and in return receive those articles essential to her existence. Again with the Dominican customs under American supervision, it was paramount to guarantee the collection of the duties at the several custom houses in the sea port towns against interruption or interference, if the provisions of the Convention of 1907 were to be complied with. The safety of the custom houses was best assured by the presence of troops in the sea port towns. As it was, the sea port towns held the greatest part of the urban population of the Republic with the correspond-

ing political and military significance. Thus it was, that the Brigade maintained during the active functioning of the Military Government strong garrisons in each of the eight important sea ports of Monte Cristi, Puerto Plata, Sanchez, La Romana, San Pedro de Macoris, Santo Domingo City, Azua, and Barahona.

The Republic was originally divided into two military districts for the purpose of regulating and supervising the military and administrative affairs of the Military Government. Natural and geographic features, distribution of population, political conditions, communication, and banditry were the main contributory factors in defining the limits of these military divisions. For instance, the Central Cordillera, a precipitous mountain range, with its base line running east and west throws up a natural and almost impassable barrier across the Island, effecting a cleavage of the Dominican Republic into two geographical divisions, almost equal in extent of territory. Concurrent with the landing of troops on the north and south sides of the Island in 1916, inter-communication was found to be extremely problematical, while troop movement over this rugged mountain range was exceedingly slow and precarious due to the inaccessibility of the terrain. In order to obviate these difficulties, troops were permanently garrisoned north and south of Central Cordillera.

Banditry played a prominent role in the garrisoning of certain sections of the Republic, especially in the eastern part, where bandit activities were virtually confined during the major part of the Occupation. Here banditry flourished, assuming such alarming proportions that the adoption of measures incident to its suppression involved the gathering of a considerable number of troops within the affected area. As a consequence of this situation, augmented by some political disturbances in the Province of Seibo and the District of Macoris, the military authorities were evidently influenced into recommending a further division of the Republic. In July, 1919, such a partition was consummated, and the Republic divided into three districts with a regiment assigned to each district.

Correlated with the problem of the military division of

Santo Domingo, there was the other problem of troop dispersion and troop concentration within each district. The vast extent of Dominican territory, the uncertain political conditions, and the general prevalence of banditry, all contributed to troop dispersion, a condition irrespective of the mission which always appears to be a violation of sound military principles. Some will contend that the expression "troop dispersion" is a relative one, and must be considered in connection with the mission of the troops, and the mobility and character of the arm involved. Yet, if the stationing of many small outposts in Santo Domingo constituted a violation of any tactical, or strategic principle, it was inevitable in many instances. However, every effort was taken to offset this weakness by improving the methods of communication and transportation. Unquestionably, in the early days of the Occupation, the lack of facilities for communication, and the inadequate means for the rapid transit of troops must have been a constant source of annoyance to the military authorities.

It is the opinion of the writer that the stationing of small detachments at great distances from a higher headquarters, particularly under conditions as obtained in Santo Domingo, is to be carefully considered, and avoided whenever practicable. Keeping innumerable outposts supplied is not only a difficult and most expensive task, but frequently means the placing of inexperienced subalterns in command. Bearing in mind the unpopularity of any military government, the severe criticism of its motives regardless of the justification, will invariably demand the constant and personal observation of the superior over the conduct of the armed forces. For example, during a short period of time one regiment maintained as high as twenty-four posts, and aside from the necessity of this apparent and unusual distribution, must have exacted the most rigid supervision and control on the part of the regimental headquarters.

The varied character of the duty performed by the regimental commander, accompanied by a wide scope of jurisdiction and influence, clothed him with more than



PRESIDENT DON HORACIO VASQUEZ AT HIS HOME, SAN DOMINGO CITY, JUNE, 1924.

ordinary authority. In time he came to occupy a dual position. He was the direct representative of the Brigade Commander in all things military and was also the deputy of the Military Governor in matters that pertained to the administration of civil relations within his district. In this latter capacity he was known as the District Commander.

BANDITRY

One of the most important tasks that fell to the lot of the Brigade was the suppression of banditry. No other operation proved more exacting or worthy of greater study and preparation.

Soon after the entry of the American forces, it became apparent that organized banditry existed in Santo Domingo, and, furthermore, that there was a strong tendency towards revolutionary development.

The Republic was harassed by roving groups of outlaws and insurgents, which, prior to the Occupation had been ineffectively combatted by a meagre Dominican soldiery. The members of these bands preyed upon the peaceful inhabitants during governmental equanimity, but upon sensing a national upheaval instantly posed as patriots, allying themselves with one of the many embryonic political parties. It was then quite customary for each new government, and there were many, to grant amnesty to these so called "patriots." This measure provided absolute immunity to the bandit against molestation, provided he elected to take up more peaceful pursuits. Assured of this protection, he could again resort to banditry when it suited his fancy or convenience, which was equivalent to placing a premium on banditry, and a deterrence on the preservation of peace and order. This singular propensity on the part of this type of Dominican mind was sufficient to preclude the adoption of any systematic plan for the suppression of banditry, and on the contrary, whether wilful or not, it encouraged the existence of brigandage within the boundaries of the Republic.

A careful research of Dominican history would undoubtedly disclose that banditry had its inception in the days of Spanish control of the island. It is more than likely that the oppressive measures instituted by the early Spanish rulers impelled many of the energetic and patriotic citizens to organize themselves into revolutionary bands under the leadership of the more intrepid spirits. The members of these bands supported by public sentiment, and acclaimed national heroes and martyrs, quickly acquired a standing and prestige that was the means of procuring an easy livelihood. After Spain had relinquished her rights to Santo Domingo, it can be readily depicted with what reluctance these groups surrendered to disbandment. No longer actuated by patriotic motives, the bands quickly attracted to their ranks an undesirable class of recruits among whom were to be found the criminal, the careless adventurer, and the revolting politician. This class gradually gained control, and with their ascendancy to power began to exercise a predatory influence within the groups, which finally culminated in outlawry. In this manner, the bands lost every semblance of their original caste. The perpetration of incessant depredations followed, until banditry became a constant menace to the happiness and prosperity of the Dominican people. Entire sections of the country were laid waste and the inhabitants terrorized, and reduced to poverty and distress. Frequently, the rural inhabitants, abandoning their farms and ranches, moved into the towns in order to escape the bandit depredations, leaving them secure in their persons but impoverished.

Banditry was the greatest disrupting force with which

the military had to contend in the restoration of domestic tranquillity. With the advent of armed intervention, followed by a disarming proclamation issued by the Military Government, not a few of the more intractable inhabitants of the cities sought greater freedom and liberty of action by moving to the more inaccessible regions of Santo Domingo rather than surrender their weapons and submit themselves to military law. This would appear to be but further proof that the history of revolution and banditry in Santo Domingo was prone to repeat itself with a change in governmental rule. It is inferred that this was merely a temporary condition for the majority of these armed oppositionists, separated from their families and suffering great physical discomfort, soon returned to their homes. However, it is believed that the dregs of this class permanently attached themselves to the bandit groups. To enforce acquiescence to the disarming order, and achieve an early return to peace and order, the armed forces were not long in preparing and perpetuating a vigorous campaign against the bandits, which was destined to endure throughout the Occupation.

Where outlawry was universal throughout the Republic, organized banditry has been confined to certain districts and provinces. In 1917, the District of Pacificador was the scene of rather extensive activities, and continued spasmodically until December, 1921, when it ceased altogether. During 1916 and 1917 there was an isolated, but well formed group of bandits under the leadership of a religious fanatic, named Dios Olivario, who acquired a large following in the Province of Azua. Early in 1917, this group was severely handled and widely scattered by a strong mixed patrol of Marines and Guardia. Subsequent to this action the group remained quiescent for several years, and aside from a few minor depredations and acting as a sanctuary for criminals, caused little trouble to law-abiding inhabitants. But in 1922, the group again showed an inclination to resume active operations. Considerable bandit activities occurred in the section surrounding Bayaguana, Monte Plata, and Pulgarin, towns located in the northeastern part of Santo Domingo Province. However, the word "banditry" when applied to Santo Domingo must be associated with the Provinces of Seibo and Macoris. Inside the territory bounded by these two provinces was established the principal field of operations and here banditry manifested itself in the most tenacious and aggravated form. This portion of Santo Domingo particularly favored banditry. It provided numerous sources of revenue, an ample food supply, and a sufficient number of animal mounts to make banditry a lucrative, if precarious occupation. Within these provinces was located the rich sugar cane belt, also sections well adapted to farming and cattle raising with regions contiguous, whose mountain and forest fastness furnished the bandit a safe retreat and rendezvous.

The bandit groups were unusually aggressive in the early days of the Occupation, and did not hesitate to attack armed patrols when they found themselves in an advantageous position. But in time the never-lagging pursuit of the bandit, together with an increasing number of contacts and constant patrolling combined to break down the morale of the bandits. For this and other reasons, beginning with 1920, boldness had disappeared from bandit tactics, and was replaced by prudence. The armed patrols were avoided and seldom attacked. Great activity occurred during 1917 and 1918, when the campaign assumed all the aspects of guerrilla warfare. The official records of the Brigade would indicate that bandit activities and operations reached the high water mark in 1919,

as evidenced by an increasing number of contacts, and an even greater expenditure of effort on the part of the armed forces. However, this must be attributed primarily to the reinforcement of the Fifteenth Regiment, which was assigned to garrison the provinces of Seibo and Macoris immediately after its arrival from the United States in February, 1919. The Regiment promptly made provisions to devote its energies to the suppression of banditry, and the restoration of peace and order. Four hundred and eighty-three patrols were conducted during the year, resulting in two hundred and thirty-one contacts.

It would be difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy the number of bandits in the field as the groups were continually being recruited or depleted by desertions. From all accounts it can be safely estimated, that at any one time, the groups never aggregated more than a thousand effectives. There was no uniformity in the strength of the groups, some contained only a few men, while others mustered several hundred. One bandit leader was reported to have had as many as three hundred men in his group, all well armed and equipped. Then again, with the disintegration of the larger bands, smaller groups would spring into existence under the leadership of the lieutenants of some powerful leader, and attain a prominence more or less in keeping with the personal characteristics of the new leader.

The individuals who composed the groups were not motivated by the same influences or stress of circumstances that led to their entrance into banditry. A rough classification would include the following:

- (a) Real bandits or gavilleros, who may be termed professional highwaymen.
- (b) Revolting politicians, instrumental in organizing banditry for the purpose of furthering their own political aspirations or of their more influential friends.
- (c) The vagrant or less scrupulous laboring class forced to accept banditry for want of legitimate employment, frequently excreted from the industrial conditions of the sugar producing areas.
- (d) Those who under duress or fear of the bandit leader, were compelled to join bandit groups.
- (e) Roving criminals, who preyed on the population committing depredations singly or in small groups, but not belonging to the organized groups.

All five of these individual classes conduct or participated in armed opposition against the Military Government.

As already stated, the Brigade was engaged incessantly in the subjugation of banditry, expending its greatest military effort in attaining the extermination of organized outlawry. The task, to say the least, was difficult. In exploiting the campaign, the armed forces met with many keen disappointments, and suffered innumerable hardships without the stimulating exhilaration and glory that attends actual combat and victory. The very nature of banditry did not lend itself to the delivery of a sudden and decisive blow. The military forces and the bandits possessed attributes dissimilar in every respect, and attempts to proceed in the regular manner were barren of results. Before initiating a successful plan of action, the commander and his forces must have an intimate knowledge of the habits of the bandits, must be experienced in the methods of bandit warfare, and be familiar with the sphere of activity of the various groups. The bandits were usually able to retain the initiative, that is,

they could avoid or seek combat at the desire of the leader, and, further, were in a position to take advantage of the surprise element, so important a factor in the issue of jungle warfare. When patrols did encounter bandit groups, they found themselves unable to prolong combat, because of the facility with which the bandits severed contact, and the impenetrability of the terrain which prohibited rapid pursuit. Then again, the bandits were seldom without information concerning the movements of the patrols, and availed themselves of every ruse and subterfuge for the purpose of spreading false information as to their movements. On the other hand, intelligence data relative to banditry was not easily obtainable. In the early epoch of the Occupation no amount of persuasion could induce the inhabitants to denounce the bandits openly, while they stood in great trepidation of the retaliatory measures inflicted by the bandit leaders on persons found divulging information to the military forces. A few of the larger groups were undeniably served by some system of secret service, and although not organized within the military meaning of the term, was no less efficacious. They operated channels of communication, employed spies and other agents, who apparently kept them reliably and well informed of the armed forces. This, added to the knowledge that a certain class of inhabitants was affiliated with banditry, or at least not in sympathy with its suppression; that successes against banditry provoked severe criticism and bitter antagonism on the part of local politicians; and the fact that the Occupation was never able to win the complete confidence of the natives necessitated that the military forces rely almost entirely upon their own agencies to gather information.

Whereas these disadvantages were to be deprecated from the view-point of military forces, it is not intended to convey the impression that the Brigade was confronted by an insuperable task, or that its forces did not enjoy certain advantages. Having a superiority in numbers, the Brigade was capable of maintaining fresh troops constantly in the field, whereby the bandit groups were kept on the move. Nothing more than this tended to wear and break down the bandit morale. Better armed, and possessing superior skill in marksmanship, the military patrols in contacts inflicted some losses on the bandit groups, while the extremely poor marksmanship on the part of the bandits seldom resulted in a casualty of the patrols. However, these advantages would have been of little value, had the military forces not possessed a superior determination, and the necessary physical stamina. The bandits never did comprehend the force that prompted the armed forces to disregard all obstacles, failures, and hardships in their endeavors to destroy them.

METHODS OF PATROLLING

As far as can be ascertained no definite plan of operation, defining the methods of warfare to be adopted in the suppression of banditry, was ever issued by Brigade Headquarters. Apparently it was realized that explicit instructions would curtail the initiative and liberty of action of those officers commanding the field forces. Furthermore, recognizing the fallacy of fixed rules to the application of irregular warfare, the various commanders of these operations were encouraged to exercise their own ingenuity and best judgment in fighting the bandit groups. Various methods were employed by the different commanders all of which had as their basis some system of patrolling. No effort will be made to draw conclusions from these methods, but the following are a majority of

the methods most frequently used:

- (a) Small independent patrols under experienced leaders, highly mobile, and constantly patrolling the affected areas.
- (b) Small mixed patrols composed of Marines and Policia, sometimes operating under the disguise of civilians.
- (c) Large patrols operating on special missions with definite information.
- (d) Concentrated operations within an area, utilizing large patrols acting in conjunction with each other.
- (e) Withdrawal of the peaceful and law abiding inhabitants from the rural sections of an infested area to the towns followed by a vigorous search for bandits within the vacated areas.
- (f) Placing a cordon of troops around suspected areas and the closing-in of the cordon, or cordon remaining in position while strong patrols combed the area inside of the cordon. All suspicious characters were collected and held for identification.
- (g) The use of civil patrols or posses within well defined areas, acting under the supervision of military controls; the patrols being kept in the field for three or four days when they were relieved by the military patrols.

These methods frequently involved night operations in order that patrols or other forces could, under the cover of darkness, secretly move to positions from which they would be able to advantageously gain contact or launch an attack against a bandit group.

By June, 1922, organized banditry had ceased in Santo Domingo with the capture, death, or surrender of the bandit leaders, who, until that time, had been actively engaged in banditry.

All leaders were tried by military commissions, and after securing complete descriptions for future identification, were released on suspended sentences pending good behavior. Their followers were released on parole without trial, but under conditions that guaranteed their future good conduct.

Afterward, generally speaking, the country enjoyed a state of comparative tranquillity never before realized, and which redounded to the improvement of conditions in general.

In conclusion of this subject, it might be well to say, that after six years of campaign, success was finally achieved through persistent and continuous operations, and not so much by the employment of new methods, but by a thorough analysis of former methods with the application of new departures where former methods had failed in whole or in part.

(Continued in our next issue)

1936 ESTIMATES

Total operating cost of the Marine Corps.....	\$23,325,000
Total pay of officers, all ranks, active list.....	5,416,805
Total pay of officers, all ranks, retired list.....	1,490,688
Total pay of enlisted men, all ranks, active list.....	8,156,583
Total pay of enlisted men, all ranks, retired list.....	759,744
Total pay of Reservists.....	852,398
Total General Expenses, Reservists.....	85,000

RESERVE PROMOTIONS

The following promotions and appointments have been made in the Marine Corps Reserve:

Colonel William G. Fay—Rank from 17 October, 1934.

Lieut. Colonel Anthony J. D. Biddle—Rank from 17 October, 1934.

1st Lieut. John W. Scott, Jr.—Rank from 17 October, 1934.

Lieut. Colonel Victor I. Morrison—Rank from 17 October, 1934.

Lieut. Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller—Rank from 17 October, 1934.

2d Lieut. William C. Judge—Rank from 17 October, 1934.

2d Lieut. Albert H. Manwaring, 2d—Rank from 13 November, 1934.

2d Lieut. Peter J. Negri—Rank from 13 November, 1934.

2d Lieut. Geo. H. Cavanagh, Jr.—Rank from 11 December, 1934.

2d Lieut. John L. Webb—Rank from 26 December, 1934.

Captain Joseph H. Berry, Jr.—Rank from 21 December, 1934.

2d Lieut. George N. Eddleman—Rank from 18 January, 1935.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Washington

September 20, 1934.

From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: All Naval Activities.

SUBJECT: Navy Mutual Aid Association.

1. As President of the Navy Mutual Aid Association I am in a position to observe more closely than ever before its operation, and I am greatly impressed by the great good the Association is doing within the Navy.

2. Immediately upon notice of a member's death his named beneficiary is wired the full benefit of over \$7,500.00. All claims for pensions, insurance, and death gratuities are prepared and followed up until satisfactorily settled. This is of great comfort to the dependents, and at every meeting of the Board of Directors many letters of thanks and appreciation are read.

3. During the past fifty-four years, the Navy Mutual Aid has been able to care for the dependents of 1252 officers through the payment to them of \$6,280,305.70. To know that there is within the Naval Service such a growing Association is a matter of great satisfaction and pride.

4. The continued growth and success of the Association depends upon getting young officers of the Navy and Marine Corps interested in the advantages of membership. I consider it a privilege and duty of the older officers, who know of the wonderful work the Navy Mutual Aid has done and is doing, to encourage these young men to join.

5. This is a mutual association, composed of officers, organized for the purpose of providing officers with maximum protection for a minimum cost, and providing dependents of these officers with prompt financial aid and assistance.

6. I will be greatly pleased if commanding officers will cooperate with me and assist Non-Resident Directors and members of the association in our efforts to recruit new members, in order that their dependents may be cared for as will be the dependents of those who are now members.

W. H. STANDLEY.

CALIFORNIA PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL EXPOSITION

■ San Diego is not a new story to a great number of members of the United States Marines, but they'll hardly know the old town if they are fortunate enough to visit it this summer.

For this summer, with the opening of the California Pacific International Exposition on May 29, San Diego takes on a holiday aspect that will beckon all travelers to the great Southwest.

As many Marines already know, San Diego is the greatest military and naval operating base in America. Afloat and ashore, the fighting forces of the nation, concentrated there, represent an expenditure of more than \$150,000,000 exclusive of \$20,000,000 in buildings. The Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard are represented by a personnel of more than 22,000 officers and men.

During many months of the year approximately 100 air craft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, tenders and transports are anchored and moored in Man-o'-War row. Also, in San Diego are located the home of the west coast Marine Corps expeditionary force, the nation's largest army and navy combined aeronautical base, the world's finest naval training station and a superb naval hospital.

Strategically, San Diego occupies one of the most important links in the chain of national defense, this being one of the chief reasons why the city and harbor was selected as a great military, naval and marine operating base by the federal government.

The recruit depot and headquarters for all Marine Corps activities on the west coast is located on a main highway leading into San Diego, and is the home of the base troops and fleet marine force.

Naturally, the Marines will play a part in helping make this, "America's Exposition—1935," a success. Marine airplanes will participate in the huge aerial review along with army and navy ships, planned as one of the most spectacular events of the Exposition. More than 1,000 planes are expected to take part.

Five million visitors are expected to attend the Exposition during the summer, although a recent survey of eleven western states revealed a potential attendance in excess of fifteen millions.

When the gates swing open, the world will be given an opportunity to view a series of magnificent exhibits representing a total investment of more than fifteen millions of dollars.

Approximately thirty foreign powers have signified their intentions of actively participating in the Exposition. Representatives of the various nations will be housed in the House of Pacific Relations, meeting there to carry out the general theme of the Exposition—the promotion of international peace and amity.

Art, science, commerce and industry will be welded into one great pageant, climaxing four centuries of advancement in the West. The Exposition palaces will be filled with displays in these lines.

The amusement zone will contain every known entertainment device, and shows of the oddities of the world will be staged along the huge midway.

One of the outstanding events of the entire program will be the United States Navy review in the harbor, with visiting foreign warships taking part.

All buildings on the Exposition grounds will follow

Indian Pueblo-Mayan, Spanish Renaissance and Spanish Colonial types of architecture, done in shades to harmonize with other structures with light cream-tan as the basic color. Simplicity of design on the Indian Pueblo structures will be stressed by tropical and semi-tropical plants and flowers set in concealed planting boxes that form the finish of the parapet wall on each structure. A slight overhang on the planting boxes will permit flowering vines and plants to drop free across the face of each building to create the effect of a hanging garden.

The Exposition is located in beautiful Balboa Park, that broad expanse of 1,400 acres in the heart of San Diego.

And so, planning one of the most colorful Expositions in the history of the world, San Diego looks forward to playing host to the peoples of all nations this summer, seeking to show the magnificent advancement of the West during the past four centuries, and to forecast the wonders that are to come in this new era of achievement and prosperity.

GENERAL MYERS RETIRES

(Continued from page 32)

severely wounded. During the World War you rendered important service as Fleet Marine Officer of the Atlantic Fleet, for which you were specially commended by the Secretary of the Navy.

4. Many other varied and responsible duties during nearly half a century of service have been characterized by a uniformly high degree of excellency and efficiency. The Department takes this occasion to express its appreciation of your long and valuable service, and to wish you many years of happiness in your well earned retirement.

5. The travel herein enjoined is necessary in the public service.

(Signed) CLAUDE A. SWANSON

1ST ENDORSEMENT

HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS,
WASHINGTON, 7 JANUARY, 1935

From: The Major General Commandant.
To: Major General John T. Myers, U.S.M.C.,
Commanding General, Department of the
Pacific, 100 Harrison Street, San Francisco, Calif.

Subject: Retirement.

1. Forwarded.

2. Your devotion to your corps and country has been outstanding, and both the Marine Corps and the Government are fortunate to have had the benefit of your services. In the performance of every assignment, including many duties of importance and responsibility, you have displayed qualities of excellent judgment, fine loyalty and great ability. I view your separation from the active list with a deep sense of loss and regret, which I am sure is shared by the entire personnel of the Corps. On their behalf, as well as my own, I extend sincere wishes for long life, excellent health and continued happiness.

(Signed) JOHN H. RUSSELL

ARMORED CARS FOR THE F. M. F.

(Continued from page 42)

demolitions or traps may be resorted to. A bend in the road may be utilized by watering it down or by soaking it with oil in order to ditch the cars. If possible barriers and obstacles should be placed beyond a stream or other natural barrier to prevent the cars from passing around it. The barrier should be concealed as well as possible so that it will be encountered without warning. It should be an infallible rule that whenever a barrier is established it be covered with effective anti-armored car weapons. In the defense against armored cars, as in their tactical employment, there can be no hard and fast rules governing but the maximum encouragement should be given to ingenuity.

MOTORIZED MARINES WITH THE F. M. F.

The preceding discussion of the characteristics and tactical usefulness of armored combat vehicles is only general, illustrating their more prominent features of utility with other combat units, though principally the augmentation of the fighting power of infantry, but should provide sufficient background for the following discussion of their particular usefulness to the Fleet Marine Force.

The most recent example we have in the employment of armored car units by a major power against an active hostile force is the movement of Japan in occupying that territory which is now Manchukuo. The celerity of the Japanese columns in moving to the occupation of this territory and their equally great rapidity in completing the campaign was perhaps a surprise to many of us. In any case it immediately presented the question of the means utilized to increase the speed of the columns advancing in the occupation. In general the means was the assignment of armored car units to precede the infantry columns. Infantry troops, accompanied by some light artillery, were entrained in motor trucks and assigned to follow the armored cars at reasonable supporting distance, to give the latter their maximum efficiency. This combined force either reduced all hostile resistance along its axis of advance or by its almost perfect reconnaissance furnished information, which when acted upon, changed the requirements for the uninterrupted advance of the main columns in rear, from the usual general deployment and maneuver, or even a pitched battle, to a mere demonstration of strength, requiring the deployment of only a small portion of the main force. The principle demonstrated here was the employment of the proper combination of modern military arms for the accomplishment of the particular mission to be performed. The combination in this case left little to be desired since the deficiencies peculiar to armored car units, when operating alone, were eliminated by the motorization of small infantry and artillery groups to support them, and conversely, the limitations of the infantry in fire power and reconnaissance were largely overcome by the presence of the armored cars and their operation in conjunction with it. This motorized advance guard was then presumably the secret of the rapid advance made by the Japanese columns in Manchuria. By giving mobility to the small infantry and artillery units equal to that of the armored cars employed, the Japanese commander formed a composite unit, the performance of which was certainly exemplary of the advantages to be obtained by the use of armored cars in conjunction with other troops. It is an example which merits our further consideration.

From the various examples already cited does it not appear that armored car units could be effectively converted to use with the Fleet Marine Forces of the Marine Corps? Their use in assisting in the establishment of a beach-head should prove highly valuable but their efficiency as an auxiliary arm, assisting the landing force, will be most valued by the force commander in the action which immediately follows a successful landing. For our purposes there is no other auxiliary arm which can perform such a thorough ground reconnaissance as the armored car platoon or company. In attempting to prove the last statement let us ask the question, what other unit can obtain the same definite information, under the various conditions of visibility, concerning the condition of the road net, the exact features of the terrain to be encountered, location of and distances between suitable defensive positions, condition of bridges, fords, etc., information of supplies which may be obtained, attitude of the inhabitants in the case of insurrection and other information requiring ground reconnaissance. The value of this auxiliary to assist in gaining a beach-head which is held by an inferior force is not to be overlooked, since the action of the armored car unit in preceding the landing force would act to materially reduce the number of casualties. In order to obtain more information concerning the adaptability of armored car units to the purposes of the Fleet Marine Force, they might be given trials with the Force on one of its annual maneuvers to Culebra Island or the Hawaiian Islands. The extent to which the adoption of armored car units is being made by our military service and that of other major powers, is the best indication obtainable of their worth as auxiliary arms. The number of occasions and the variety of situations arising in the Marine Corps, warranting the use of armored motor vehicles, is believed to be greater than in any other branch of our military service.

Armored combat vehicles could be used very effectively by the Fleet Marine Force to augment the holding force of the cities and towns required to be occupied along the axis of advance thereby reducing the number of men required for such garrisons and increase the number available for field combat duty. From our experiences of the last expedition in Nicaragua may be taken many examples of local garrisons, acting as holding forces, having been completely surrounded by Sandino's insurgents, superior in number and arms. In such situations the holding force is practically penned within their own fortifications. If the action of armored cars is available this situation is eliminated as the defending force will be able to maneuver about the city in these vehicles to outflank and put to rout the opposing force. This will also prove an effective means of night reconnaissance throughout the town and also prevent looting on the outskirts. The employment of even a section of armored cars would greatly reduce the probability of attack upon the small force holding the town and also act to allay the fear and terror which is invariably entertained by the inhabitants under such circumstances. During critical periods of time the crews of the armored cars could be required to mount regular watches within the vehicles and even cruise about the city in the service of security which, if nothing more, would add inestimable comfort to the people.

To suit the purposes of a landing force commander, armored cars could be readily mounted on railway flat-cars where available at the beach-head or port of de-

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THE EDIFICE OF LEADERSHIP

(Continued from page 30)

and even ridicules orders of his seniors. This is intense disloyalty. The writing of orders is a difficult art. A recipient of orders should appreciate this and be sympathetic and not obtuse in understanding them. At times orders *are* impossible. In such cases a quiet conversation with the adjutant will usually rectify matters. Such a procedure is loyal, intelligent, co-operation. Ridiculing orders in front of juniors does nothing for a subordinate commander but to have him "lose face." Remember the higher commander has more information on which to base his actions. Give him credit for knowing what he is doing. Without this loyalty an army becomes a disconnected group of mobs.

Now assume the unit commander has a clear idea of his mission and is loyal and devoted to its accomplishment. Exactly what should he now plan to do to be a successful leader. First, and this in connection with the carrying on of routine professional work, he should strive to instill in his men pride—pride in the whole command, in the squad, in their work, and in themselves. Pride involves loyalty and the officer who destroys it in a man does more harm than a disease. An appeal to a man's pride will keep many officers from court-martial duty. Most men have a lot of good in them. See that good and develop it. Be slow to give up. *The American Soldier cannot be ruled by the "mailed fist," and it is futile to try to indoctrinate him with a discipline which requires blind obedience to an over-bearing; unintelligible, force. It is in conflict with the American character.* Rather let him in on the play, let him know who is going to carry the ball, let him appreciate the reason for his job, and let him realize he's part of the team just like the fellow who goes over the line for the touchdown.

Here let us insert a further work of explanation lest some misunderstand. Good leadership abhors codling, vacillating, half way measures. Having consideration for men does not mean being easy, does not mean condoning mistakes with a "won't you please" do better attitude. Quite the contrary, in fact. Be hard if you choose—many times it is necessary—but temper your hardness with justice and intelligence. Give the incorrigible as much opportunity as the occasion permits, but if necessary strike hard.

Along with pride create professional enthusiasm. This is made possible by making work interesting, by keen, friendly, competition, and by having all hands working for the same goal.

The officer of a unit should occupy himself principally in supervision, in inspection, in making training plans, and in improving himself. When a unit begins to function smoothly very little effort on the part of a clever officer should be required to keep it that way. He should have ample time for plans for general betterment, for a personal interest in his men, and for individual work. Yet, it is amazing how hard some officers can toil and accomplish so little. Remember, corporals command squads. If a squad is wrong get after the corporal. Make him assume his responsibility. Know how to do his job better than he does himself, but don't do it for him. He may be on an isolated outpost someday where it is incumbent on him to act. If you have short-circuited him in the barracks don't be surprised if he sends you a message "what do" while you're being outflanked.

Be arduous in supervision, but slow in interfering. If things are going wrong instruct those concerned in pri-

vate. Stop in the mess hall and talk with the sergeant about warm food, clean equipment, and neat storerooms; if a squadroom is clean don't be afraid to say so. Conduct drill personally as the situation requires, but let others have a chance at it. Once in awhile call a man by name out of the rear rank and tell him to drill the company. Say you're looking for corporals. The man will be complimented, the others will be electrified with interest and perhaps the whole company a little amused, but if you commend the man on his first try he will not mind. The above method has produced splendid results.

Punishments. Strive to keep men out of trouble. A friendly talk to all hands on those things which get people into difficulties will save many. Tell them what it means to have a clear record. Speak to them of health, of what a terrible harm they do when they injure their bodies; tell them how to take care of themselves, how to drink, if they must drink. Put the issue squarely as a personal matter for each individual as well as a matter of importance to the command. A sincere interest of this sort will not be wasted.

When it is necessary to punish do not be reluctant to adjudge sentence, but let punishments be just and if possible instructive. Above all don't humiliate. Let no offender leave your office bitter and resentful—rather let him leave fully appreciating his mistake and with a desire not to repeat.

War was an art long before it was a science, and in spite of inventions and new methods of operations, the artistic side will always prevail. Let the officer who would command well be both a great artist and a great scientist; let him realize that the moral force prevails over all other considerations, and let him be full of wisdom, for his profession is old and honorable, and the tools of his trade are human lives.

SUPPORTING THE FLEET MARINE FORCE

(Continued from page 35)

the gathered troops were embarked they would be ready to go also as part of the second instalment of the Fleet Marine Force. The Fleet Reserve Units as now organized, but preferably as separate battalions, would be available to form part of the reserve for the Fleet Marine Force, being despatched when their mobilization and training was completed. The Volunteer Reserve, with its slower mobilization and training schedule, would fill its purpose as reinforcement to the whole Corps.

The creation of the Fleet Marine Force is probably one of the most forward looking steps that could have been taken; there is no question but that the true function of the Marine Corps is within the Navy itself, there have been officers and enlisted men who have long felt that the Corps was drifting too far from its true utility and becoming too rapidly an army of its own thereby neglecting a most glorious opportunity of service as the hard right fist of the Admiral of the Fleet.

The student of the Gallipoli campaign does not find it difficult to believe that when first undertaken that campaign would have been successful had the naval commander possessed the force necessary to land troops, force the beaches and gain the peninsula. Both General Liman von Sanders and General de Nogales have written of the very sketchy dispositions that circumstances forced upon the defenders and could the fleet have thrown an army of Marines ashore instead of being forced to conduct two very separate campaigns, one naval the other military, it seems probable that the object would have been attained and Churchill's vision vindicated.

Commodore Dewey cruising Manila Bay for months after his destruction of the Spanish squadron waiting for a landing force is an extreme example. Captain Ammen, writing upon the operations in the Civil War in which he was a participant, makes it very plain that when engaged upon in-shore operations the Naval commander must have personal command of an adequate land force; only when the co-operating military commander subscribed wholly to the plan and the soldiery were in effect Marines, were landing operations on a large scale effective. It is even possible that a vigorous naval campaign involving the landing of a large naval landing force in Belgium on the German flank might have been successful if carried out as a complete military operation instead of as a raid, for the performance of a Royal Marine Brigade in that area, although totally inadequate, was effective in some degree. A vast field and function lies before the Marine Corps which has in the past fallen to the military with the attendant evils of dual command.

It is especially essential, therefore, to have already provided the replacements and supports for the Fleet Marine Force, so that the force of the blow be not weakened nor the pressure lessened at a crucial moment as it was twice at Gallipoli. To this end the assignment of designated reserve officers who can become instantly available, with the essential Marine Corps background, who have manifested an ability to speedily become efficient, into a reserve group for the Fleet Marine Force and the preparation of the organized reserve units to serve as supporting troops to the same mission is most economical of time, effort and ability. The Volunteer Reserve composed of younger officers, specialists and untrained enlisted men would provide reinforcements of the Corps as a whole.

THE LANDING AND OCCUPATION OF SEAPORTS

(Continued from page 20)

Another, and in at least one respect, a most remarkable, landing took place at Port au Prince, Haiti, in July, 1915.

After a considerable period of unrest the revolutionary party had gained possession of the Haitien Capital, Port au Prince, and, on July 28 mobs entered the Dominican and French Legations and murdered President Guillaume Sam, who had taken refuge in the French Legation. There was no government authority functioning in Port au Prince. The French cruiser *Descartes* was rushed to the scene and was due at Port au Prince the night of July 28-29. The USS *Washington*, flagship of the Cruiser Squadron, having on board the 12th Company Marines in addition to her regular complement, had been in Haitien waters since January and was en route from Cap Haitien to Port au Prince. While en route preparations were made to put the Landing Force ashore upon arrival. The Landing Force was commanded by Captain George Van Orden, USMC., the Squadron Marine Officer. It was composed of Headquarters and Special Details; the 1st Battalion (Poteet) consisting of three seaman companies and the 2nd Battalion (Bishop) consisting of the 12th Company Marines (Wilcox) and the Marine Detachment, USS *Washington* (Wass). The USS *Washington* (Beach) was prepared to support the landing by gunfire from "two 10-inch, some 6-inch and at least five 3-inch guns."* Several armed launches under command of Lieutenant Rhodes, USN., covered

the left flank of the Landing Force and covered the waterfront of the town. The landing was effected on the beach just east of the Haitien Navy Yard at Bizoton. Due to the insufficiency of the ship's boats the advance to the city was delayed until 5:45 p.m. At that hour the column moved out with the Second Battalion as advance guard and the Special Details and First Battalion as main body. No opposition was encountered either at the landing place nor during the advance to the city. It was growing dark when the First Battalion reached Fort Lerrebours (See Plate M) at 6:40 p.m.

Upon reaching Fort Lerrebours near the Cemetery at the outskirts of the city, the advance guard deployed to the north with both companies in line, the 12th Company on the right. One section moved up each Street from the Rue du Magasin de E'tat to the Rue de la Reunion (both inclusive). The columns were deployed in double column of files, one on each side of the street close to the buildings. A certain amount of cover from the front was afforded the short columns by the stone "stoops" projecting from the front of each building.

The main body passed across the rear of the deployed 2d Battalion and turned north on Rue de L'egalite, sending one section forward as an advance guard and one squad up the street on its right (east) to cover that flank.

The First Battalion met with no opposition but there was considerable sniping along the whole front of the Second Battalion and its left company was compelled to return the fire. The Landing Force suffered no casualties. It was later reported that two Haitiens had been killed and ten wounded. As soon as the sniping commenced the Marines disarmed all natives encountered. No attempt was made to search private dwellings. The 12th Company found a considerable amount of ammunition and other war material in the arrondissement Bureau, disarmed the native guards and left two squads to guard the building and captured material.

The Second Battalion halted in accordance with previous orders when it reached the Rue des Casernes. The First Battalion was halted by the Landing Force Commander, who had accompanied it, when its head reached the Caserne. Captain Van Orden then proceeded with one squad to the French Legation where he established the squad as a guard and then joined the Second Battalion. The 12th Company was assembled and proceeded to the American Hotel furnishing guards for the legations in the vicinity and relieving the seaman guard at the French Legation. The Marine Detachment of the *Washington* and the First Battalion bivouacked for the night at the Valliere Market.

In studying this operation let us first consider the selection of the place of landing. Discarding the possibility of landing on the waterfront of the city as tactically unsound, there remain two possibilities,—at Bizoton and north of the city near Fort Dimanche. The land on the south shore of Port au Prince Bay rises abruptly from the water's edge, reaching an altitude of 1,000 feet in some places at a distance of about one and one third miles from the shore. These slopes are covered with the usual tropical vegetation affording cover to the defender and a location from which fire could be delivered on the beach and on the road which must be traversed in order to reach the city. But the *Washington* could deliver overhead supporting fire on this high ground during the landing and during the advance to the city without endangering our own troops or the civilian inhabitants of the city, and should have had no difficulty in rendering the hillside untenable. Moreover this fire could have been requested

*From a Memorandum addressed to Captain Beach, USN., and Captain Van Orden, USMC, directing them to make preparations for landing. I and much indebted to Colonel George Van Orden, USMC, ret., for many of the details of this landing. He placed his personal files at my disposal and supplemented them at a personal interview.

and controlled as needed by visual signal from the column. To the north of the city, however, the ground is low and, in the vicinity of the landing place, swampy. The road lies at some distance from the shoreline. These factors prevented the *Washington* from delivering an effective supporting fire during the advance to the city. Furthermore when a column reaches the city from the north it is flanked during the first part of its advance through the streets by the commanding ground upon which Fort National stands and must advance deployed over a wider front in order to cover all of the streets. Finally the northern portion of the city is the poorer quarter and the doctrine held applicable in Domestic Disturbances that a mob should be driven into or through those districts where looting is least profitable was equally applicable here.

Landing so late in the day is undesirable, but the situation permitted of no delay hence this difficulty had to be accepted. The delay at the beach due to insufficient numbers of boats being provided might have proved very costly had resistance developed in the city after dark. It

is not clear from the reports whether this lack of transportation was due to faulty planning in determining upon the size of the Landing Force or to breakdown of some of the boats.

Until the city was reached the usual advance guard formation sufficed. While the strength so employed,—about two-fifths of the whole force,—may appear excessive at first glance, it preserved tactical unity and gave the advance guard commander sufficient force to enable him to brush aside any resistance which might develop without waiting for any portion of the main body, a matter of considerable importance due to the lateness of the hour.

After reaching the city the formation adopted by the Second Battalion,—column of files on each side of each street,—afforded the maximum protection and mobility. It was noted that many of the shots directed at the columns struck the walls of the buildings on one side of the street ahead of the column and ricocheted in such a manner as to strike the wall on the opposite side of the street in rear of the tail of the column thus doing no harm. Had the col-



umns been stronger casualties might have occurred in the rear elements. By holding the bulk of his force (the 1st Battalion) intact under his immediate supervision on the exposed right flank while advancing up all remaining streets with the more fully trained (in land operations) Marine Battalion, the Force Commander provided security for his exposed right flank, preserved tactical unity and retained a strong reserve in hand. The provision of armed launches to cover the left flank is worthy of note although they do not appear to have taken an active part in the operation. No mention is made anywhere of machine guns.

The situation permitted the retention on board ship of supplies and equipment and this was done.

It is apparent that subordinate commanders failed to some extent in keeping the Commander of the Landing Force informed of the situation on their front, as it was not until he visited the Second Battalion after it had halted at Rue des Casernes that he learned that the *Washington* Detachment had been compelled to open fire to keep down sniping. This is a too common fault on the part of some junior officers. Engrossed in their immediate problems, and handling them in a perfectly satisfactory manner, they fail to realize that the higher commander must be advised of the situation *as it develops* in order that he may properly solve his own problems.

The action of the Landing Force Commander in personally leading one squad to the French Legation appears questionable. But the early establishment of an efficient guard there was, under existing circumstances, of prime importance; so far as he knew no opposition had been met with; and it gave him an opportunity to obtain first-hand information of the situation from the French Minister. As it turned out no harm was done and he there encountered "General" Robin, the commander of the Revolutionary Forces in the city, and persuaded him to assist our forces.

The subsequent operations illustrate some of the difficulties with which a commander may have to contend. The Revolutionary Committee was unwilling to permit our forces to use the Caserne as a barracks and for diplomatic reasons it was considered inadvisable to seize it by force. The Valliere Market being unsuitable for prolonged occupation, the Maison Central was occupied by the First Battalion, although the Landing Force Commander acceded to this disposition unwillingly. When the Second Marines, which were rushed from the United States, neared port the Caserne was seized, the Haitians locking the gates against our forces, but otherwise offering no resistance. The agreement of the native leaders that all natives should disarm was openly violated until those leaders were impressed with the fact that they would be held individually responsible for further violations. Numerous calls were made for protection and to meet those that were legitimate and also to conceal the extreme weakness of the force garrisoning the city, many shifts of the guards and detached posts were made, thus giving an air of much movement and activity on the part of the troops. Because of the conditions, the guard duty was exceedingly severe, some men having no opportunity to change their clothes for 72 hours at a stretch. It was again demonstrated that personnel, individually excellent, but untrained in special types of duty, are liable to "crack" if put under a severe nervous strain for any considerable period while on such type of duty.

The whole operation was carefully planned and skillfully executed. It is noteworthy that it was planned in February by the officer subsequently charged with its execution in July and that no substantial changes were made in the orig-

inal plan. It is probably unique in that officers taking part in the operation had, without exception, been ashore and had been conducted over the route his unit was to follow at least once between the making of the plan in February and its execution in July.

The foregoing historical examples illustrate some of the difficulties that have been encountered and the means taken to overcome those difficulties. The plans adopted were successful. Whether or not those same plans will work against opponents armed with modern weapons and incited by modern propaganda is something we may have to determine for ourselves at some future date. But mostly, it seems to me, one is struck with the apparent insufficiency of the force employed and the truth of the late Captain Jonas Platt's remark. "There was never enough of any thing."

PEEP SIGHT

(Continued from page 21)

The suggested battle sight adapter was fired by the writer with the same rifle as fired with the No. 10 and No. 6 Sights. At no time was the rifle sighted in, nor were sighting shots taken, except those required at 600 yards slow fire. All shots were record shots and the regulations were complied with. The following are the scores made:

Range	Battle Sight		No. 10 Sight		No. 6 Sight	
	Oct. 5	Oct. 8	Dec. 5	Dec. 6	Dec. 7	Dec. 7
200—S	43	41	46	45	44	48
300—S	45	42	44	41	46	45
500—S	47	46	49	46	45	45
600—S	45	47	47	45	43	43
200—R	49	50	50	50	49	50
300—R	40	48	47	46	48	49
500—R	42	45	33	42	44	44
TOTAL	311	319	316	315	319	324

The writers right eye tests about 13/20. It will be noted that the scores made with the larger sights at 600 yds. are greater than those made with the small sights. That the scores made with the small sights at 200 yards slow fire are greater than those made with the battle sight. Impaired vision requires larger sights. It follows then that poor visibility, fog, smoke, darkness, or an indistinct target under conditions of good visibility, would also require larger sights. If these scores can be made under Course "A" with the battle sight, it may be assumed that greater scores can be made in musketry with the battle sight adapter than with a No. 10 Peep Sight.

The District of Columbia Penal Institution Guards have just been equipped with a Remington semi-automatic shoulder rifle, cal. 32, and desired that we train them to shoot this rifle to get their man. This training has no slow fire nor a round bulls eye of any position but standing, and range beyond two hundred yards.

The record course is as follows: 100 yds., target E, pistol bobbars, 10 shots: 100 yds. 2 "E" targets 5 feet apart, moving in quick time, 5 shots in 20 seconds, penalty of five if one is not hit; 200 yards, target "D," 5 shots in 30 Seconds. A difficult course, but they have a difficult problem trying to shoot an escaping prisoner. To teach these guards to shoot prone, with sling, and with sights blackened would be of little value. In teaching the mechanics of fire they have a little slow fire to teach aim, trigger squeeze, etc.

We also have a difficult problem; have we the best course and is the peep sight the best answer?

MEMORIES OF FIVE YEARS

(Continued from page 13)

we looked over our targets it was clear that a little less elevation, and a trifle more windage to the left would have made material difference. Too many shots had gone over the shoulder of the prone figure as the patterns indicated.

We were hopelessly out of it but the men were game despite the heart-breaking handicap. The Navy, ultimate winner, had averaged 72.5 points in the run; Ohio, finishing third had averaged 75.5; our average was 57.75 points. The individual runs of the team ranged from 82 to 25. Standing 23 at the run's end we had moved up to 20th place at the end of the day with three stages completed. At the close of the match we stood in 14th place, a gain of nine places. The match was won by the Navy, with the top teams in the following order: Massachusetts, Ohio, Cavalry, Washington, Naval Academy. The Infantry finished just outside of leading six. In those days any team landing in that group had no apologies to make.

A comparison of the scores of the winning Navy team and those of the Marine Corps follows:

	Sk.	R.F.	Slow Fire				Total
			200	600	800	1000	
Navy	870	535	515	519	541	438	3421
Marines	639	514	509	502	538	418	3184

In 1906 the Navy's total was 3131 while our total was 3113. Despite our disastrous skirmish we had bettered our previous year's work. At the long ranges we had beaten half of the six leading teams. Undoubtedly our unexpected reverse at the first stage had shaken the morale of the men at first but from that time on we were burning up the range with the aces.

The 1,000-yard range was shot under great difficulties, requiring skill of the highest order. It began with good light and a light wind but towards the finish the mirage was so strong as to distort the bull through the sights and miss after miss was recorded. We did have the consolation that our final score would have gained us third place in the 1906 match.

The scores listed in this article may seem mediocre to the crack shots of today, but they were made with the old blunt bullet, and we were helping blaze the way with squads of a minimum size and under other handicaps that have happily disappeared.

In those days we had some characters in the Corps. Regimentation, prohibition and feminism have taken heavy toll of their ranks, though some even rose above the golden and silver leaves of the military forest, soared even above the wheeling eagles to the twinkling stars. We had our share on the teams of which I have written.

In 1906 when the use of micrometers came into practice it was my custom to enter the micrometer readings for each man as he came off a range, and then set it for the next higher one, entering the new readings in a book. One day at Sea Girt I set the sights of Corporal Joe Markey for the 800-yard range, adding as I thought the six-minute correction from the 600-yard range. Markey, a laughing, red-haired, blue-eyed Irishman promptly loosed both sighters and two record shots into the blue vault of sky. I had applied a sixteen-minute elevation by mistake. As Markey came off the firing line, his score at 600 completely shot, he came up to me and saluted. "Sir," he explained, "the Captain thought he moved me up six minutes. I think he made it six hours." Markey was an incorrigible optimist,

and he was kept on the squad as much for his cheering humor as his ability to hold a rifle steadily as a rock.

In 1905 a tall, lean, eagle-eyed North Carolinian, Private J. F. DeLoach, joined the squad. DeLoach was as natural a shot as ever snuggled a rifle-butt to shoulder. With the vision of a hawk, and the immobility of a Sphinx, he soon demonstrated his worth. Nerves were unknown to him. He invariably shot with his pipe at hand. One day, shooting with him, I picked up his pipe and took a draught. After one puff I could not have held the line of sights on an ocean liner at 200 yards. The following year his cousin, C. I. DeLoach, joined, almost as fine a shot as Joe.

Another well-known character was Sergeant Peter Lund. Lund was blue-eyed, blonde and with a keen dry wit and broken Swedish accents. There was Owen Mulligan also. Mulligan had his first taste of soldiering with the British army in India, and had a fund of stories. One eye began to show the toll of rifle firing and in 1905 Mulligan made his expert qualification with a final three at the 1000. I was pulling the target for him and as he got it off, with no change in conditions, I turned to ask him if his pull was good. Mulligan never heard me. From the time his finger squeezed the trigger to send his last bullet on his way, conscious that the pull was a bit shaky, he cursed that bullet fluently and thoroughly on its way in his rich Irish brogue. Fast as the bullet was, his tongue outraced it to the mark.

Rifle shooting in the old days left its mark on many of us. Today as we go up for the annual physical examination it shows in dulled ears and dimmed eyes. Four or five years of continuous firing, with the vicious crack of the rifle close to the ear, does not improve hearing. Nor does squinting through one eye glued to the 'scope, with the lens a bit out of focus to read the tale of the mirage, add to the power of the eyes. Whether the same is true today I do not know, but it would be a kind thing to compel team shots and coaches, whether they are on the big team or serving at a post, to drop out of the game after a maximum period of three or two years.

TWO INTERNATIONAL MATCHES

I had the good fortune to serve on two fine international rifle teams, the Palma Trophy Team in 1907 and the Olympic International Team in 1908 before I dropped out of the game to allow better men to lead on the Corps to greater results. At the close of the 1907 debacle Colonel Nathaniel B. Thurston of New York, then the Grand Old Man of the ranges, was selected by the National Rifle Association to captain the Palma team for the match in September at the Canadian Rockcliffe meet. He did a gracious thing by asking a badly beaten team captain to act as adjutant. Captain Mumma of the Infantry was chosen as quartermaster.

The Hudson-Thomas bullet with its startling improvement in accuracy, was first used in that match. It was an eight-man team with Great Britain, Australia and Canada as our competitors. The Australians, like the other two, had just come from the famous Bisley matches in England. In a tricky fishtail mirage running mainly about 7 o'clock with a six-mile wind the match began. Each man was to fire fifteen shots at 800, 900 and 1,000 yards. The last half of the match was shot in a clear light but with mirage thick enough to dull the targets. Out of a possible 600 at each range the United States team shot into the lead with 590 at 800, 573 at 900 and 549 at the thousand. The

team score of 1712 smashed records to tiny bits. The team average of 214 broke the former individual record of 213 when match rifles and special sights had been used. Seven of the eight shooters broke the former high-gun record at the distances with a service rifle made in 1903. Major Winder of Ohio and Sergeant George Bryant of New York tied with scores of 219 out of a possible 225. Four of the eight made possibles at 800 and Bryant hung up a 74 at 1,000. The last shot fired was as perfect a pinwheel at 1,000 as ever decorated a target. The team total of 1712 broke the former record of 1575 by 142 points.

Canada finished second with 1671, Australia third with 1653 and Great Britain, the favorite, fourth with 1580.

It was the seventh of the historic Palma matches. It was won by the United States in 1876, 1877, 1878, 1900 and 1903. Canada won it in 1901 and Great Britain in 1902.

Our victory was acknowledged with full sportsmanship by the other teams but the British reminded us grimly that the Olympic Match in 1908 would be fired on the Bisley range with its sharp fluctuations of wing-age, and not in a light fishtail mirage.

In 1908 I was adjutant and quartermaster and Captain Edward A. Greene, now retired, was an alternate. All other members, as had been the case in the Palma, were members of the New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Ohio State teams. Brig. Gen. James A. Draine, of Washington and President of the N. R. A., was team captain.

I have not the complete records of that match where our competitors were Great Britain, Australia, Canada and six continental teams. We won it with a total of 2531 points with a convincing margin between us and the British team. The match called for a six-man team with each man firing 25 shots at 200 and 600, and 15 shots at 800, 900 and 1,000 if my memory is correct. The British took a scant lead away from us at the 600 range and the teams moved over to the long ranges. Ravines traversing this range, with the consequent draws of wind, made it a stern test. At times one shot would call for two points left and the following shot three points right. At 800 the expert coaching of Captain K. K. V. Casey and Major Winder pulled us out in front and at each range we increased the lead.

Two teams were assigned each target and we drew the French. The rivalry between the continental teams was as intense as that of the four Anglo-Saxon outfits. None of them had any but scant experience firing beyond 300 meters. The French were a likable lot and we took them under our wing. With Casey and Winder's superlative coaching the French followed our wind dope like a hawk. At 800 the ace of the French team, Violet, scored a possible and there was Gallic pandemonium. Each of his team mates kissed him fervently and, released from their accolades, Violet dashed about kissing us indiscriminately. The French won hands down from their European rivals.

We had an attractive English subaltern attached to our team and as we began to draw away from the British at 800 we sent him along the line for news of our rivals. Each time as he delivered the figures he began his message with, "Fine, old top, we're licking the breeches off them all!"

Another British subaltern attached himself to him the last day, and that night, resting from our laurels, they came to us with a truly Kiplingesque touch. Number Two subaltern was named Pickens, and he gloried in the fame that he was the smallest officer in

His British Majesty's service. In my hut he drew himself up to his full height of five feet, less an inch or so, and made his request. Before the headquarters offices was a circle of tall white flagpoles, each carrying the flag of one nation in those represented. In the center towered above them all the British flag.

"I say, old man," he began, "we'd like to borrow your Yankee flag for a day or two. We'll bring it back as good as new."

Naturally I inquired what the great idea was.

"We're having a review at Salisbury tomorrow, and we want to carry your blooming flag past in review."

We put a guard on the flag that night.

The Olympic team passed into history two weeks later when the final awards in the Olympic games were made in the great stadium at Shepherds Bush on the outskirts of London. At the head of the American contingent, all in their various uniforms, marched a giant hammer-thrower from California with the American flag. One by one each squad filed up to receive from the hands of King George his coveted medal. I have no doubt that somewhere in the stadium two British subalterns, one the smallest in His Majesty's Service, were rooting like demons for us.

ARMORED CARS FOR THE F. M. F.

(Continued from page 52)

barkation, and used to precede a troop train, or under their own power proceed along the railway road-bed to reconnoiter in advance of the train. In this manner the heavy type of armored cars would also serve the purpose of an armored train.

The objection has been raised that, "They are too heavy and cumbersome to load aboard ship," however, a glance at their classification and weights, as already given, will suffice to show that they can be carried as well as any of the accompanying trucks. Objection because of the additional demand which they make upon the personnel of the Marine Corps, which is still reduced below strength, is only slight when considered in the light of the advantages to be gained in increased fire power, shock action, and reconnaissance through the employment of only 52 men and of 5 officers per armored car company. Also this number of men required per company can be readily reduced by transferring the responsibility of maintenance and repair of the unit to the service company. However, this is not considered conducive to efficient performance.

The expeditionary force commander who has at his disposal an armored car unit for tactical employment with his main force possesses the most powerful modern auxiliary for insuring the elements of surprise and shock action so necessary to early success in combat.

The development of effective armored car units has been seriously undertaken by most major military powers rather recently. Therefore an ideal opportunity is presented for those most interested to begin almost from the beginning, and progress with its study, abreast of future developments. The best method of obtaining direct information on the subject would be through official assignment to one of the armored car units stationed at Fort Bliss or Fort Riley, for the purpose of observation and instruction.

Recent developments, such as the production of the new six wheeled armored cars and those equipped with tractor treads, open up a broader prospect of utility, and these cross country combat machines appear likely to become the future outflung tentacles or feelers of the modern fighting force.

"MARK" 44*(Continued from page 10)*

National matches. The Marines won 44 out of the 71 rifle matches and six out of the 16 pistol matches entered, including all four of the National events, together with 14 places in the National Individual Match. Members of the Marine squad broke seven world's records, as follows: Sergeant Thomas J. Jones, 132 consecutive bull's-eyes at 300 yards and 66 at 1,100 yards; Marine Gunner C. A. Lloyd, 101 consecutive bull's-eyes at 600 yards; First Sergeant T. B. Crowley, 176 consecutive bull's-eyes at 800 yards; First Sergeant J. W. Adkins, 80 consecutive bull's-eyes at 900 yards and 75 at 1,000 yards; Sergeant Edwin F. Holzhauer, 41 consecutive bull's-eyes at 1,200 yards. Six officers were on the team squad this year: Captains William W. Ashurst and Joseph Jackson, First Lieutenant Merritt A. Edson, Marine Gunners Calvin A. Lloyd, Otho Wiggs and J. J. Andrews.

Three Marines were selected as members of the American International team to compete at Lyons, France.

Lieutenant Colonel W. C. Harllee and Major L. W. T. Waller, Jr., were members of the National Board. Lieutenant Colonel D. C. McDougal and Major L. W. T. Waller were additional members of the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

In 1922 the Lauchheimer Trophy was presented to the Marine Corps for the most excellent combined rifle and pistol shot. This Trophy carries with it three medals: gold, silver and bronze, and is the most esteemed medal issued by the Corps for shooting. An-

other change this year was the issuance of an order that every man would fire the pistol course at least once an enlistment.


A National team was organized at Wakefield, Mass., with Major Ralph S. Keyser as team captain and Captain A. B. Hale as team coach. This team competed in the New England matches, winning seven out of eleven rifle and one of the two pistol matches entered. The team then proceeded to Camp Perry, Ohio, where they won both the National rifle and pistol team matches and took twenty places in the National Individual.

Three marines were selected this year as members of the International team, which fired and won the match at Milan, Italy. Major L. W. T. Waller, Jr., U.S.M.C., was team captain of the United States team.

Again the National Match course was radically changed, being fired at 200, 300 and 500 rapid fire and 200, 300, 500 and 600 yards slow fire.

In 1923 the team squad was organized under Major M. B. Humphrey as team captain and Captain William W. Ashurst as team coach. The National Match was held at Camp Perry, Ohio, and was won by the Marine Corps. The Marines also won 23 places in the National Individual. Many places were won in other lesser matches. Three officers were shooting members of this team: Captain Joseph Jackson, First Lieutenant Raymond T. Presnell and Second Lieutenant Pierson E. Conradt.

The National Match was fired over a course comprising 200 and 300 yards rapid fire and 200, 600 and 1,000 yards slow fire, the "A" target being used for both 200 and 300 yards rapid fire.



HOW MANY CAN YOU PICK OUT?

Major L. W. T. Waller was Assistant Executive Officer on the National Board and captain of the American Free Rifle team. Major Waller was on the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

The 1924 team squad was organized with Captain William W. Ashurst as team captain and Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach. A part of the team squad entered in the New York State matches, winning seven out of the eight events. The team placed second in the National Match which was held at Camp Perry, Ohio. Only four places were taken by Marines in the National Individual. One officer, Captain Jacob Lienhard, was a shooting member of this team.

Majors Harold F. Wirgman and L. W. T. Waller were Assistant Executive Officers of the National Matches. Major Waller was on the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

The 1924 American International Team match was fired over a 300 meter course. Three countries competed and placed in the following order: United States, Switzerland and France. Two Marines, Sergeants Morris Fisher and Raymond Coulter were members of this team. Sergeant Fisher won the world's individual rifle championship in this match, together with the world's kneeling championship.

Major Waller captained the Olympic Rifle Team. Sergeant Morris Fisher was a shooting member of this team. The match was fired in France and won by the United States. Haiti and France placed second and third, respectively. Of interest to the Marine Corps is the fact that the native Haitian Team was organized and trained by two marine officers prominent in the shooting game of the Corps. Brigadier General D. C. McDougal, then Commandant of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, was team captain and Lieutenant Colonel Harry L. Smith, then Major, Gendarmerie d'Haiti, was team coach.

In 1925 a National team was organized with Major Harry L. Smith as team captain and Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach. This team entered and won the National Match at Camp Perry, Ohio. Several other matches were won, together with five places in the National Individual. Three officers were shooting members of this team: Captains William W. Ashurst, Jacob Lienhard and Second Lieutenant Pierson E. Conradt. The team squad trained at Wakefield, Mass., and entered the New England matches prior to going to Camp Perry.

Two Marines were on this year's International team, which fired in Peru.

The National Match course was changed this year by substituting 400 yards rapid fire for 300 yards rapid fire. However, the 400 was not deemed of value and was removed from the course at the end of the season.

In 1926 there were no National Matches. However, a team squad was organized with Major Randolph Coyle as team captain, Captain Allen H. Turnage as Executive Officer and Captains Joseph Jackson, Eugene Mullaly and Jacob Lienhard as coaches. This squad competed in the Sesquicentennial matches at Sea Girt, N. J. The Marine team won the team match fired over the National Match course and made many wins in the other matches held.

Lieutenant Colonel D. C. McDougal was Executive Officer of the matches. Majors C. B. Vogel, H. L. Smith and L. W. T. Waller were Assistant Executive Officers.

This team squad, competing in the New England matches at Wakefield, Mass., won 22 out of 23, and in the Sesquicentennial matches at Sea Girt, 28 out of 34.

The Old Dominion matches were held at Fort Eustis, Va., Marines winning twelve individual and team matches. Also, Parris Island entered a team in the Southeastern Tournament held by the 8th Infantry at Fort Screven, Ga., winning 15 of the 21 matches entered. During these matches, Gunnery Sergeant Betke, U.S.M.C., established a world's record over the Army qualification course with the .45 caliber automatic pistol.


This was the first year the Wirgman Trophy was presented as a subsidiary prize in the Elliott Trophy match. This trophy was donated by Lieutenant Colonel Wirgman, U.S.M.C.

The 1927 National team was organized with Major M. B. Humphrey as team captain and Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach. This team placed second in the National Match held at Camp Perry, Ohio. There were two officer shooting members of the team: Second Lieutenants Richard M. Cutts, Jr., and Allen T. Hunt. Twenty-seven places were won by members of the squad in the National Individual and during the season the squad entered 96 rifle and pistol matches, of which they won 81 and captured 49 trophies.

Three Marines placed on the International Team, of which Major Harry L. Smith was captain, which fired at Rome, Italy.



YOU GUESS



MARINE CORPS RIFLE TEAM NO. 1, CAMP PERRY, OHIO, 1918.
HOW'S YOUR MEMORY?

The National Match course was changed from the previous year, in that the 400 yards rapid fire was eliminated and the 300 yard rapid fire range reinstated.

Colonel D. C. McDougal and Major Ralph S. Keyser were members of the National Board. Majors Keyser and Waller were also additional members of the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

The 1928 team squad was organized with Major Julian C. Smith as team captain and Captain William W. Ashurst as team coach. This team fired and won the National Match at Camp Perry, Ohio. Members of the team squad won 22 places in the National In-

dividual. The only officer member of this team was First Lieutenant Richard M. Cutts, Jr.

Two Marines fired on the International Team, of which Colonel D. C. McDougal was captain, competing in the International matches in Rotterdam, Holland.

Colonel D. C. McDougal and Major W. H. Rupertus were members of the National Board and Majors Rupertus and Waller, additional members of the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

There was no change in the National Match course this year. However, there was a change in the Ma-



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rine Corps training schedule, in that .22 caliber preliminary training was introduced at Parris Island. This preliminary training tended to make much improvement in qualification scores over previous years and has now been adopted as standard throughout the Marine Corps. This was the first year the Marine Corps adopted the short pistol course.

The 1929 team was again organized with Major Julian C. Smith as team captain and Chief Marine Gunner C. A. Lloyd as team coach. They competed in the National Match at Camp Perry, Ohio, taking third place. There were two officer shooting members of this team squad: Captain Jacob Lienhard and First Lieutenant Richard M. Cutts, Jr. Although they did not win the National Individual Match, the Marines took twenty-four places.

The International Match was fired in Stockholm, Sweden. Major Ralph S. Keyser, U.S.M.C., was team captain of the United States team and Chief Marine Gunner Calvin A. Lloyd was team coach. Five Marines were shooting members of this team: Gunnery Sergeants John Blakely, Russell F. Seitzinger, Morris Fisher, Paul E. Woods and Joseph E. Hankins.

Colonel D. C. McDougal and Major W. H. Rupertus were on the National Board and Majors Rupertus and Waller were on the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

The 1930 team was organized with Major Harry L. Smith as team captain and Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach. They fired and won the National Match at Camp Perry, Ohio. First Lieutenant Raymond T. Presnell was the only officer shooting member of this team. Eighteen places were won in the National Individual by members of the Marine squad.

Major S. M. Harrington was on the National Board and, together with Major Waller, members on the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

In 1931 Major Harry L. Smith was again captain of the team squad, with Captain Joseph Jackson as team coach. They won the National Match at Camp Perry, Ohio, that year and took eleven places in the National Individual. There were two officer shooting members of this team, First Lieutenant Pierson E. Conradt and Second Lieutenant August Larson.

Major S. M. Harrington was a member of the National Board and, with Major Waller, additional members of the National Rifle Association Executive Committee.

This is the last year in which the National Matches have been held due to various legislative and economy measures; however, the Marine Corps has continued its interest in the shooting game and held the annual Divisional and Marine Corps matches.

The National Rifle Association has been very active in keeping the shooting interest throughout the country by holding Regional matches each year since 1931. These matches were held over the same course as when all assembled at Camp Perry so that the shooters are kept in yearly trim. It is the hope of those vitally interested in the shooting game that the National Matches will be again in vogue shortly.

It has been found extremely necessary for commissioned personnel to take an active interest in some manner in the shooting game in order to increase the efficiency of the Corps in general in this training. It is hoped that in the future more young officers will be attracted to this phase of our military training than in the past.

In looking back there are a few items of interest relative to the courses fired in the National matches, as for instance as late as 1919 the competitor in this firing was allowed to kneel, sit or squat from standing in some of the rapid fire matches. The squatting position disappeared from the course in 1921. In 1922 the National Match Course was the same as the Army qualification course. This course was fired in our Divisional and Marine Corps matches until 1930, when the match course as outlined in 1927 was adopted. The changes made in the National Match Course from year to year were more or less in the way of experiments by the board to determine the course which would give the most efficient training for all arms of the service. The course now in use is believed to be the most satisfactory of any of those previously fired in developing the more efficient shooters.

In 1925 the 400 yard rapid fire which was substituted for 300 yards rapid fire was on a target consisting of a 20-inch bull's-eye with a 10-inch center ring, both the 4 and 5 rings being in the black. This was found to be a very difficult target for a man to make a consistently good score on and its value to marksmanship was nil. It was only used that one year.

The information as set forth in the above article is gleaned from various sources, both written and verbal, and no doubt some errors have crept in. In compiling this information it was found that records in various departments in some cases were rather vague, especially in the beginning of team competitions. Many happenings of the various teams mentioned are not of record and enlightened information from any previous members of those team squads would be greatly welcome as an addition to the present archives.

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(Mention This Ad)

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
Washington, D. C.

16 January, 1935.

From: The Major General Commandant.
To: The Commanding Officer, 4th Marines,
Shanghai, China.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: Service bands for the staff of the regimental
colors, 4th Marines.

1. Following the practice prescribed for the 5th and 6th Marines, the following silver and bronze service bands, indicating service of the 4th Marines, are authorized for installation on the staff of the regimental colors:

"Dominican Republic
June 21, 1916, to December 4, 1916" (Silver)

"Dominican Republic
December 5, 1916, to July 1, 1924" (Bronze)

2. It is not contemplated authorizing a band for service in China until the duty there has been completed.

3. The bronze band has been designated to indicate service not of a combat nature.

4. In accordance with the above, the Quartermaster, U. S. Marine Corps, has been directed to have the required bands manufactured and furnished your organization. Upon receipt please have the bands installed in accordance with instructions to be furnished by the Quartermaster.

JOHN H. RUSSELL

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
Washington, D. C.

16 January, 1935.

From: The Major General Commandant.
To: The Commanding General, Fleet Marine
Force, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.
Subject: Service bands for the staffs of the regimental
colors, 5th and 6th Marines.
Reference: (a) Letter, CO, 5th Marines to CG, FMF,
No. 57-LPH-wp, dated 14 November,
1934, and endorsements thereon.

1. In connection with the request contained in reference (a), the following additional service bands are authorized for the staffs of regimental colors of the 5th and 6th Marines as follows:

5th Marines

"Occupation of the Rhine
December 13, 1918, to July 19, 1919" (Bronze)

"Second Nicaraguan Campaign
January 11, 1927, to May 11, 1931" (Silver)

"Second Nicaraguan Campaign
May 12, 1931, to January 2, 1933" (Bronze)

6th Marines

"Occupation of the Rhine
December 13, 1918, to July 19, 1919" (Bronze)

"China
May 2, 1927, to January 19, 1928" (Bronze)

2. The bronze bands have been designated to indicate service not of a combat nature.

3. In accordance with the above, the Quartermaster has been directed to have the required bands manufactured and furnished the organizations concerned. Upon receipt, it is requested that the regimental commanders be directed to deliver the regimental colors to the organization quartermasters for the purpose of properly installing the bands.

JOHN H. RUSSELL

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
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
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